Re-engineering the Semiconductor Supply Chain

"Hi listeners, welcome back to No Priors. Today Elad and I are here with Lip Bu Tan — the legendary investor from Walden, then CEO of Cadence, now CEO of Intel."

"听众朋友们好,欢迎回到 No Priors。今天我和 Elad 请到了 Lip Bu Tan(陈立武)——他是来自 Walden 的传奇投资人,后来做了 Cadence 的 CEO,现在是英特尔的 CEO。"

"We talk about his plan to transform Intel, having the US government as a major shareholder, how to be an amazing semiconductors investor, and whether or not we can make chips in the United States."

"我们聊了他改造英特尔的计划、美国政府成为大股东这件事、怎样成为一名出色的半导体投资人,以及我们到底能不能在美国本土造芯片。"

"Welcome, Lipu. Lipu, it's great to see you. We'll start with the obvious question."

"欢迎你,立武。立武,见到你真高兴。我们先从最显而易见的问题问起。"

"This is a really hard job — to go be CEO of this incredibly important American semis company. Why take the job at all?"

"这是一份非常难的工作——去当这家无比重要的美国半导体公司的 CEO。你究竟为什么要接?"

"It's a good question. I'm 66, and people [say], well, you should retire rather than take on this hottest job in the industry."

"这是个好问题。我都 66 了,大家都说:你该退休了,而不是去接这个全行业最烫手的活。"

"So a couple [of] reason[s]. One is, um, this is [an] iconic company, and it's so important for the semiconductor ecosystem, and also so important for [the] United States."

"原因有几个。一是,呃,这是一家标志性的公司,它对整个半导体生态太重要了,对美国也太重要了。"

"And so I decided, you know, [to] do one more after Cadence."

"所以我就决定,你知道,在 Cadence 之后,再干一票。"

"A lot has happened in this past year. What has been the most surprising to you?"

"过去这一年发生了很多事。对你来说,最意外的是什么?"

"Well, the most surprising thing — that I don't learn from my previous job, or even training — is one day, early morning, President Trump asking me to resign."

"嗯,最意外的一件事——这是我过去的工作、甚至所有训练里都没学到过的——是有一天清早,特朗普总统要我辞职。"

"[For] conflict of interest, and there's no exceptions."

"理由是利益冲突,而且没有例外。"

"And so I had to convince myself, first of all — you know, I don't need this job. I do it purely to save Intel."

"所以我得先说服我自己——你知道,这份工作我并不需要,我做它纯粹是为了救英特尔。"

"And so [I] take that personal issue out of the way. Then I figure out what can I do to be helpful to Intel."

"于是先把'我个人需不需要'这个问题拿掉。然后我才想清楚:我能为英特尔做点什么。"

"And so [the] good news is, I have a meeting, you know, Thursday morning, and then Monday I have the meeting — and then he listen to me, like I [had] a chance to explain myself."

"好消息是,你知道,我周四早上有个会,然后周一又见了一次——他听进去了,就像我有机会把自己当面讲清楚。"

"[I was] born in Malaysia, grew up in Singapore, went to MIT, and I live in [the] US — never live outside [the] country."

"我在马来西亚出生、在新加坡长大、读的是 MIT,后来一直住在美国——从没在美国以外生活过。"

"And so [that's] something that I share. And then somehow he listened very well, and then, uh, he gave me the chance. And so I'm delighted."

"这些都是我跟他讲的。不知怎么,他听得很认真,然后,呃,给了我这个机会。所以我很高兴。"

"And now you have the chance to do the work. When you said, you know, the job is to save Intel — it's a really important company — what does that look like to you? What does Intel winning or thriving look like?"

"现在你有机会真正动手了。你说这份工作是'拯救英特尔'——它是家非常重要的公司——在你眼里那是什么样子?英特尔赢、或者活得好,长什么样?"

"Yeah, I just passed 14 months. A lot of thing[s] happened in this 14 months. So a couple of thing[s]."

"嗯,我刚满 14 个月。这 14 个月里发生了很多事。有这么几件。"

"One is to change the culture, and then, uh, clearly [I] want to drive more accountability, and also in terms of decision-making, [it] had to be faster."

"第一是改变文化,然后,呃,我明确想推动更强的问责制;另外在决策上,也必须更快。"

"You know, I'm so used to startup culture, and you move fast in the speed of light — and [here you're] going to have that bureaucracy, layer of layer of meeting."

"你知道,我太习惯创业公司的文化了,你动得飞快、快到像光速——可这里全是官僚,一层又一层的会。"

"So something that I change [is] the accountability — listen to the customer, and the customer delighted, you know, [with] someone like Lip Bu [being] so humble, willing to listen, and then address some of the problem[s] that they face, and try to delight the customer."

"所以我改的一点就是问责制——倾听客户;客户也很满意,你知道,看到像我这样的人这么谦卑、愿意听,还去解决他们面对的一些问题,努力让客户满意。"

"And also the other part, from day one, I decided all the engineering report to me. [Being] an engineer by training, I want to know what went wrong and what are the things that I need to correct."

"还有一块,从第一天起,我就决定所有工程团队直接向我汇报。我是工程师出身,我想知道到底哪里出了问题、哪些是我必须纠正的。"

"Listen to the customer, and delight the customer, and then make sure that we have the right product. Simplify our product line, and really have the roadmap and the vision for the next five, ten years."

"倾听客户、取悦客户,然后确保我们做的是对的产品。精简产品线,真正把未来五年、十年的路线图和愿景立起来。"

"What is your vision of where Intel should be in 10 years?"

"你心目中,十年后的英特尔应该在什么位置?"

"Yeah, I think [a] couple of things. One, I always believe — when I was at Cadence and also at Intel — is first of all you crawl, and then be humble, listen to customer."

"嗯,我觉得有几点。第一,我一直相信——无论在 Cadence 还是在英特尔——首先你得'爬',然后保持谦卑,倾听客户。"

"And then secondly, deciding to walk. And then finally, deciding to run in [a] sprint."

"第二步,再决定'走'。最后,才决定全力'奔跑'。"

"So that's kind of my culture, of step by step doing it."

"这就是我的做法——一步一步来。"

"And then first [the] sheets — and, uh, the balance sheet is really horrible in some way."

"然后先说报表——呃,某种程度上,资产负债表真的很糟糕。"

"So I'm delighted, you know, [the] US government become a big shareholder. Just I explained to President Trump: TSMC, when they started, they have the Taiwan government as a shareholder."

"所以我很高兴,你知道,美国政府成了大股东。我就是这么跟特朗普总统解释的:台积电当年起步时,台湾当局就是它的股东。"

"If you look at Japan, you look at Singapore — this is the infrastructure [the] US government get[s] to provide the support [for]."

"你看日本、你看新加坡——这是基础设施,美国政府本就该出手支持。"

"Secondly, very happy that Jensen Huang, my old-time friend, uh, he also put five billion, uh, in investing and support me. And I'm glad I at least do some good work."

"第二,我很高兴老朋友黄仁勋(Jensen Huang),呃,也投了 50 亿,既是投资也是支持我。我也算欣慰,至少干出了点成绩。"

"His five billion become 25 billion now, and, uh, or more."

"他那 50 亿现在变成 250 亿了,呃,甚至更多。"

"And then the other part is SoftBank, Masa. I used to be at [the] SoftBank board, and then he lend a hand to help me."

"另一边是软银的孙正义(Masa)。我以前是软银董事会成员,他也搭了把手帮我。"

"So we strengthen the balance sheet, and then, uh, focus on the products, and [listen to] the customer, and then drive the next [generation]."

"于是我们把资产负债表夯实,然后,呃,聚焦产品、倾听客户,再推进下一代。"

"In some way it's very lucky, uh, right now the agentic AI and inference CPU become, you know, highly in demand."

"某种程度上很幸运,呃,眼下 agentic AI 和推理用的 CPU,你知道,需求都非常旺。"

"And so, you know, versus one to eight in the training CPU to GPU, now I can see one to four, maybe one to [less]."

"所以,你知道,训练阶段 CPU 比 GPU 是 1 比 8;现在我看到的是 1 比 4,甚至更接近。"

"And I'm delighted [the] CPU become important. I talked to some of the AI model and developer[s]. They said about, in term[s] of, uh, reinforced learning — in term[s] of the speed of orchestrating all the agents — and to run, uh, the CPU is actually better."

"CPU 重新变重要,我很高兴。我跟一些做 AI 模型的人和开发者聊过。他们说,在,呃,强化学习上——在编排一大堆 agent 的速度上——要跑起来,呃,其实 CPU 更合适。"

"And so in some way I'm happy right now the demand is very high for my CPU. So I think overall, build on the product on the data center server side."

"所以从某种意义上,我很高兴现在我的 CPU 需求非常高。所以总体上,先在数据中心服务器这块把产品做扎实。"

"Then the other part is our foundry business. And initially, this is a capital-intensive business, and it's not easy."

"另一块就是我们的代工(foundry)业务。这一开始就是个资本密集、不好做的生意。"

"And you really need to have a couple of thing[s] — you need to have all the right IP so that you can support the customer. Like, for example, if it is mobile-related, you got to have low-power, uh, IP set that you need to have; without that you cannot serve them."

"你确实需要几样东西——必须备齐所有该有的 IP,才能服务客户。比如,如果是移动相关的,你就得有低功耗的,呃,IP 库;没有这些,你根本没法服务他们。"

"It's a service business, it's a trust business. If people want to give you, you know, orders to have wafer[s], [and] if the yield not good, they will be toast in term[s] of revenue miss."

"这是服务生意,更是信任生意。客户愿意把,你知道,晶圆订单交给你,可一旦良率不行,他们就会因为营收不达标而完蛋。"

"So with that, I think it's very important to really focus on the yield, the defect density, the cycle time, and then make sure that you really [are] able to meet and serve the customer in high quality and reliable[ly]."

"所以,我认为关键是真正死磕良率、缺陷密度、周期时间,然后确保你真的能高质量、可靠地满足并服务客户。"

"And so those are the thing[s] that I really focus on. And eventually you have to really move into a full stack. So not just a silicon — you need to have software."

"这些就是我真正在抓的。而且最终你必须走向全栈。所以不只是硅片——你还得有软件。"

"And some of the customer asked me, 'Give me the whole rack.' So there's a system that you have to build."

"有些客户直接跟我说:'把整个机柜(rack)都给我。'所以你得搭建一整套系统。"

"And so I think those are the thing[s] that I quietly building, uh, step by step, and recruit some of the best talent I can find."

"所以我觉得这些就是我在,呃,一步一步悄悄搭建的东西,并招募我能找到的最顶尖的人才。"

"By the way, all the recruitment I do it myself — no search firm helping. And so I think sometime[s] it's good to have a Rolodex, that you know who to reach out [to], call for."

"顺便说,所有招聘都是我亲自来——不靠猎头。所以我觉得有时候手里有一本通讯录(Rolodex)挺好,你知道该去找谁、该给谁打电话。"

"I mean, you've been in the business for so long, and you've run Cadence for, I think, 12 years before this —"

"我是说,你在这一行待了这么久,而且在这之前执掌 Cadence 大概有 12 年——"

"13 years, I'm sorry. Yeah. And then two more years as executive chairman. So 15 years — I signed up for three months."

"是 13 年,不好意思。对。之后又当了两年执行董事长。所以总共 15 年——可我当初只答应干三个月。"

"Three months. So right now I'd be very careful — the moment you said just do it for three months, it turned out to be 15 years."

"三个月。所以现在我会非常小心——你一旦说'就干三个月',结果可能就是 15 年。"

"Well, it seems like you have a lot of longevity ahead of you here as well. And so, um, the other big initiative that has been sort of talked about is TerraFab, and working with Elon Musk on that."

"嗯,看起来你在这儿往后也还有很长的'任期'。那么,呃,另一个被反复提到的大动作是 TerraFab,以及你和马斯克(Elon Musk)在这上面的合作。"

"Can you tell us a bit more about how that came together, and your involvement, and how you all are collaborating?"

"能多讲讲它是怎么促成的、你参与到什么程度、你们是怎么协作的吗?"

"Yeah, good. I mean, Elon Musk — I think we all agree — is one of the best, if not the best, uh, entrepreneur in this century."

"好的。我是说,马斯克——我想大家都同意——是这个世纪最优秀的,呃,创业者之一,甚至可能就是最优秀的那个。"

"He and I, we share the same view that the semiconductor infrastructure actually is not catch[ing] up with the AI growth."

"他和我有同一个判断:半导体的基础设施,其实没跟上 AI 的增长。"

"And, uh, in term[s] of, you need the capacity, you need to have the productivity, and you have the, uh, efficiency — and so those are the thing[s] that he and I, we share that there's something missing."

"而且,呃,你需要产能、需要生产效率、还要有,呃,能效——这些正是他和我都觉得'缺了点什么'的地方。"

"And then secondly, [I'm] just delighted to work with him. And, uh, he is very — I call it — unconventional."

"其次,跟他共事让我很愉快。而且,呃,他非常——我称之为——不走寻常路。"

"And he basically question[s] every step, and then [asks] why this traditional way of doing things. And in some way it's very refreshing, and I like that."

"他基本上对每一步都要质疑,然后问:为什么非得用这套传统做法。某种程度上这很让人耳目一新,我喜欢。"

"You know, I like people [who] have [a] different opinion, and let's work together, find what is the best route. And we both going to learn a lot together."

"你知道,我喜欢有不同意见的人——咱们一起干,找出最优的那条路。我们俩也会在一起学到很多。"

"And then I think clearly he have a vision that his robots and his car, you know, he need a lot of silicon."

"而且我觉得他显然有他的愿景——他的机器人、他的车,你知道,都需要大量芯片。"

"Yeah, could you actually explain what TerraFab is, for people who aren't familiar with it?"

"对,能不能给不熟悉的人解释一下 TerraFab 到底是什么?"

"TerraFab — he decided he want to build his own fab."

"TerraFab——就是他决定要建自己的晶圆厂。"

"And then meanwhile, we are delighted to work with him, and then make sure that we can work together and enable him to be faster and quicker to the production, [using] some of our technology and some of our process."

"与此同时,我们很乐意跟他合作,确保我们能一起干,用我们的一些技术和工艺,帮他更快、更早地把产线跑起来。"

"And that's something that we both kind of collaborate together. And he's a very good team that I work with weekly, and it just [feels] refreshing to work with him."

"这是我们俩共同协作的东西。他那个团队很好,我每周都跟他们打交道,和他共事真的让人很提神。"

"And he's talked about things like he wants you to be able to smoke inside the clean room — and all these things that normally are verboten."

"他还提过一些事,比如想让你能在洁净室里抽烟——这些通常都是绝对禁止的。"

"I think I don't go that far. And maybe some part of the clean room you can do that."

"我觉得我不会做到那一步。也许洁净室的某些区域可以那样。"

"But I think [it's] something that is open mind, and then we are also listen and see whether we can do that."

"但我觉得这是一件需要保持开放心态的事,我们也会去听、去看,到底能不能这么干。"

"Yeah, I mean, it's very exciting to see how you're morphing the business here in the US — in terms of incrementally building out the foundry business, in terms of collaborating with things like TerraFab."

"嗯,我是说,看你怎样在美国本土重塑这盘生意,真的很令人兴奋——一点点把代工业务建起来,又跟 TerraFab 这样的项目合作。"

"If you think about the global AI and semiconductor supply chain — say you were to look at the changes that AI is driving on a macro basis, country by country."

"如果你从全球 AI 和半导体供应链的角度看——比如从宏观、一个国家一个国家地去看 AI 正在带来的变化。"

"If I look at the layoffs that are claimed from AI, for example — um, most of them, I think, are overstated right now. You know, most of the layoffs are actually just over-hiring during [the] 2020 COVID period."

"比如我看那些号称由 AI 造成的裁员——呃,我觉得现在多数都被夸大了。你知道,大部分裁员其实只是 2020 年疫情期间招人招多了。"

"But the first things I see actually being cut are outsource firms — where you'd rather cut external headcount versus internal."

"但我看到真正最先被砍的是外包公司——比起裁内部人,大家更愿意砍外部人头。"

"So you're cutting external customer support, you're cutting external IT — and that has more of an impact, I think, for certain countries which have big BPOs: the Philippines, India, etc."

"所以砍的是外部客服、外部 IT——我觉得这对一些有大量 BPO(业务流程外包)的国家冲击更大:菲律宾、印度等等。"

"And so they may be impacted in the short run by AI. And then if you ask, how do companies participate in the future in a positive way in AI — you have to almost go country by country, right?"

"所以短期内它们可能被 AI 波及。那如果问,企业未来怎么正面地参与 AI——你几乎得逐国来看,对吧?"

"Places with cheap energy will do data centers; places with the ability to train models will train models — but it's probably only the US and one or two other places."

"电便宜的地方会做数据中心;有能力训模型的地方会训模型——但大概也就美国,加上一两个别的地方。"

"How do you think about the shift in [the] global supply chain for the semiconductor industry? Should certain countries invest more — like, should Israel be doing more, given the Nvidia and Intel presence there? Should the Philippines move back to more of a manufacturing base? How do you think about that on a global basis?"

"你怎么看半导体产业全球供应链的迁移?某些国家是不是该投入更多——比如以色列要不要做更多,毕竟英伟达和英特尔都在那有布局?菲律宾要不要重回制造业?你从全球层面怎么看这件事?"

"Yeah, good question. So I think clearly the AI is changing the whole landscape, and I think the impact will be bigger than [the] internet, and, uh, it's more profound also."

"嗯,好问题。我认为 AI 显然在改变整个格局,我觉得它的影响会比互联网更大,而且,呃,也更深远。"

"So I think the AI, you know, initially is able to help you to do things more efficiently, and then with a lot of agent[s] helping you to do things that [are] now kind of mundane that you need to do, but now they can give it to you faster."

"我觉得 AI,你知道,一开始能帮你把事情做得更高效,然后有一大堆 agent 帮你处理那些你必须做、却挺琐碎的活,现在它们能更快地交付给你。"

"So in some way I think it can drive a lot of efficiency — even like semiconductor design, how much you can drive the efficiency in term[s] of timing, uh, how quickly can you come out, and secondly the cost."

"所以某种程度上,我觉得它能撬动巨大的效率——哪怕是半导体设计:你能在时序上提多少效率,呃,多快能出成果,其次是成本。"

"And then I think [a] couple of bottlenecks for the AI, you know, demand and growth. One is, of course, everybody knows, [the] power constraint — some country[s], the power, they just don't have that, [they] get impacted."

"然后我觉得 AI 的需求和增长有几个瓶颈。第一,当然,人人都知道,是电力约束——有些国家就是没那么多电,会被卡住。"

"And then secondly, a lot of people didn't realize the helium impact can be also quite significant for semiconductor."

"第二,很多人没意识到,氦气的影响对半导体也可能相当大。"

"And then thirdly is, everybody know[s] right now memory is a bigger shortage, and everybody try to scramble for memory."

"第三,大家都清楚,现在内存的短缺更严重,所有人都在抢内存。"

"And then even though you have to build a fab to capacity increase, it will take [a] couple of years to do that — [the] same thing for CPU, GPU — and all this will be highly demanded. And I think the pricing also go up, because we have to pass the price, the cost, to the customer."

"而且就算你为扩产去建一座新厂,也要花上好几年——CPU、GPU 也一样——所有这些都会被高度需求。我觉得价格也会涨,因为我们得把价格、把成本转嫁给客户。"

"So I think those will be the impact [on] the industry growth. And then, uh, I think overall I felt that, you know, the company that [is] most impacted is [the one where] you are not embracing, uh, AI."

"所以我觉得这些都会影响产业增长。然后,呃,我总体的感受是,你知道,受冲击最大的公司,是那些不拥抱,呃,AI 的。"

"And because AI can help you to drive a lot of efficiency across all the different function[s] of the enterprise — we should embrace, and also find way[s] to better use the AI for your prediction, for your design, for, you know, all the different part[s] of the workload. And I think that's tremendous."

"因为 AI 能在企业的各个职能里都帮你撬动巨大的效率——我们应该拥抱它,并想办法把 AI 用得更好:用在预测上、设计上、用在,你知道,各种各样的工作负载上。我觉得这潜力巨大。"

"A number of people would say the simplistic argument against TerraFab, against Intel foundry being competitive, is really a question of — you know, there's all the factors internal to the building, right? You describe, um, IP and velocity, just how you're doing business."

"不少人会说,质疑 TerraFab、质疑英特尔代工没竞争力的那套简单逻辑,其实是一个关于——你知道,所有'楼里头'的内部因素,对吧?你前面讲过的,呃,IP、速度,你怎么做这门生意。"

"Then there are external factors — and, you know, Elad's talking about a number of them — but one of them is the cost of labor, and actually the manufacturing capacity."

"然后还有外部因素——你知道,Elad 刚提了好几个——但其中一个就是人力成本,以及制造产能本身。"

"In investing in the foundry business, you obviously believe there's a version where you can manufacture domestically, and Elon does too. Can you talk a little bit about that — and how real that constraint is, the labor constraint?"

"你既然投资代工,显然相信存在一种'能在本土制造'的可能,马斯克也信。能稍微聊聊这个吗——那个约束到底有多真实,我说的是人力约束?"

"Right. So I think, you know, when I decided whether [I] should double down on foundry, or should I get out of the foundry…"

"对。我想,你知道,当我在决定到底是该死磕代工、还是该退出代工时……"

"And there's a lot of voices, a lot of voices in the marketplace, as you can tell. 'It's very expensive.' 'It's very expensive, not going to work.'"

"市场上声音一大堆,一大堆,你也能想象。'太贵了。''太贵了,根本做不成。'"

"But I finally decided this is very important for [the] United State[s], and also very important for the industry."

"但我最终决定:这件事对美国非常重要,对整个产业也非常重要。"

"And I'll give you the idea that, you know, we all live through this challenge[s] of supply chain, and, uh, it's very important for any of the big company in semiconductor [to] really have to think about the supply chains."

"我给你讲讲这个道理:你知道,供应链这道坎我们都亲身经历过,呃,对任何一家半导体大公司来说,认真思考供应链都极其重要。"

"And you have to have a robust and resilient supply chain. You cannot just depend on one or two player[s] in different geographic[s]."

"你必须有一条强韧、有韧性的供应链。不能只押在某一两个地区的一两个玩家身上。"

"And so I think, you know, the more and more people going to realize making in [the] United States is critical."

"所以我觉得,你知道,会有越来越多人意识到:在美国本土制造,是关键中的关键。"

"And then the most advanced process, like for example, we have the, you know, 14A is like 1.4 nanometer, and we already starting to plan for 1 nanometer and 0.7 nanometer."

"再说最先进的制程,比如,你知道,我们有 14A,大约就是 1.4 纳米,而且我们已经开始规划 1 纳米和 0.7 纳米了。"

"It's getting smaller and smaller, so in a way it's much like our hair, so thin. So it's a lot of complexity. It's not that easy to do, and every step, if you make a mistake, [it] just go[es] down, you know, go down the drain."

"它越来越小,某种意义上就像我们的头发,细到那种程度。所以复杂度极高。这没那么好做,每一步只要出一点错,就,你知道,全打了水漂。"

"So in some way you have to be really precise in that manufacturing. So in some way this [is] become more and more going to be the bottleneck."

"所以某种意义上,你在制造上必须做到极其精准。也正因如此,这件事会越来越成为瓶颈。"

"So we felt that, you know, we have a lot of respect for TSMC. We are great partner[s], and then the more important — we both need to have more capacity to serve the customer."

"所以我们觉得,你知道,我们非常尊敬台积电。我们是很好的伙伴,而且更重要的是——我们俩都需要更多产能去服务客户。"

"And then, uh, so I think we decided [to] bite the bullet. Longer term I think [it] is critical, and then that's where I can create more value for the industry."

"然后,呃,所以我们决定咬牙顶上。长期看我认为这至关重要,这也是我能为产业创造更多价值的地方。"

"People have been talking for a long time about eventually, um, hitting a point of resolution where you can't really, uh, miniaturize things further — like the line width just gets too small to be able to keep going. Uh, when do you think we actually hit that limit?"

"很长时间以来,大家都在说,呃,我们终将撞到一个分辨率的极限,没法再,呃,把东西做得更小——线宽小到根本走不下去。呃,你觉得我们什么时候会真正碰到那个极限?"

"Good question. So I think I can see, you know, right now we have 18A, and then now [going] to the production of 14A. I can see 10 and 7, and so I think that path I think we can get there, but [it's] going to be more and more expensive and more difficult to do."

"好问题。我想我能看到,你知道,我们现在有 18A,接下来在量产 14A。我能看到 10、7,所以这条路我觉得我们走得到,但会越来越贵、越来越难做。"

"And that's why we need partners — we cannot just do it ourself alone. Partner with the substrate vendor[s], partner with [the] equipment vendors, so that [we] make sure that we can really drive those yield and performance."

"这就是为什么我们需要伙伴——没法单打独斗。要跟基板供应商合作、跟设备供应商合作,这样才能确保我们真的把良率和性能拉上去。"

"And then the other part [that] also become the bottleneck is packaging, the advanced packaging. And so we all know about CoWoS by TSMC; now we have a really good one called EMIB, that is a really next-generation [one]. [I] had to make sure that it become able to do in the production yield that meet the customer requirement."

"另一个也成为瓶颈的是封装,先进封装。我们都知道台积电的 CoWoS;我们现在有个很不错的东西叫 EMIB,是真正下一代的方案。我得确保它能在量产良率上达到客户要求。"

"And [as things] now start[] to run out of steam, like you describe — so right now I also look at some new material. So [it] become[s] going back to the material side, or the chemical [periodic] table: gallium nitride, silicon carbide, and indium phosphide. So I invest in all three."

"而且,正如你说的,等这条路开始'后劲不足'——所以现在我也在看一些新材料。于是它就变成回到材料这一侧、回到化学元素周期表:氮化镓、碳化硅、磷化铟。这三样我都投了。"

"And then [I'm] looking at some of this new material — how can we really drive that. And then in term[s] of packaging, I starting to invest into glass."

"我也在研究这些新材料——我们到底怎么把它推动起来。然后在封装上,我开始投玻璃。"

"Glass is a very good heat insulator. So we, I invest [in] a venture site called 3DGS. Then I realized that, [at] Intel, we have like 1,000 pattern[s] on the module — [so] how the, you know, substrate and the module put it together."

"玻璃是很好的隔热材料。所以我们、我投了一家叫 3DGS 的创业公司。后来我意识到,在英特尔,一个模块上有大概 1,000 个图案——那么,你知道,基板和模块要怎么拼到一起。"

"And then we just announced a big program with [the] Indian government to manufacturing in India plus in [the] US, in New Mexico. So I think this advanced packaging [is] very important."

"我们刚宣布和印度政府的一个大项目,在印度加美国新墨西哥州两地制造。所以我觉得先进封装非常重要。"

"I also starting to look at artificial diamond, and that's another very good, you know, insulator. So I also invest into, uh, you know, diamond foundry, and that's something [that] is the next generation to look at."

"我也开始看人造钻石,那又是一种很好的,你知道,绝缘体。所以我还投了,呃,你知道,一家钻石代工厂,这是下一代值得看的东西。"

"So new material, new substrate material, and new, you know, uh, design methodology to drive that."

"所以是新材料、新的基板材料,以及新的,你知道,呃,设计方法论来推动这件事。"

"So one thing good about being an engineer[]: you always hitting the wall, then you find [a] way to either jump over the wall, or you work around the wall, and then, uh, to get to the better result."

"做工程师有个好处:你总会撞墙,然后想办法要么翻过去、要么绕过去,然后,呃,拿到更好的结果。"

"And that's what I being, uh, [have] been [a] long time as an investor and building semiconductor — from the EDA tool, to design, to manufacturing. It's kind of nice to have that experience [so] now I can help find a way to make a small contribution to the industry."

"这也是我,呃,长期作为投资人、一路构建半导体所积累的——从 EDA 工具,到设计,再到制造。有这样的经历挺好,现在我能帮着找到办法,为这个产业做点小小的贡献。"

"One of the reasons I'm asking about it is, to your point, there's always some things that you can invent around — but there are also physical limits, where once you hit, you know, seven, [or] whatever the limitation is, you start to run into [needing] new materials or other workarounds."

"我之所以问这个,是因为,正如你说的,总有些东西你可以靠创新绕过去——但也有物理极限,一旦你撞到,你知道,7 纳米、或者无论那个极限是什么,你就开始得找新材料、或别的变通办法。"

"And we've been talking about this for a long time — I remember 20 years ago people were talking about how we'd eventually hit a point where we ran out of space. Do you run into some sort of asymptote that actually normalizes performance across different foundries, or not?"

"这个话题我们已经聊了很久——我记得 20 年前人们就在说,我们终会撞到一个'没空间了'的点。你会不会撞上某种'渐近线',让不同代工厂之间的性能最终被拉平?还是不会?"

"Yeah, good question. In term[s] of, like, Moore's law is a, you know, [a] double[ing], you know. And then the power and the cost — you can double the performance, but you cannot double down on the cost and area."

"嗯,好问题。就摩尔定律而言,你知道,它是一种翻倍。然后功耗和成本——你能把性能翻倍,但没法在成本和面积上也跟着翻。"

"So those are the thing[s] you have to give way [on], unless you find some new way of material, new way of design — and then [it] become[s] material science. I starting to hire more people in the material science. So that is kind of innovation in our area. How can we do that?"

"所以这些就是你必须让步的地方,除非你找到新的材料路子、新的设计路子——于是它就变成了材料科学。我开始在材料科学方向招更多人。这正是我们这个领域里的创新所在:我们到底要怎么做到?"

"And I still remember 18 years ago, and I, I [was] still investing in semiconductor — and actually most of the VC firm[s], some of them were very nice tier-one venture firm[s], [run by] a good friend of mine."

"我还记得 18 年前,我、我那时还在投半导体——其实大多数 VC,有些是非常不错的一线风投,掌门人还是我的好朋友。"

"And initially the partners meeting — the whole partners in the room — then after I talking about semiconductor, half make excuse to run out of the room."

"一开始开合伙人会议——全体合伙人都在会议室里——等我一开口讲半导体,一半人就找借口溜出去了。"

"Then eventually the other half, they said, 'Lip Bu, do you have any software [or] service [deal]?' So then [I was] left with only [those] who sympathetically listen to me."

"然后剩下那一半就问:'立武,你有没有软件或者服务的项目?'最后只剩下几个出于同情还愿意听我讲的人。"

"So it's kind of the history have changed. And now semiconductor, if you look at it — Jensen is a 5.3 trillion market cap company, and then Broadcom and TSMC is [a] two-trillion market cap company, and Lisa, my good friend at AMD, is almost 800 billion, and I'm close to 600 billion."

"所以可以说风水轮流转。现在的半导体,你看——黄仁勋是一家 5.3 万亿市值的公司,博通和台积电是 2 万亿,我在 AMD 的好朋友苏姿丰(Lisa)接近 8000 亿,而我(英特尔)也快到 6000 亿。"

"So in some way it's kind of semiconductor become hot again, and it become essential. Because 15 years, 20 years ago when I invest in semiconductor, no VC want to join me — except, you know, some of the big corporation[s] like Samsung, you know, ARM and SoftBank and others, investing with me."

"所以某种意义上,半导体又变香了,而且变得不可或缺。因为 15 年、20 年前我投半导体时,没有 VC 愿意跟我一起——除了,你知道,三星、ARM、软银这些大公司,和我一起投。"

"And then now I starting to see a lot of VC like to come investing in semi, so I'm very happy."

"而现在,我开始看到一大批 VC 想进半导体了,所以我很开心。"

"Um, what do you think — I mean, you've been a venture investor with Walden for a very long time, as well as an operator. The general fears, I'm just going to list a bunch of them."

"呃,你怎么看——我是说,你在 Walden 做风投很久了,同时也是经营者。大家普遍的担忧,我就直接列一串。"

"It's very capital-intensive. It's very unpredictable in terms of, you know, shipping a design that works, missing tape-out. You need to understand the workload very well. It's very high risk for the customer to switch. There's a design win, and then there's still the question of scaling order volume. And then there's cyclicality — you build hard manufacturing capacity, and demand may change in any given year."

"它非常资本密集。它非常难预测——你知道,能不能交付一个真能用的设计、会不会错过流片(tape-out)。你得非常懂工作负载。对客户来说,切换供应商风险极高。拿到一个设计订单(design win)之后,还有'订单量能不能放大'的问题。再有就是周期性——你建了实打实的制造产能,可任何一年需求都可能变。"

"So how do you think about [what] makes it hard as an industry, and then the secular demand growth from a bunch of different areas? You're still an investor, and then you're making the biggest bet ever — like, go be CEO. How do you think about these different risk[s], and advise others about where to invest in this supply chain?"

"所以你怎么看这个行业难在哪,以及来自多个方向的长期需求增长?你既是投资人,又下了有史以来最大的一注——去当 CEO。你怎么权衡这些不同的风险,又会怎么建议别人在这条供应链里投什么?"

"There's a lot of, like, YOLO action of, like, there's a memory shortage, buy memory stocks — as well as an unwillingness to take on things that have a 10-year timeline, like material science."

"市场上有很多那种'梭哈'式的操作,比如'内存短缺,那就买内存股'——同时又不愿碰那些需要 10 年周期的东西,比如材料科学。"

"Good. You have quite a broad range of questions. Let me try to, uh, explain that. So first of all, I think, you know, the venture capital startup is in my blood, and I really enjoy it."

"好。你的问题范围挺广。我试着,呃,一一说一下。首先,我觉得,你知道,做风投、做创业公司刻在我骨子里,我是真的喜欢。"

"And so there's some good exit, you know — I still have 159 IPO, 126, you know, M&A. And that['s] include semiconductor; just break down the semiconductor I invest over the years, [it's] 238, and 38% is in US."

"也有不少漂亮的退出,你知道——我至今有 159 个 IPO、126 笔,你知道,并购。这其中包含半导体;单看我这些年投的半导体,是 238 笔,其中 38% 在美国。"

"On the investment side, I always look at: where is the bottleneck, what are you trying to solve?"

"在投资这边,我永远先看:瓶颈在哪、你想解决的是什么?"

"And for example, I invest in [a] company called, uh, Cradle [semiconductor] — [because] this interconnect become the bottleneck, so I decide to back [it]. And also I back, uh, Celestial AI, you know, optical — and then because speed become more important in the interconnect in the cluster, so I think optical become very important."

"比如,我投了一家叫,呃,Cradle 的公司——因为互连成了瓶颈,所以我决定支持它。我还投了,呃,Celestial AI,你知道,做光互连——因为在集群里互连的速度越来越重要,所以我觉得光互连变得非常关键。"

"Look at Jensen — he invests in almost every company [that] is photonic-related."

"你看黄仁勋——几乎每家跟光子相关的公司他都投。"

"And then the other part I['m] looking at is, you know, okay, what are the solution[s] that [are] need[ed] — like, for example, we talk about design and then the complexity and also the cost. Can you find some[thing] using AI machine learning to drive better design and better solution?"

"我看的另一块是,你知道,好,哪些是被需要的解决方案——比如我们说到设计、复杂度,还有成本。你能不能找到用 AI、机器学习去驱动更好设计、更好方案的东西?"

"So a couple of new startup actually go into the EDA-related area to drive performance improvement. I think it's a gold mine to do that."

"所以有几家新创业公司真的切进了 EDA 相关领域去驱动性能提升。我觉得这块是座金矿。"

"And then the other part you look at the new material — and we talk about, you know, this indium phosphide, that's why I invest in INFI, and then [someone] bought it. And then you invest into some of the new material, gallium nitride and then silicon carbide."

"再有就是看新材料——我们说到,你知道,磷化铟,这就是我投 INFI 的原因,后来它被收购了。然后你再投一些新材料,氮化镓、还有碳化硅。"

"And then some of the company starting to being acquired — include one of them, you know, doing power management, and ADI just bought Empower. So again, this IVR, that's a very, very good area; power management become bottleneck in term[s] of converting from 40 volt down to one volt, and in that conversion you lost a lot of power. So how you drive the power improvement? So power [and] thermal, those become the bottleneck."

"然后一些公司开始被收购——其中一家,你知道,做电源管理,ADI 刚刚买下了 Empower。所以,这个 IVR(集成电压调节),是个非常非常好的领域;电源管理成了瓶颈——从 40 伏降到 1 伏,在这个转换里你损耗了大量功率。那你怎么去提升能效?所以功率、散热,这些都成了瓶颈。"

"So I always look at, from what is the problem we try to solve — is it real, is [the] customer crying for it — and then I starting to invest."

"所以我永远从'我们要解决的是什么问题'看起——它真实吗、客户是不是在嗷嗷待哺地要它——然后我才开始投。"

"The next thing is, [it's] very important from day one [to] target the first customer. And usually I like the customer [to be] a hyperscaler. They have the [scale]. If they like what you have, they're willing to pay million[s] of dollars [over the] next few years, and even giving some warrant is worth it, because you have a big one customer you can scale."

"接下来,从第一天起锁定第一个客户极其重要。而且我喜欢这个客户是超大规模厂商(hyperscaler)。他们有体量。一旦看上你的东西,接下来几年他们愿意掏几百万美元,甚至给点认股权证(warrant)都值——因为你有了一个能让你放量的大客户。"

"So I always look at some of the formula — how do you do that. And then where do you get the talent. Yeah, you know, sometime[s] it's very important to find the talent."

"所以我总在看一些'公式'——你到底怎么做到。然后是人才从哪来。对,你知道,有时候找到人才极其关键。"

"That's why I'm very interested in US, and then Silicon Valley, and then some Austin. And the other part is Israel — a lot of talent. So I back quite a few, quite a significant amount [of] my investment in Israel."

"这就是我特别看重美国的原因,还有硅谷,还有奥斯汀(Austin)。另一块是以色列——人才很多。所以我在以色列投了不少,投资里相当大的一部分。"

"And then because they have very disruptive, innovative entrepreneur[s], and they work really hard. Even in this wartime, they still have conference call[s], and sometime[s] they say, 'Okay, there's a warning, I have to go to underground,' and then the internet may not be good, maybe [we] use voice. In some way it's kind of fun — the kind of resilient entrepreneurship, I really enjoy."

"因为他们的创业者极具颠覆性和创新力,而且非常拼。哪怕在战时,他们照样开电话会,有时会说:'好,有警报,我得躲到地下室去',然后网络可能不好,也许就改用语音。某种意义上还挺有意思的——这种坚韧的创业精神,我真的很欣赏。"

"So all in all, I felt that there's a lot of opportunity, and especially in the AI. And then right now, beside the agentic AI, now you're looking at physical AI — next [a] big frontier."

"所以总而言之,我觉得机会很多,尤其在 AI。眼下,除了 agentic AI,接下来你要看的是物理 AI(physical AI)——下一个大前沿。"

"And then you had to really look at the full stack. That's why I'm still involved with a lot of this frontier model that we [are] very familiar [with], and some of the investment I back because I really like open-source frontier, you know, technology for physical AI. I think that's a gold mine."

"然后你必须真正着眼于全栈。这就是为什么我至今还深度参与很多我们很熟悉的前沿模型,有些投资我之所以下注,是因为我真的很喜欢开源的前沿,你知道,面向物理 AI 的技术。我觉得那是座金矿。"

"You mentioned the opportunity to make certain parts of the design and test of chips faster, cheaper, more creative with AI. Given your Cadence experience — where do you think is most fertile? Is there anything you think is already working?"

"你提到用 AI 让芯片设计与测试的某些环节更快、更便宜、更有创造力。结合你在 Cadence 的经历——你觉得哪块最肥沃?有没有什么你认为已经跑通了的?"

"Yeah, I think, you know, for almost 15 years with Cadence — and I'm so happy [that] one of my highlight[s] is [I was] able to find my successor [while] on the road, and I train him, and he becomes [a] super great CEO. And he really embracing the AI, you know, driving the agentic AI to drive more efficien[cy]."

"嗯,我想,你知道,在 Cadence 待了将近 15 年——我特别欣慰的一个高光时刻,是我在路上(出差途中)就找到了接班人,我培养他,他成了一位超级出色的 CEO。而且他真的很拥抱 AI,你知道,推动 agentic AI 去提升效率。"

"But the good part — I think Synopsys, Sassine, also tried to do that, and they have investment from, you know, Nvidia, 2 billion I think, helping him to do a lot. And he acquire Ansys to move into the whole system design."

"不过另一面——我觉得 Synopsys 的 Sassine 也在尝试做这件事,他们还拿了,你知道,英伟达 20 亿(我记得)的投资,帮他做了很多。而且他收购了 Ansys,切进整个系统设计。"

"So I think all in all, they all do the best thing they can. But also some opportunity for startup to do some of the more disruptive [things], and then eventually they can either go public or being acquired by both of them, or Siemens [could] acquire them. So I think there's opportunity for all, depend[ing] on what the entrepreneur vision [is]."

"所以我觉得总体上,他们都在尽其所能。但创业公司也有机会做一些更具颠覆性的东西,最后要么上市,要么被他们俩之一收购,或者被西门子(Siemens)收购。所以我觉得每种路都有机会,取决于创业者的愿景。"

"And then, I always have [a] philosophy: if [an] entrepreneur want[s] to sell the company, [that's a] quicker way for exit — you don't have a lockup, you don't have to worry about quarter-to-quarter earning. And then some entrepreneur, from day one they want to go IPO."

"还有,我一直有个理念:如果创业者想卖掉公司,那是更快的退出方式——没有锁定期,也不用操心季度对季度的财报。而有些创业者,从第一天起就想 IPO。"

"You know, being a VC — I think three of you, [with] three of us, we all VC — we support the entrepreneur[s'] dream, and then help them to fulfill their dream."

"你知道,作为 VC——我想你们(在座)、我们三个都是 VC——我们支持创业者的梦想,然后帮他们去实现这个梦。"

"If you look at the different areas you mentioned — there's companies like Periodic doing materials, there's folks on the EDA side and design, and throughout the chain there's manufacturing. Do you think that either Intel or [a] future semiconductor company 10 years from now looks radically different from today, given AI — and if so, how?"

"看你提到的这些领域——有像 Periodic 这样做材料的公司,有 EDA 和设计这边的人,整条链上还有制造。考虑到 AI,你觉得无论是英特尔、还是 10 年后的某家半导体公司,会不会和今天截然不同?如果会,怎么个不同法?"

"Yeah, I think so. First of all, back to Sara['s] question about capital-intensive, and a little bit unpredictable, and cyclical — so you have to kind of factor that into your decision-making investment."

"嗯,我觉得会。首先,回到 Sara 那个关于资本密集、有点难预测、还有周期性的问题——你得把这些都纳入你的投资决策。"

"You know, I usually like to go in very early, put a team together — it's kind of fun to do that. And then secondly, you try to find the right investor that can co-partner with you. It's not just the whatever, the brand firm — I usually go for the individual, whoever the individual that [is] really knowledgeable in this space."

"你知道,我通常喜欢非常早期就进去,攒一个团队——这挺有意思的。其次,你得找到能跟你共同搭伙的合适投资人。不是看什么牌子大的机构——我通常看具体的人,看谁在这个领域真正懂行。"

"[The] most important [thing is] to find a partner [for the] difficult time and good time. A lot of the time people are very enjoyable working with you [in] good time; when the company [is in] trouble, they just walk away. I like to have partner that really work[s] through… eventually take[s] off."

"最重要的是找到一个'共患难也共富贵'的伙伴。很多人顺境时跟你合作很愉快;公司一出事,他们扭头就走。我喜欢那种真正陪你熬过来、最终一起起飞的伙伴。"

"And then the other part is look at what are the strategic investor that can help you, either in manufacturing or memory connectivity, or various way[s] to add value to the company. And also [I have a] couple of friend[s] [who] are in the growth stage and also in the hedge fund. I really enjoy them because they have a different perspective — they know about the public market, [they] can guide the entrepreneur where not to go."

"另一块是看哪些战略投资人能帮到你,无论是制造、内存连接,还是各种为公司加分的方式。我也有几个做成长期、做对冲基金的朋友。我很喜欢和他们打交道,因为他们视角不同——他们懂公开市场,能给创业者指出'哪些路不要走'。"

"So I think [it's] just fun to do that. And then [you] just realize [that] engineering for [a] startup is like problem-solving each step of the way — you have to find people to help you to solve the problem, and then if you [trigger] that, then great, [the] next frontier to work on."

"所以我觉得做这件事就是很有意思。然后你会发现,做创业公司里的工程,就像一步一步解题——你得找到人帮你解决问题,一旦解出来,太好了,再去攻下一个前沿。"

"And then, frankly speaking, I look back: nine of the 10 company I invest, halfway, because [the] market have changed [they change their plan]. So I like to have entrepreneur as [a] team, not just one person."

"而且,坦白讲,我回头看:我投的 10 家公司里有 9 家,做到一半,因为市场变了(就改了打法)。所以我喜欢创业者是一个团队,而不只是一个人。"

"Secondly, open mind — willing to listen, and listen, you know, getting coaching from us. And then eventually they formulate their own plan. It's not just 'do what I want.' It's more [that] they figure out [that] the best thing is [when] you give them enough feedback, they draw their own conclusion — that [is] exactly what you like, or different [in a way] that you can embrace [as] the right decision. That's kind of [the] fun of doing startup."

"其次,开放的心态——愿意听,而且真的听,你知道,接受我们的辅导。然后他们最终会形成自己的计划。不是'我说啥你做啥'。更多是他们自己想明白:你给足反馈,他们自己得出结论——那个结论要么正好是你认可的,要么不同、但你也能接受、确实是对的决定。这正是做创业的乐趣。"

"So back [to] your question: if you look at it, 10 years from now, what will be the winning company? This is just my personal view — the one that articulate and laser-focus on one niche area, and also find the right partner, and also able to scale the company."

"所以回到你的问题:你看 10 年后,谁会是赢家?这只是我个人的看法——那个能把话说清楚、激光般聚焦在一个细分领域,同时找对伙伴、又能把公司做大的人。"

"And so, in [a] way — back to my point about full stack — so in [a] way you need to have a full-stack solution. And so it can be [a] big company [that] transform themselves to be looking at [a] big platform, like Jensen — I admire him."

"所以,某种意义上——回到我说的全栈——你需要一套全栈解决方案。它可以是一家大公司,把自己转型成做大平台,像黄仁勋那样——我很佩服他。"

"You know, he focus on CUDA, he focus on [NVLink]. [He said] 'I want to be a platform company,' and he did it. And so in [a] way you can do that. Or [a] startup company like Anthropic, OpenAI — they find a way to do it in a more elegant way, they change the game. And then [a] startup move[s] fast, you know, [at the] speed of light; you can really become a dominant player."

"你知道,他聚焦 CUDA、聚焦 NVLink。他说'我要做一家平台公司',他做到了。所以你可以走这条路。也可以像 Anthropic、OpenAI 这样的创业公司——他们找到更优雅的方式,改变了游戏规则。而创业公司动得快,你知道,快到像光速;你真的能成为主导玩家。"

"And hopefully Intel can play the role, because we have the XPU, and we have the advanced packaging, and we have foundry. If you put that all together, [you] can build some of the purpose-built silicon for different workload[s]. I think that's where I'm going."

"希望英特尔也能扮演这个角色,因为我们有 XPU、有先进封装、还有代工。把这三样拼到一起,就能为不同的工作负载造出一些专用芯片(purpose-built silicon)。我觉得这就是我要去的方向。"

"Part of the question I was wondering is where you're going, and the other part is: does it fundamentally change how you work? Because when I look in the software world, I think there's a very big shift happening right now in terms of who you hire, in terms of people managing multiple agents."

"我想问的一部分是你要去哪,另一部分是:它会不会从根本上改变你的工作方式?因为我看软件世界,我觉得现在正发生一个很大的转变——关于你招谁,关于人去管理多个 agent。"

"Many people now that I know are hiring people more in their 30s, 40s, 50s, because they're used to managing teams — and I think that transfers directly over to managing agents, in terms of understanding the complexity of what to set up, and the QA and everything else."

"我认识的很多人现在更倾向招三四十、五十岁的人,因为他们习惯了带团队——我觉得这套能力可以直接迁移到'管理 agent'上:理解要搭建什么的复杂度、质量把控(QA),以及其他一切。"

"And I wonder, in the context of the physical world, or in the context of a fab, how you think about shifts in terms of either team structure, or capabilities, or how AI layers on. So I just wasn't sure if it's a natural slow evolution, or if there's areas where there's a radical shift."

"我好奇,在物理世界、或者在晶圆厂的语境里,你怎么看团队结构、能力、或者 AI 如何叠加进来的变化。我不太确定它是自然的缓慢演进,还是某些地方会有剧烈的突变。"

"Good question. I think, you know, [it's] back to that crawl, walk, and run. So [in] 'crawl,' I basically recruit some of the best talent in the semiconductor industry."

"好问题。我想,你知道,还是回到'爬、走、跑'。在'爬'这一步,我基本上先招来一批半导体行业最顶尖的人才。"

"And then now I starting to look at what are the software talent I need to bring on board, in order to build a full stack."

"然后现在我开始看,为了搭建全栈,我还需要引进哪些软件人才。"

"And now I starting to look at, you know, my average age of my team [is] in the 40, late 40[s]. I need to bring in some new talent — and then so they['re] understanding the workload, understanding the frontier model, open source. That is important."

"现在我也开始看,你知道,我团队的平均年龄在 40、47、48 岁。我需要引进一些新人——这样他们懂工作负载、懂前沿模型、懂开源。这很重要。"

"So I found out that my son become my teacher now."

"于是我发现,我儿子现在成了我的老师。"

"So every time he invite me to go to his house, [and] we['re] playing [with the] grandkids, I starting to tap on him on all the AI machine learning — he's more plug[ged]-in than me. So I learn[ed] a lot, and then try to understand investing, and then bring some of the talent to come in."

"所以每次他请我去他家,我们陪孙辈玩的时候,我就开始向他取经各种 AI、机器学习——他比我懂行多了。所以我学到很多,然后再去理解投资,再把一些人才引进来。"

"So we are changing Intel — [it] used to be a very old, legacy spreadsheet company. Now I'm transform[ing] it to become AI- — and not, uh — AI-enabled, using some of our design and also across all the, uh, all the organization embracing AI."

"所以我们在改造英特尔——它过去是一家非常老派、靠电子表格运转的公司。现在我把它改造成 AI——不是,呃——AI 驱动的公司,用在我们的一些设计上,也让整个,呃,整个组织都拥抱 AI。"

"And then so they become, uh, less, less, uh, depend on the spreadsheet and [are] able to do that. And you're going to combine the two talent plus the best AI tool that I can use — not only for my organization, not only for my sales, and then now [it's] exciting to look at not just marketing, and now the design, and then to embrace that."

"于是他们就变得,呃,越来越少、越来越不依赖电子表格,也能干成这些事。你要把这两类人才,加上我能用到的最好的 AI 工具结合起来——不只用在管理上、不只用在销售上;现在令人兴奋的是,不只是营销,连设计环节现在也用上了,都去拥抱它。"

"At least for me, the last few years since I started a firm, it's been very educational thinking about the different capital sources for more capital-intensive companies. I did a lot of software before — and so your need to have smart friends with a very different stance [on the] balance sheet was less."

"至少对我来说,自从创立了基金,这几年关于'资本密集型公司有哪些不同资金来源'的思考特别长见识。我以前做了很多软件——所以那时你对'拥有一群在资产负债表上立场迥异的聪明朋友'的需求,要小得多。"

"You've lived that for a very long time, and then you have the unique experience of, um, working with the government as a large stakeholder. How do you think this sort of industrial policy — it's led to huge successes like TSMC, right, the most important companies in the world — but it's also been a bit frowned upon in American business culture for a long time. How do you think that should change now, or where is it relevant?"

"你在这件事上摸爬滚打很久了,而且你还有一段很特别的经历,呃,跟政府这个大股东打交道。你怎么看这种产业政策——它催生过台积电这样的巨大成功,对吧,世界上最重要的公司之一——但长期以来在美国商业文化里又有点被嫌弃。你觉得它现在该怎么变,或者它在哪里真正适用?"

"Good question. So I think, you know, clearly for capital-intensive, uh, business and infrastructure play, uh, you need to [have] access to the capital."

"好问题。我想,你知道,显然对资本密集的,呃,生意、以及基础设施型的项目,呃,你必须能拿得到资本。"

"And then in some way, I think [even] our early-day venture capital investment, you know, now starting [to] become very capital-intensive. And some of the venture firm[s] willing to put 1 billion into some company [— that] is very unheard of in the VC business. Now it's happening."

"而且某种程度上,我觉得连我们早年的风投,你知道,现在都开始变得非常资本密集。有些风投愿意往一家公司里砸 10 亿——这在 VC 圈本来闻所未闻。现在却真的在发生。"

"And so in some way you just have to be, you know — I like this kind of bell curve: either you go in very early, and then because [the] series A is over [a] billion valuation[]… and so you had to go [in at] pre-money, [the] pre-seed, to go into that kind of [valuation]. A 20-, 30-billion valuation is very rare right now. So you just have to do that — pick the right one."

"所以某种意义上你必须,你知道——我喜欢这种'钟形曲线':要么你非常早期就进,因为现在 A 轮估值动辄就过 10 亿……所以你得在 pre-money、pre-seed(种子前)阶段就进去。如今 200 亿、300 亿的估值已经很罕见了。所以你只能这么干——挑对那一个。"

"And then the other part is [to be] able to find capital to scale. And that's why some of this mutual fund[s], they also like to move into the pre-market, uh, early states to join me [in] investing. I delight them, because they are very less sensitive [about] whether I had to own 20% of the company — there's not too many 20% to give. So you have to find the right investor to come in."

"另一块是要能找到资本去做大。这就是为什么一些共同基金也愿意往,呃,上市前的早期阶段挪、加入我一起投。我很欢迎他们,因为他们对'我是不是必须占公司 20%'敏感得多——本来也没那么多 20% 能分出去。所以你得找对进来的投资人。"

"And then in term[s] of the capital-intensive [things] like AI, you know, factory, and also the foundry, then you really need to tap either government funding or some sovereign fund, and also some very big capital. There are some big fund[s] [that are] doing that, and the fund they've organized is basically [to] support the infrastructure — and we like to tap into some of them, and then to make sure that they can scale our operation."

"再说资本密集的东西,比如 AI,你知道,工厂,还有代工厂,那你真的得去对接政府资金、或者某些主权基金,以及一些超大体量的资本。有些大基金正在这么做,他们组建的基金基本上就是为了支持基础设施——我们也乐意去对接其中一些,确保它们能帮我们把运营做大。"

"So I think in overall, government [and] sovereign fund become very important. And also, as a public company, I also purposefully want to focus on some of the investor[s] that are more long-term, growth-oriented, so that they can help me to grow the business."

"所以总体上,我觉得政府和主权基金变得非常重要。另外,作为一家上市公司,我也刻意想聚焦那些更长期、更看重成长的投资人,这样他们能帮我把业务做大。"

"And then rather than short-term asking [about] capital [allocation], you know, where [are] you going to, you know, buy back your shares. Those are good question[s], but meanwhile I also had to build the business. And so I think it's kind of that balance is important."

"而不是短期就追着问资本配置,你知道,你打算什么时候,你知道,回购股票。这些是好问题,但与此同时我还得把业务建起来。所以我觉得这种平衡很重要。"

"Do you think there is something that investors most misunderstand about Intel at this moment?"

"你觉得此刻投资者对英特尔最大的误解是什么?"

"Quite a few thing[s]. First of all, I think, um, you know, [it's] back to this crawl, run, and walk. Last four month[s] I crawl, and then people starting to recognize that potential of it."

"挺多的。首先,我想,呃,你知道,还是回到这个'爬、跑、走'。过去四个月我在'爬',然后大家开始认识到它的潜力了。"

"And so the other part is very important: we need to really get the best product out, either PC client — we still have a market share, but we really need to really build [a] better performance. So that's why I'm quietly building up the CPU architect, GPU architect, and the software architect, so that we can leapfrog."

"另一点也很重要:我们必须真正把最好的产品做出来,比如 PC 客户端——我们还有市场份额,但确实需要做出更强的性能。所以我在悄悄搭建 CPU 架构、GPU 架构和软件架构团队,这样我们才能'蛙跳'式超越。"

"Just like, I look at Intel, I want to be a multiple of startup culture, so that we move fast and we can leapfrog using better technology."

"就好比,我看英特尔,我想让它成为'好几个创业公司文化的叠加',这样我们能跑得快,用更好的技术实现蛙跳。"

"And then the other part, beside the product, there are some new energy coming in — like agentic AI, the physical AI. That's a lot of area that we can invest; market is huge. That's on the product side."

"另一块,除了产品,还有一些新动能进来——比如 agentic AI、物理 AI。那是我们能投入的大片天地;市场巨大。这是在产品这一侧。"

"And the foundry side — we are very distant from TSMC, and then in term[s] of their performance. So there, uh, we have to be humble, looking at building the building block[s], like I mentioned earlier — the IP, the yield, the defect density, and the cycle time, to make it more efficient and more reliable."

"代工这一侧——我们和台积电差距很大,在性能上。所以在那块,呃,我们必须谦卑,着眼于把地基一块块垒起来,就像我前面说的——IP、良率、缺陷密度、周期时间,让它更高效、更可靠。"

"[It] is a trust business — people want to trust you before they give you the wafer to count on you. So those are the thing[s] [that] will take longer time. But I think by 2030, 2032, 31, 32, I think [it] was starting to surface up — people may not understand how big potential I can be."

"这是信任生意——人们要先信得过你,才会把晶圆交给你、把身家押在你身上。所以这些都要花更久。但我觉得到 2030、2032、31、32 年,就会浮出水面——大家可能还没意识到我(英特尔)的潜力能有多大。"

"In term[s] of product — you know, the PC client, that's our bread and butter — and we moved up to the edge, and move into the physical AI and agentic AI. Because right now, in the past, you basically provide the server, provide the PC for human."

"在产品上——你知道,PC 客户端是我们的看家饭碗——我们往上走到边缘端,再切入物理 AI 和 agentic AI。因为现在,过去你基本上是给人提供服务器、提供 PC。"

"Now you're starting to have another different dimension: millions of agent[s], they need to access to the compute, [they] access into the software stack. So I think that part, [we] have a chance to really play the game [—] is not over yet. We can play in the, in the agentic AI and also the physical AI."

"现在你开始多出另一个维度:成百上千万的 agent,它们需要访问算力、接入软件栈。所以我觉得在那块,我们有机会真正下场——这盘棋还没下完。我们可以在 agentic AI、也可以在物理 AI 上参与进来。"

"So that's kind of where I'm going. And so the AI is just a beginning — you know, you have the training that Jensen own[s], and the [inference at the] edge, and also, you know, in term[s] of agentic AI with agents, and also physical AI. I think [it] is the jumbo[: ] everybody have a chance."

"所以这就是我要去的方向。AI 才刚刚开始——你知道,有黄仁勋掌握的训练,有边缘端的推理,还有,你知道,带着一堆 agent 的 agentic AI,以及物理 AI。我觉得这是个超大盘子:人人都有机会。"

"So I think that's part that I want to go for it. And so I think hopefully, uh, the investor will know [that] even though in 14 month[s], you know, we make six-time return to the shareholder, they['re] just a beginning — we still have a lot of room to go."

"所以这就是我想去争取的那部分。所以我想,希望,呃,投资者会明白:尽管 14 个月里,你知道,我们给股东带来了 6 倍回报,但这只是开始——我们还有很大的空间。"

"There's venture returns from here."

"这等于从现在起还有'风投级'的回报空间。"

"Yeah. So, you know, I always look for 10x, you know, being [a] venture [investor] at heart. You want to look for 10x. And [at] Cadence, when I step down as a CEO, I think we make about close to 76-time, you know, starting from interim CEO [at] $2.42; and then when I retire[d] [as] executive chairman, about 85-time return to the shareholder."

"对。所以,你知道,我永远盯着 10 倍,你知道,骨子里是个风投。你就是要找 10 倍。在 Cadence,我卸任 CEO 时,我们大概做出了将近 76 倍,你知道,从代理 CEO、股价 2.42 美元起算;然后等我从执行董事长退下来,给股东的回报大约是 85 倍。"

"So [it's] hard to do that [at] the Intel, because the base is bigger. So I kind of say, okay, let's do it at 10x, you know — and then [in] five year[s], 10 years, if we can do 10x, I think [it] is a good return, being a venture capital at heart. That's kind of my goal."

"所以在英特尔很难复制,因为基数更大。所以我就说,好吧,我们做 10 倍,你知道——然后五年、十年,如果能做到 10 倍,我觉得就是不错的回报,毕竟我骨子里是风投。这算是我的目标。"

"So, Godspeed on this very, very large mission, from this huge base already. There's an embedded belief in what you described about where the workload is."

"那么,祝你在这个极其宏大的使命上一路顺利,而且是从一个已经很大的基数出发。你刚才描述的内容里,藏着一个关于'工作负载落在哪'的判断。"

"Some would say we're just going to build bigger and bigger data centers — a gigawatt is the beginning — and the centralization and the efficiency from running even the inference compute in a centralized way is the dominant way, versus thinking about the edge, thinking about the client. Do you think there's an equilibrium state that you believe in of where the compute is, or is it just [that] we will find out from the workload?"

"有人会说,我们只会建越来越大的数据中心——一吉瓦只是起步——而把算力(甚至推理算力)集中化运行所带来的效率,才是主导路线,而不是去想边缘、去想终端。你心里有没有一个相信的'算力落点'的均衡态,还是说,只能看工作负载才知道?"

"Yeah, I think, you know, that's a very good question. Right now there's a massive buildup in term[s] of the AI — I think it's the right thing to do. I don't see there anything to slow it down, uh, because the workload is increasing a lot."

"嗯,我觉得,你知道,这是个非常好的问题。眼下 AI 在大规模铺建——我认为这是对的。我看不到有什么能让它慢下来,呃,因为工作负载在猛涨。"

"And then I think the question mark is — we are supply-constrained. So I think anything [that] slow[s] down is the supply constraint."

"然后我觉得真正的问号是——我们受制于供给。所以我认为唯一能让它放缓的,就是供给约束。"

"But I think the other part is, uh, I always look at all this infrastructure buildup [—] at the end you have to look at what is the solution, what is the application you want to drive. And I'm more focused on application."

"但我觉得另一面是,呃,我看所有这些基础设施的铺建——归根结底你得看:解决方案是什么,你想驱动的应用是什么。我更聚焦在应用上。"

"So if you can identify the application that is humongous, or add up a few application[s] to become meaningful, and you focus on that — it's not everybody [who] build[s] going to be winning."

"所以如果你能找出某个体量巨大的应用,或者把几个应用加起来变得有分量,然后聚焦于此——不是谁建了谁就赢。"

"And so some going to be winning big time, and some going to lose over time or go sideway[s]. So, you know, just like internet — you can see some of them turn out to be very big, like Amazon, like the Netflix; and then some of them is kind of go sideway[s] and disappeared or being acquired."

"所以有的会大赢,有的会慢慢输掉、或者原地踏步。所以,你知道,就像互联网——你能看到有的最后做得很大,比如亚马逊、Netflix;有的则原地打转、消失,或者被收购。"

"And so I think, to me, it's the same approach. [You] really focus on what application they try to serve, and that application, how big is that, and whether it's sustainable or not, or [if it] is very crowded. So if it's too crowded, you know, maybe one or two may survive [and] the other maybe just consolidate."

"所以我觉得,对我来说是同一套打法。真正盯住它想服务的是哪个应用,以及那个应用有多大、是否可持续,或者是不是已经太挤。如果太挤,你知道,也许只有一两家能活下来,其余的可能就被整合掉。"

"So I think this industry go through that big growth, and then then starting to consolidate, maybe eventually one or two become the real winner. So I think that's kind of [it] — we've watched the movie before, so it's not [a] surprise to me — [but] focus on application. Like Netflix is [an] application, you know, Amazon is a real application; that, to me, they're winning."

"所以我觉得这个行业会先经历大爆发,然后开始整合,也许最后只有一两家成为真正的赢家。所以我觉得就是这样——这部'电影'我们以前看过,所以对我并不意外——但要聚焦应用。比如 Netflix 是个应用,你知道,亚马逊是个真正的应用;在我看来,它们是赢家。"

"But you're assuming that some of these applications will be better served by client or edge compute than only by the data [center]?"

"但你的假设是,其中一些应用,用客户端或边缘算力来服务,会比只靠数据中心更好?"

"Exactly."

"正是。"

"Yeah, I mean, I will say, as — I'm an investor in a number of companies that, you know, they're doing robotics, they're doing defense — and so the compute on the device is a very important choice in terms of [what] we assume around it."

"对,我是说,作为——我投了不少公司,你知道,做机器人的、做国防的——所以设备端的算力,在'我们围绕它做哪些假设'上,是个非常关键的选择。"

"Like, let's say a robot in the home — eventually, what you assume is in the home and [the] connectivity around it determines what you're able to do, right? And I think that was kind of forgotten for a little bit in the, in the SaaS era."

"比如说,一个家用机器人——最终,你假设家里有什么、它周围的连接是什么样,就决定了它能做什么,对吧?我觉得这一点在,在 SaaS 时代被忽略了一阵子。"

"Yes, yes. I think — more, my investment thesis is find a problem that is really need[ed] to solve. And secondly, who will be the player that you can partner with. And then thirdly, look at the application — how big is that application, is that sustainable?"

"对,对。我觉得——更多地,我的投资逻辑是:先找一个真正亟需解决的问题。其次,看谁是你能结盟的玩家。第三,看应用——那个应用有多大、能不能持续?"

"And if it's really big [and] you believe in it — double, triple down."

"如果它真的够大、而你也相信它——那就加倍、再加倍地下注。"

"But you're including betting on applications that have not yet been broadly deployed."

"但这其中也包括押注那些尚未被大规模部署的应用。"

"Yes. It's amazing."

"是的。这很奇妙。"

"Well, thank you so much for joining us today. It was a pleasure."

"好了,非常感谢你今天来。这是我们的荣幸。"

"Thank you so much. Thanks, Lipu. Thank you."

"非常感谢。谢谢你,立武。谢谢。"