How to Build Real Taste — and Why AI Makes It Matter More

You still need humans in the loop.

环节里还是得有人(humans in the loop)。

Don't surrender to the machine.

别向机器投降。

We can use the machines, but don't cognitively surrender.

机器我们可以用,但不要认知投降(cognitive surrender)。

Because it's so easy to build, the things that stand out are the things that are really well thought through.

正因为现在做东西太容易了,能脱颖而出的,反而是那些真正想透了的东西。

Today in the AI world, I can just make a prompt and all of a sudden it gets spit out.

如今在 AI 世界里,我只要写个 prompt,东西一下子就吐出来了。

You're building on a really crusty foundation.

你是在一个烂到掉渣的地基上盖房子。

You're getting short-term gain for very, very long-term loss.

你赚的是短期便宜,赔的是非常非常长期的账。

If you're going to build a real company, it can't be throwaway.

如果你要做一家真正的公司,东西就不能是用完即弃的。

One of your colleagues, Hermann Hauser, that ask him how he decides what is worth building.

你的一位同行 Hermann Hauser,问他是怎么判断什么东西值得做的。

I always start from pain.

我永远从痛点出发。

Are there new technologies to solve that pain?

有没有新技术能解决那个痛点?

Bring innovation in, revolution in, and redefine the space.

把创新带进来,把变革带进来,重新定义这个领域。

What's the threshold?

门槛在哪?

What's the sign of, OK, this isn't big enough?

什么信号能说明,OK,这个盘子不够大?

Well, the iPod wasn't big enough.

这么说吧,iPod 当年就不够大。

It took three generations of the iPod before it became successful.

iPod 出到第三代才算成功。

You got to fail a few times till you find your way.

你得摔几次跟头,才能找到自己的路。

You are so into marketing, that piece of building that I think a lot of builders don't think about at all.

你对营销特别上心——造东西里的这一块,我觉得很多 builder 压根没想过。

The technology's in service of the customer.

技术是为客户服务的。

Not we're going to jam the technology down the customer's throat.

而不是我们把技术硬塞进客户的喉咙里。

A customer only sees what they see through the lens of marketing.

客户能看到的,只有透过营销这面镜头看到的东西。

You often come back to the value storytelling for product builders.

你经常回到一个话题:讲故事对产品 builder 的价值。

Too many times when we're technology led, we talk about the what.

太多时候,我们被技术牵着走,只讲"是什么"。

We don't talk about the why.

不讲"为什么"。

The why is storytelling.

"为什么"就是讲故事。

When I watched Steve, he was honing the story of the iPhone every day.

我看 Steve 的时候,他每天都在打磨 iPhone 的故事。

And so when you saw him come on stage, it was just cuz he had done it a hundred thousand times.

所以你看到他站上舞台的样子,只不过是因为他已经练过十万遍了。

Today my guest is Tony Fadell.

今天我的嘉宾是 Tony Fadell。

Tony doesn't know this, but ever since I started this podcast, he's been near the top of my wish list of people that I've dreamed to have on this podcast.

Tony 自己并不知道,但从我开播这档 podcast 起,他就一直排在我梦想邀请名单的最前面。

And that's because Tony is the epitome of what most people listening to this podcast want to become.

因为 Tony 正是这档节目大多数听众想成为的那种人的典范。

He co-created some of the most innovative and beautiful and popular products in history.

他共同缔造了历史上最具创新性、最漂亮、最受欢迎的一批产品。

The iPod, the iPhone, the Nest thermostat.

iPod、iPhone、Nest 温控器。

He's also famous for being part of the legendary team at General Magic.

他还因为身处 General Magic 那支传奇团队而闻名。

He's co-authored over 300 patents.

他共同署名的专利超过 300 项。

He also wrote one of the most important and valuable and inspiring books for builders called Build.

他还写了一本对 builder 来说数一数二重要、有价值、鼓舞人心的书,叫《Build》。

Tony is currently an active investor and advisor to deep tech startups with his team at The Build Collective.

Tony 目前和他在 The Build Collective 的团队一起,活跃地为 deep tech 初创公司做投资和顾问。

He was recently named the inaugural designer in residence at the MIT Morning Academy of Design.

他最近刚被任命为 MIT Morning Academy of Design 的首任驻校设计师。

There's so much gold in this episode.

这期节目里的干货多到爆。

I could go on and on.

我还能一直往下夸。

I'm going to leave it there.

就先说到这儿。

Before we get into it, don't forget to check out Lenny's Podcast dot com for a free year of some of the hottest and most well-crafted AI products in the world available exclusively to Lenny's newsletter subscribers.

进入正题之前,别忘了去 LennysPodcast.com 看看——Lenny's newsletter 订阅者可以独享一整年免费使用全球最火、打磨最精的一批 AI 产品。

With that, I bring you Tony Fadell.

好,下面有请 Tony Fadell。

Tony, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.

Tony,非常感谢你能来,欢迎来到节目。

Thanks for having me.

谢谢邀请。

I appreciate it.

很感谢。

I have a a bazillion questions I want to ask you.

我有一 一大堆问题想问你,多到数不清。

I feel like I could fill 4 hours of conversation with all the things that I want to get out of your head.

我感觉光是想从你脑子里挖出来的东西,就够聊满 4 个小时。

I want to start with uh with the BlackBerry.

我想先从,呃,从 BlackBerry 说起。

I was just watching the uh BlackBerry movie recently and it's kind of this journey of the BlackBerry founders and their story.

我最近刚看了那部,呃,BlackBerry 电影,讲的差不多就是 BlackBerry 创始人们的历程和他们的故事。

And then at the end they're like, "Oh, and this iPhone thing launched."

然后到结尾他们来了一句:"哦,然后这个叫 iPhone 的东西发布了。"

And they're like, "Nah, this is dumb. It's like no keyboard. This is not serious. Can't do anything with it."

他们的反应是:"切,这玩意儿真蠢。连键盘都没有。根本不能当真。啥也干不了。"

I've always wondered just being on the other side of this, being within Apple building the iPhone, uh how much did you guys actually doubt that, okay, maybe they have something, maybe we need to add a keyboard?

我一直很好奇,站在这件事的另一边——身在 Apple 里做 iPhone 的你们,呃,当时到底有多怀疑过:好吧,也许他们真有点东西,也许我们该加个键盘?

It was the most heated conversation and it dragged out the longest.

那是吵得最凶的一场争论,也是拖得最久的一场。

There was one one way of looking at the BlackBerry, which was that is the market we want to go after and we want to win.

有一 一种看待 BlackBerry 的角度是:那就是我们要进攻、要赢下的市场。

And then there's the other side, the flip side of that argument, which is only 1% or 2% of mobile phone users at the time had a BlackBerry, knew what a BlackBerry was.

然后还有另一面,这个论点的反面:当时手机用户里只有 1% 或 2% 的人有 BlackBerry、知道 BlackBerry 是个啥。

So, what about the other 98% of the people?

那,剩下 98% 的人呢?

What would they want?

他们会想要什么?

What would they need?

他们会需要什么?

Why are we going to go after winning this this very loyal and and and you know, um incredibly passionate user base and try to pull them away from something.

我们干嘛要去争这 这群极其忠诚、而且而且而且你知道的,嗯,狂热到不行的用户群,非要把他们从原来的东西上拽过来?

And so, there was this basically head-to-head competition between a display keyboard or virtual keyboard and a physical keyboard.

于是,基本上就形成了一场正面对决:屏显键盘也就是虚拟键盘,对阵实体键盘。

I had been doing virtual keyboards for a while since General Magic and then the in the '90s.

我做虚拟键盘已经有一阵子了,从 General Magic 开始,然后是那个 90 年代。

And I knew what handwriting was and and keyboards were like on these touch screens.

我很清楚手写和和键盘在这类触摸屏上是什么体验。

And but I I was only doing it on a and I was writing software and calibrating them and making trying to make them work with a single touch uh display, resistive or what have you.

但我 我当时只是在一个……我写软件、做校准,想方设法让它们在单点触控的,呃,屏幕上跑起来,电阻屏之类的。

And so, I knew what the limitations were of those kinds of things.

所以那类东西的局限在哪,我心里有数。

So, I was like, "Hmm, this is really going to be difficult."

所以我当时想:"嗯,这事真的会很难。"

And we hadn't, you know, multi-touch was just, you know, was on a big ping pong table.

而且我们还没有,你知道,多点触控当时还,你知道,还摆在一张乒乓球桌那么大的台子上。

It like it hadn't been scaled down.

它就是 它还没被缩小到能用的尺寸。

So, it wasn't like something in a consumptive form where you could really do user test with it.

所以它还不是那种消费级形态的东西,能真正拿来做用户测试。

And so, we set out a set of tests.

于是我们定了一组测试。

Like, okay, how fast can I type this text?

比如,好,这段文字我能打多快?

How can I How fast can I do this on a hardware keyboard?

我怎么能 我在实体键盘上能打多快?

And then, how can we do this on the virtual one with multi-touch?

然后,在带多点触控的虚拟键盘上,我们又能做到什么程度?

And it was a hardware-software integration challenge of how we could get this to work.

这是一个软硬件整合的难题:我们要怎么把这事跑通。

So, we were going back and forth and back and forth.

于是我们就来来回回、来来回回地磨。

Oh, that doesn't quite work in the software.

哦,这个在软件里不太行。

Oh, that we need to change this in the hardware.

哦,那个得在硬件上改。

And so, this was a over a set of months would Okay, the hardware keyboard's here and you know, and depends on how you know, how much you've been using it and but if there's this margin of error and we could really understand it.

就这样,这是一个持续好几个月的过程……好,实体键盘在这个水平,你知道,还得看你知道,你用了多久,但只要有这么一个误差范围,我们就能真正把它摸透。

This over time was started way down here and then started get it, you know, and we got a little faster and a little faster and a little faster.

这条曲线一开始在很低很低的位置,后来开始往上走,你知道,我们越打越快、越打越快、越打越快。

And how many errors?

还有,错多少?

Not just how fast, but how many errors and how do you correct the errors and and all of those things.

不光看多快,还要看出多少错、怎么纠错,以及以及所有这些东西。

And at the end of the day I was able to convince myself it wasn't going to be a hardware issue.

到最后,我说服了自己:这事不会卡在硬件上。

And I was convinced at some point that we were good enough.

到某个时点我已经确信:我们够好了。

Were we as good as a hardware keyboard?

我们有实体键盘那么好吗?

No.

没有。

But were we good enough?

但我们够好了吗?

Yes.

够了。

And then other people came to that conclusion.

后来其他人也得出了同样的结论。

But at the same time there were other people who were adamant that the hardware keyboard has to be there.

但与此同时,还有另一拨人死咬着实体键盘必须保留。

And they were unrelenting.

他们寸步不让。

And so it came down to So this was a you know, classic like I I say in build the data versus opinion based decision.

所以最后就归结为……这就是一个,你知道,经典的,就像我 我在《Build》里说的,"数据型决策 vs 观点型决策"。

And if you think about it, you had data that said there was pros and cons on both sides.

你想想看,数据显示两边各有利弊。

And what happened was the data was not clear that we should choose one over the other.

而实际情况是,数据并没有明确告诉我们该选哪一边。

And Steve said, "We are going this way."

然后 Steve 说:"我们走这条路。"

Enough other people kind of said, "Yeah, that seems like that's the right thing to do. We're going to get close enough to get there."

足够多的人也差不多表态:"对,看起来这么做是对的。我们能做到足够接近,能走到那一步。"

And then other people were like, "No, my opinion is this."

然后另一些人则是:"不,我的观点是这样。"

And guess who wins at the end of the day?

猜猜最后谁赢?

Steve Jobs' opinion does.

Steve Jobs 的观点赢。

And he was like, "If you're not going to get on board, get out of this room and you can go work on another project, but you're not going to work on this one."

他就直接说:"你要是不打算上这条船,就离开这间屋子,你可以去做别的项目,但这个项目没你的份了。"

This episode is brought to you by our season's presenting sponsor WorkOS.

本期节目由本季的冠名赞助商 WorkOS 呈现。

What do Open AI, Anthropic, Cursor, Vercel, Replit, Sierra, Clay, and hundreds of other winning companies all have in common?

OpenAI、Anthropic、Cursor、Vercel、Replit、Sierra、Clay,还有数百家其他赢家公司,它们有什么共同点?

They are all powered by WorkOS.

它们全都在用 WorkOS。

If you're building a product for the enterprise, you've felt the pain of integrating single sign-on, SCIM, RBAC, audit logs, and other features required by large companies.

如果你在做面向企业的产品,你一定体会过接入单点登录、SCIM、RBAC、审计日志这些大公司必备功能的痛苦。

WorkOS turns those deal blockers into drop-in APIs with a modern developer platform built specifically for B2B SaaS.

WorkOS 把这些卡单的拦路虎变成即插即用的 API,背后是一个专为 B2B SaaS 打造的现代开发者平台。

Literally every startup that I'm an investor in that starts to expand upmarket ends up working with WorkOS.

毫不夸张地说,我投资的每一家开始往高端市场扩张的创业公司,最后都用上了 WorkOS。

And that's because they are the best.

因为他们就是最好的。

Whether you are seed stage startup trying to land your first enterprise customer or a unicorn expanding globally, WorkOS is the fastest path to becoming enterprise ready and unblocking growth.

不管你是想拿下第一个企业客户的种子期创业公司,还是正在全球扩张的独角兽,WorkOS 都是让产品具备企业级能力、打通增长的最快路径。

It's essentially Stripe for enterprise features.

它本质上就是企业级功能领域的 Stripe。

Visit workos.com to get started or just hit up their Slack where they have actual engineers waiting to answer your questions.

访问 workos.com 开始使用,或者直接去他们的 Slack,那里有真正的工程师随时回答你的问题。

WorkOS allows you to build faster with the delightful APIs, comprehensive docs, and a smooth developer experience.

WorkOS 有让人愉悦的 API、完善的文档和顺滑的开发者体验,帮你更快地构建产品。

Go to workos.com to make your app enterprise ready today.

现在就去 workos.com,让你的应用具备企业级能力。

One direction I want to get into here is this idea that you'll talk a lot about, about, uh, micromanaging being actually really, uh, important and powerful.

接下来我想聊的一个方向,是你经常谈到的一个观点——呃,微观管理其实非常重要、非常有力量。

So, there's this image that's floating around Twitter that I don't know if you've seen.

Twitter 上流传着一张图,不知道你有没有见过。

I'll show it on the screen as I'm describing it and hopefully you can visualize it.

我边描述边把它放到屏幕上,希望你能想象出来。

It's a functional system versus a, a dysfunctional system.

图上对比的是一个运转良好的系统和一个、一个失灵的系统。

Basically, a company that's doing great versus not great.

基本上就是一家做得很好的公司,对比一家做得不好的公司。

And there's this chart that goes up to more functional that is, uh, basically unkind truth and then another unkind truth, another unkind truth creates more functional systems.

图里有一条往"更良性运转"方向走的线,呃,基本上就是一句不客气的真话,再一句不客气的真话,一句接一句,造就了更良性运转的系统。

Uh, kind lie followed by kind lie followed by kind lie leads to dysfunctional systems.

呃,而善意的谎言接着善意的谎言,再接着善意的谎言,通向的是失灵的系统。

Something Steve Jobs is very famous for.

这也是 Steve Jobs 特别出名的一点。

Yeah, in your book you talk about mission-driven are actually really You want You want a mission-driven There's certain types of that are great.

对,你书里也讲过,使命驱动型的人其实真的很——你想要、你想要一个使命驱动型的——某几类这样的人是很棒的。

Talk about just the importance of somebody being very direct in what it takes to build great products.

聊聊这一点吧:要做出伟大的产品,有人非常直接地说话,到底有多重要。

When you're doing a 1.0 of anything, when you're doing, if you're doing anything that matters and it's a 1.0 and it's a new category or it's a new device the world hasn't seen before, you have very few analogs that you can use to make data-driven decisions.

当你做任何东西的 1.0 时——当你在做、如果你在做一件真正重要的事,它是个 1.0,是个新品类,或者是个世界从没见过的新设备,那你几乎找不到可以参照的先例来做数据驱动的决策。

And so, if most of your decisions are going to be opinion-based decisions for a 1.0, you have to have one or two or a very, very small set of people who are in charge with making the opinion-based decisions and can actually get you from point A to from a, a white paper, a, you know, a white blank, blank sheet of white paper or whiteboard to an actual 1.0 spec.

所以,如果做 1.0 时你的大部分决策都得靠主观判断,那你必须有一两个人、或者一个非常非常小的团队来负责拍这些主观决策,他们能真正带你从 A 点走到——从一张白纸、一块、你知道的、一张空白的白纸或白板,走到一份真正的 1.0 规格书。

Because if you try to do data-driven decisions all the way along, you're, you're either not doing a differentiated product because you're taking data from another thing or you're just getting just data. Right?

因为如果你想一路全靠数据驱动来做决策,你要么做不出差异化的产品——因为你的数据是从别的东西上拿来的,要么你拿到的就只是一堆数据而已。对吧?

So, you're going to have to figure out how to get opinion-based decisions to happen, and that means you have to have, you know, for lack of a better word, tastemakers.

所以你必须想清楚怎么让主观决策发生,这就意味着你得有——你知道,找不到更好的词了——品味定调人。

This is what we are doing.

我们干的就是这个。

We are the, the person or the team who is going to make those opinion-based decisions.

我们就是那个、那个要拍这些主观决策的人或团队。

Of course, some people aren't going to like it, and it's going to be like, "I'm sorry, this is a benevolent dictatorship."

当然,有些人不会喜欢,那就得说:"抱歉,这是一个仁慈的独裁。"

"This is what's going to happen, and this is the vision, and we don't know what we don't know until we ship it and we get opinions from the, you know, the, the, the users."

"事情就会这么走,愿景就是这个,而在把它发布出去、听到,你知道,那些、那些用户的意见之前,我们并不知道自己不知道什么。"

Now, it's very different when you do this on a, in a B2B context versus a B2C context.

另外,在 B2B 场景和 B2C 场景里做这件事,差别非常大。

And so, the hardest environment to work with it when, when you have these opinion-based decisions is in a B2C context because you have to see these decisions in the full light, and you don't, a consumer does.

所以,做这类主观决策最难的环境是 B2C,因为这些决策必须被放在完整的光照下审视,而你看不到全貌,消费者才看得到。

They have to see it in from the marketing, from how they discover it in the marketing, the key, uh, the key feature sets, the, the ability to use the product, all of these different things for them to actually come up with an opinion of what they like and what they don't like and being able to critique it.

他们得从营销里看到它、从营销里怎么发现它,到关键的、呃、关键的功能组合,再到、到实际上手用产品——所有这些环节合在一起,他们才能真正形成自己的看法:喜欢什么、不喜欢什么,才有能力去评判它。

And if you don't, And if you're doing a 1.0 and the world hasn't seen you, you're not going to get that from consumers, ever.

而如果你没有——如果你在做一个 1.0,世界还从没见过你,那你永远别想从消费者那里提前拿到这些反馈。

You have to ship it, and you have to build the entire kind of ecosystem so those consumers see it in the fullness so that when they do the evaluation and they spend their own money, then you're getting real feedback.

你必须把它发布出去,必须把整套生态都搭起来,让消费者完整地看到它,这样当他们做出评判、掏出自己的真金白银时,你拿到的才是真实的反馈。

When it comes to consumer hard atoms-based products with services or not, whatever it is, you have to build the entire thing and visualize the entire thing to be able to make those, uh, uh, opinion-based decisions.

对于消费级的实体硬件产品——不管带不带服务,不管是什么——你都得把整个东西做出来、把整个东西在脑子里过一遍,才能做那些、呃、呃、主观决策。

And so, you need a small team who's looking at the marketing angles, the engineering angles, the, the sales angles, all those different things to go, "Okay, that's the way we're going."

所以你需要一个小团队,同时盯着营销的角度、工程的角度、还有、还有销售的角度,把所有这些维度都看完,然后说:"好,我们就往这条路走。"

And there's only so many ways you can do it because the rest of the team doesn't see this either.

而且你能用的方式就那么几种,因为团队的其他人同样看不到这幅全景。

And so, you have to be very articulate about how, uh, what that opinion-based decision is made for, why, how it might affect market, how you do it, and make sure the team understands it.

所以你必须讲得非常清楚:呃,这个主观决策是为了什么、为什么这么定、它可能怎么影响市场、你打算怎么做,并且确保团队真的理解。

Now, if the team is just fully against it, well, then maybe it has to be unkind.

而如果团队就是全员反对,那,也许就只能来点不客气的了。

But hopefully, if you've done a good job and you really, you know, have an informed gut and you can articulate that, you can get everybody moving in the same direction, even if it is and it's going to be risky.

但理想情况下,如果你做足了功课,真的,你知道,有一副有依据的直觉,而且能把它讲清楚,你就能让所有人朝同一个方向走——哪怕这条路确实有风险,而且一定会有风险。

You're right, you got to know that you got to take risk, cuz most people in those other functions, they don't want to take any risks.

没错,你得清楚你必须承担风险,因为其他职能里的大多数人,他们一点风险都不想冒。

And so, there's someone who's got to be the target, right?

所以,总得有个人站出来当靶子,对吧?

And today, you know, in many contexts, people go and hire consultants. Right?

而如今,你知道,在很多场合,人们的做法是去请咨询顾问。对吧?

They go and hire, okay, we're going to do a user study, or we're going to do all this, and they don't have the user study, they don't have the full context like I was just describing.

他们去请人,好,我们要做个用户调研,或者我们要做这一整套,但那些人没有真正的用户调研,也没有我刚才描述的那种完整上下文。

They don't go buy the product, and they don't what have you, and then they get data.

他们不会自己掏钱买产品,也不会做诸如此类的事,然后他们就拿到了一堆数据。

And that's because the leader, or whoever's in there, or board maybe, it's like, we need data to make sure this 1.0 is going to be a success.

而这背后是因为领导者,或者管这事的什么人,也可能是董事会,想的是:我们需要数据来确保这个 1.0 一定成功。

And I saw this so many times at all these major corporations.

这种事我在那些大公司里见过太多太多次了。

So, they're just kind of covering their ass with data, and not really doing the hard work of saying, I'm going to make this decision, and we are going to select this, and yes, I might be wrong, or we as the opinion based decision makers are wrong, and we will correct it later.

所以他们只是拿数据给自己免责,而不去做真正难的事:说出"这个决定我来拍,我们就选这个,对,我可能会错,或者我们这些做主观决策的人错了,我们之后会纠正"。

And we'll take the heat for that.

而且这个锅我们来背。

So, that's the, you know, a great product manager, a great person who's leading this thing, has to understand that's, that's what they have to do if they're really doing something innovative.

所以这就是,你知道,一个伟大的产品经理、一个真正领导这件事的人必须明白:如果真要做创新的东西,这就是、这就是他们必须承担的。

So, what I'm hearing here is just the power, especially in a consumer product, of a singular vision of a singular leader that drives it, that is basically relies on their instinct and their taste and their experience.

所以我听下来的重点是:尤其在消费级产品里,一个由单一领导者驱动的单一愿景有多大力量——它基本上靠的是这个人的直觉、品味和经验。

They and, and, and a lot of, but again, a lot of informed judgment from all the experts around, asking questions, refining, prototyping, these kinds of things to then make a decision.

他们还有、还有、还有很多——但要强调,还有来自周围所有专家的大量有依据的判断:提问、打磨、做原型,靠这些东西最后才做出决定。

So, it's not just like, I woke up one morning and, you know, this is, you know, now it's we're going this direction.

所以不是说,我某天早上一睁眼,你知道,就这样,你知道,现在我们就往这个方向走了。

No, it's, it, there's a lot of work to get, to get there.

不是的,要走到、走到那一步,背后有大量的工作。

I want to come back to the idea of micromanaging, which a lot of people like to, a lot of people that word is, is a bad.

我想回到微观管理这个话题,很多人喜欢——在很多人眼里这个词是、是个贬义词。

Don't be a micromanager.

别当一个微观管理者。

You advocate for, for creating great products, you need to actually be really micromanaging.

而你主张的是:要、要做出伟大的产品,你实际上需要真刀真枪地微观管理。

You just speak to that.

你就聊聊这一点吧。

What do you feel you think miss about the importance and power of micromanaging as a, as a leader?

你觉得大家对领导者做微观管理的重要性和力量,到底忽略了什么?

You know, we've heard the term sweat the details.

你知道,我们都听过"抠细节"这个说法。

It's micromanagement of certain details.

它就是对某些特定细节的微观管理。

And then there's the kind of hands-off of other details.

而对另一些细节,你则要放手不管。

You have to really understand the blend of which things really matter, which things don't.

你必须真正搞清楚这个配比:哪些事真的重要,哪些不重要。

When I was early in my career, I thought everything mattered.

我职业生涯早期,以为每件事都重要。

And I drove everybody nuts, drove myself nuts, the people hated like, you know, the, and it became my, it became like everybody's got to do it the way I would do it.

结果我把所有人都逼疯了,也把自己逼疯了,大家都恨死了,你知道,那种——然后就变成了我的、变成了所有人都得按我的方式来做事。

It's like no, no, no, no.

其实不对,不不不不。

There's only a few key things mostly for the customer or maybe some certain things for manufacturing or cost or something where it needs to really be very clear or a long-term vision.

真正关键的就那么几件事,大多是为了客户,或者可能是制造、成本之类的某些环节,需要定得非常清楚,或者关乎长期愿景。

But then you can delegate other things, but certain pieces of it you really need to

其他事情你都可以下放,但其中某些部分你真的必须——

And when I mean micromanaging, it means micromanage the decision, not necessarily operations of doing it.

我说的微观管理,指的是微观管理决策本身,不一定是执行层面的具体操作。

Making sure you're getting the data like we did with the keyboard on the iPhone to make sure we're getting the right data to help us get the informed gut to make that opinion-based decision.

确保你拿到数据——就像我们做 iPhone 键盘那样,确保拿到正确的数据,来帮我们练出有依据的直觉,去拍那个主观决策。

And so, so it's, it's the, the, the, the micro specification and delivery of those certain data pieces that you need.

所以、所以关键就在于、在于、在于对你需要的那几块数据做微观级的定义和交付。

And, and maybe it's also to get out of a crisis.

而且、而且有时也是为了从危机里脱身。

Or maybe it's a, it's a system level thing where you have to worry about this thing at the low level changing up here and here and like, like we could do that, but only if they do this and this is like, "Okay, guys, we're going to fix all of those things at once."

又或者是个、是个系统层面的问题:你得操心底层这个东西一改,会牵动上面这里和这里,就像、就像我们可以这么干,但前提是他们得先做那个——于是就变成:"好,各位,我们要把所有这些问题一次性全修掉。"

And you have to micromanage it because everybody wants to find excuses why they can't do that or they can't do that.

这时你必须微观管理,因为每个人都想找借口,说这个干不了、那个干不了。

So you have to ask why a lot.

所以你得反复地问为什么。

So it just, and but it's all in service of some really key detail that needs to get delivered or some innovation that needs to be delivered.

所以这一切——但这一切都是为了某个必须交付的关键细节,或者某项必须落地的创新。

Just like, like I said the keyboard, we had to do the hardware, we had to do the software, we had to do the filt- filtering, you know, we had to do how it was, how the graphics were done on the screen.

就像、像我说的键盘那个例子:我们得做硬件,得做软件,得做过——过滤算法,你知道,还得做屏幕上图形是怎么、怎么呈现的。

So, you had all of these layers that had to keep constantly changing and adjusting and, and, and sometimes you have to micromanage that because there's just too many variables and someone has to be the orchestrator of this, of this huge orchestra of many different components to kind of make it all come together and be harmonious.

所以你有这么多层东西要不停地变、不停地调,而且、而且、而且有时你必须微观管理,因为变量实在太多,总得有个人来当指挥,指挥这支、这支由无数不同组件组成的庞大交响乐团,让一切汇到一起、和谐共鸣。

I want to go in a slightly different direction.

我想稍微换个方向。

I want to talk about the Nest.

我想聊聊 Nest。

The thermostat, I'm assuming.

你说的是温控器吧,我猜。

Thermostat, yeah.

温控器,对。

What versus what, the bird? A bird?

不然还能是什么,那个鸟?鸟窝那种?

Was many other Nest products.

还有很多其他 Nest 产品呢。

Right.

对。

All right.

好吧。

Yeah.

嗯。

Uh man, the uh smoke alarm — is is that discontinued, by the way, the smoke alarm?

呃老兄,那个呃烟雾报警器——顺便问一句,是是停产了吗,那个烟雾报警器?

Yeah, I just —

对,我就是——

Oh, you you you just — What do you — Why do you you want to stab me in the heart? Like 2 years ago.

哦,你你你这是——你干嘛——你干嘛非要往我心口捅刀子?大概两年前停的。

That was one of the toughest products I and our team and Nest and other people who were on the team have ever made in their life cuz it's so hard to make something like that that's — There's so many constraints.

那是我、我们团队、Nest 以及团队里所有人这辈子做过的最难的产品之一,因为做那种东西太难了——约束条件实在太多。

Like that's an ultimate constraint kind of product to actually innovate in.

那种产品,想真正在里面搞创新,属于终极约束级别。

So, yes, it unfortunately is discontinued.

所以,是的,很遗憾,它停产了。

But it was the best product in the space for a decade and no one changed it, no one invested in it.

但它在那个品类里当了十年最好的产品,没人动过它,也没人往里投入。

It It is so crazy.

这 这太疯狂了。

It's It like pains me and it pains everyone.

这 这让我心痛,也让所有人心痛。

People are like, "They're expiring around me. What do I do?"

大家都在问:"我家里的都陆续到期了,我该怎么办?"

And I'm like, "I wish I could tell you there's something better."

我只能说:"我真希望能告诉你有更好的选择。"

No one replaced it with something better.

没有人拿出更好的东西来取代它。

I It's just It's mind-boggling that the number one product with revenue and everything, you're just going to toss it away.

我 这真的 这真的难以理解——一个排第一、有收入、什么都有的产品,你说扔就扔了。

Why do you think that's happening?

你觉得为什么会这样?

Cuz it was an orphan.

因为它是个没人管的孤儿。

It's an or- It's just not a big enough business within Google and they got that merger.

是个孤——就是它在 Google 里的业务体量不够大,后来又赶上那次合并。

No, no.

不,不。

It was Yeah, it was Yeah, it was a stepchild.

它是 对,它是 对,它就是个后妈养的孩子。

They You really had to pour a lot of love a lot of a lot of attention, a lot of love to make something that was that crystalline.

他们 你真的得倾注大量的爱、大量 大量的心思、大量的爱,才能做出那么晶莹剔透的东西。

And and it had to be well-formed and nobody really wanted to put in the effort.

而且 而且它必须打磨得非常完整,可没人真想下那个功夫。

So, they probably like, "Who want to do this? Who's excited by it?"

所以他们大概就问:"谁想干这个?谁对它有热情?"

Nobody was probably excited and they just said, "Yeah, okay, we'll just — it's not that big a deal in the end of the day,"

估计没人有热情,他们就说:"行吧,那就——说到底这也不是多大的事,"

where if it was invested in, I think it would have been a critical piece of the next generation AI assistant in your home.

可要是当初持续投入,我认为它会成为你家里下一代 AI 助手的关键一环。

I want to hear more about that.

这个我想多听你讲讲。

And just on the smoke alarm point, I my favorite feature — I was at an Airbnb once and I just started — instead of just like straight to beeping, it was just like, "I'm about to make a loud noise."

再说回烟雾报警器,我 我最喜欢的功能——有次我住 Airbnb,它突然启动了——不是直接开始狂响,而是先说:"我马上要发出很大的声音了。"

Like that.

就那样。

It's just warning you that it's going to get —

它就是在提前警告你,声音马上要——

We call it heads up.

我们管这个功能叫 heads up(提前预告)。

I love that feature so much.

我太爱这个功能了。

It's like, "It's about to get very loud."

它就像在说:"马上要变得非常吵了。"

You were telling me.

你这是提前打招呼啊。

That was so good.

那个设计太棒了。

You know, it's so that you don't get PTSD every time cuz you know when a smoke alarm go off, you're like, "Okay, everyone calm. We're going to do this now."

你知道,这就是为了别让你每次都留下 PTSD——因为烟雾报警器一响,你就得:"好,大家冷静,我们现在来处理这个。"

Especially when we're doing tests and stuff.

尤其是我们做测试之类的时候。

We're like, you know, when we're — cuz the people are supposed to test or are supposed to test itself.

我们就,你知道,当我们——因为按理说人得去测试它,或者它得自己测试自己。

Like, you know, like, "Everyone stay calm. It's going to be good, children. We just we're going to do this one thing. You'll get through it. Don't worry."

就像,你知道,像这样:"大家保持冷静,没事的,孩子们。我们就 我们就做这一件事,你们能挺过去的,别担心。"

That's so good.

太妙了。

I was like, "Thank you so much for telling me."

我当时就想:"太感谢你提前告诉我了。"

There was a lot of love and care poured in that thing.

那个东西里倾注了太多的爱和心血。

So, I was going to ask specifically about the Nest.

所以我本来就想专门问问 Nest。

Like, the Nest thermostat is still the best thermostat out there.

就是,Nest 温控器到今天依然是市面上最好的温控器。

I use it everywhere I go.

我走到哪儿都在用它。

It's just the best.

它就是最好的。

The app hasn't evolved.

但 app 一直没进化。

Nothing's changed for a long time.

很长时间什么都没变过。

Is it the same reason you just described?

是你刚才说的同一个原因吗?

It's just not a priority?

就是优先级不够?

It's definitely not.

它显然不是什么优先事项。

Yeah, it you know, the the whole organization was a stepchild for whatever reason.

对,你知道,不管出于什么原因,整个组织都是后妈养的。

You know, there was cultural mismatch.

你知道,有文化上的不匹配。

There was, you know, probably a business mismatch.

可能还有,你知道,业务上的不匹配。

Um I think if Nest was uh around and alive today like it was, it would have a whole different thing when like Google and Gemini and Google IO was what yesterday or the day before.

嗯,我觉得如果 Nest 今天还像当年那样活着,那局面会完全不同——你看 Google 和 Gemini,Google I/O 不就是昨天还是前天刚开的嘛。

Um you know, it would have been one of the I think some of the centerpieces of what you could do because AI needs context.

嗯,你知道,它本可以成为其中一个 我认为会是几大核心亮点之一,因为 AI 需要上下文。

AI needs a lot of context.

AI 需要大量上下文。

And in a home, you want to make everything very seamless.

而在家里,你希望一切都非常无缝。

Um and the way you get best context is by having sensors properly placed around the home that don't necessarily invade privacy, but allow you to pick up a lot of comings and goings and who's who in the room and your voice and these kinds of things.

嗯,拿到最佳上下文的方式,就是在家里合理布置传感器——不一定会侵犯隐私,但能捕捉到大量的人来人往、屋里都有谁、你的语音这类信息。

Um audio, I should say, not voice.

嗯,准确说是音频,不是语音。

Um to be able to give AIs context so that you can have a anywhere assistant that really knows what's going on.

嗯,把上下文喂给 AI,你就能拥有一个真正知道家里发生了什么、走到哪儿都跟着你的助手。

Is there space for someone to launch the new Nest, do you think?

你觉得,现在还有空间让谁来做一个新的 Nest 吗?

Oh, for sure.

哦,当然有。

For sure.

绝对有。

People keep asking me, "Why are we going to do it?"

一直有人问我:"我们为什么要去做这个?"

It's like, no, absolutely.

我就说:不用怀疑,绝对要做。

It's now's the I now's the time if it isn't already happening.

现在就是 我 现在就是时机——如果不是已经有人在做的话。

I'm actually getting business plans of people who are like, "Hey, you know, is this interesting to you? Want to invest in it? You want to come and help us, you know, build it? This is like Nest 2.0."

我真的在收到别人发来的商业计划书,他们说:"嘿,你知道,这个你感兴趣吗?想投一笔吗?要不要来帮我们一起做?这就像 Nest 2.0。"

So, you know, they're trying to do stuff like that at Ring.

所以,你知道,Ring 那边也在试着做类似的东西。

I don't think very, you know, it not very privacy-focused, but that's what they're trying to do.

我觉得不太,你知道,那不太注重隐私,但他们就是在往那个方向做。

That was our vision in the beginning, to tell you the truth.

说实话,那就是我们一开始的愿景。

That's how we we were like, "You're going to need lots of context home."

我们当时就是 就是这么想的:"家里会需要大量上下文。"

Cuz we remember, we the Nest learning thermostat wasn't the Nest AI thermostat.

因为要记得,我们 Nest 学习型温控器当年可没叫 Nest AI 温控器。

It could have been called that, but we couldn't call it that in 2011 cuz people would have freaked out.

它本可以叫那个名字,但 2011 年我们不能那么叫,因为大家会被吓到。

Now, you would have called it the Nest AI thermostat, right?

放到现在,你肯定会叫它 Nest AI 温控器,对吧?

And people would have bought it.

而且大家会买账。

Um and so, we knew what AI was, right?

嗯,所以我们那时候就知道 AI 是什么,对吧?

So, since 2010, that was one of the predict one of the foundation piece foundational pieces of the company was AI.

所以从 2010 年起,AI 就是公司的一个预 一块基石 基础支柱之一。

And so, that's how we were able to do a lot of the things we were able to do, but it was in much, you know, obviously not LLMs, but smaller stuff.

所以我们才做成了那么多事,只不过用的,你知道,显然不是 LLM,是小得多的东西。

And we said, "Okay, we can see this world growing in this AI assistant."

我们当时说:"好,我们能看到这个世界正朝 AI 助手的方向生长。"

Then voice assistants came, then then there was Alexa and all that stuff that happened later on in 2013, 14, 15.

后来语音助手来了,然后 然后有了 Alexa,那一堆事都发生在后面的 2013、14、15 年。

It's like, "Okay."

我们就想:"好嘛。"

And that was Gen 1, but we could see this kind of blossoming and you know, unfortunately in the fullness of time it takes 15 years more you know, from the time one Nest launched for that vision to come to fruition,

那是第一代,但我们能看到这个方向在开花。可惜,你知道,把时间拉长看,从初代 Nest 发布算起,这个愿景足足多花了 15 年才落地,

but it is there now and it and if Nest was if we pitched it that way we were just too we were just too early.

但现在它真的到来了。而如果 Nest 当年 如果我们当年那样去讲这个故事,我们只是太 只是太早了。

Let me follow this thread around how to know what to build and what how you come up with ideas.

让我顺着这条线往下聊:怎么判断该做什么,以及你的点子是怎么来的。

So you emailed a bunch of people that know you, asked them what to ask you.

你之前给一堆熟悉你的人发邮件,问他们该问你什么。

One of your colleagues Herman Herman Hauser Herman —

你的一位老同事 Hermann Hermann Hauser Hermann——

Hauser, yeah.

Hauser,对。

Herman Hauser.

Hermann Hauser。

So his question he wanted me to ask you said, ask him how he decides what is worth building.

他想让我问你的问题是:问问他,他是怎么决定什么值得做的。

Okay.

好。

Well Herman's great.

Hermann 这人很棒。

I've known Herman since 1987 probably before any most of your listeners were even born.

我 1987 年就认识 Hermann 了,估计你大部分听众那会儿都还没出生。

But Herman just for context Herman was the creator of Acorn computer which was the Apple II of the UK back in the 70s

不过 Hermann 交代一下背景 Hermann 是 Acorn 计算机的缔造者,那是 70 年代英国版的 Apple II,

and then he created with a his team the ARM processor.

后来他又和他的团队一起造出了 ARM 处理器。

So Acorn RISC is so ARM means Acorn RISC machine from Acorn computer

所以 Acorn RISC 就是 所以 ARM 的意思是 Acorn RISC Machine,来自 Acorn 计算机,

and so he was the founder of one of the founders of ARM and so I was talking about processor.

所以他是 ARM 的创始人 联合创始人之一,所以我才提到处理器。

Anyway so that's so how do so so Herman and I go way way back.

总之,所以 怎么说呢 反正 Hermann 和我交情非常非常久了。

So the the thing is how do you solve your figure out what is worthy to be built and what's not.

所以 所以问题是:你怎么解决 怎么搞清楚什么值得做、什么不值得。

So um the first thing is I start from pain.

嗯,第一件事:我从痛点出发。

I you know, some people start from other directions.

我 你知道,有些人从别的方向切入。

I always start from pain.

我永远从痛点开始。

That's what I learned is what are people's pain right now or you can see it on the horizon they're going to have pain and in not too far away.

这是我学到的:人们现在的痛点是什么,或者你能在地平线上看到,不远的将来他们会有什么痛。

But how do you solve for that pain?

那怎么去解决那个痛?

And typically those pains were because when those products were created either it was unintentional consequence or it was a limitation of the technology at the time it was created

通常这些痛的根源在于:当年那些产品被创造出来时,要么是无心之失,要么是受限于当时的技术,

and it kind of just it evolved but it never revolutionized itself.

然后它就那么 它一直在缓慢演化,却从没革过自己的命。

And so, it just evolved in that same pain kind of was there, but it gave you enough of a a painkiller for the other problem that having this new pain was worth it.

所以它只是演化,老的痛一直在,但它对另一个问题的止痛效果够强,让你觉得忍着这个新痛也值了。

And so, I always kind of start with okay, where's our current pain and are there new technologies to solve that pain?

所以我总是从这里开始:好,我们当下的痛在哪?有没有新技术能解决这个痛?

And like in the thermostat case, Nest was we could use AI to learn.

比如温控器这个案例,Nest 就是 我们可以用 AI 来学习。

So, it can learn when you're there, when you're away, what you temperatures you like so you don't have to program it so you can save energy.

它能学会你什么时候在家、什么时候外出、你 你喜欢什么温度,这样你不用手动编程,还能省能源。

So, the big pain was being either comfortable or saving money because 50% of your energy bill was in this heating and cooling unit that you you hated the interface, you didn't know what it was, you just paid the bill.

所以大痛点就是:要么图舒适、要么想省钱——因为你能源账单的 50% 都花在这台冷暖设备上,而你 你讨厌它的界面,不知道它是个什么东西,只是闷头交账单。

And so, it started from that pain and said, okay, well, programmable thermostats weren't innovated, but they weren't used.

所以一切从那个痛出发:好,可编程温控器没什么创新,而且也没人在用。

Like everyone a lot of them had it because you know, the energy company would give you rebates for it, but no one knew how to use it cuz it was arcane.

就是,大家 很多人家里都装了,因为你知道,能源公司会为它发补贴,但没人会用,因为它太晦涩了。

It was programming of VCR.

跟给 VCR 录像机编程一个德行。

And so, what I said was, oh, wait a second, what if it could learn your patterns?

所以我说:哦,等一下,如果它能学习你的生活规律呢?

And that was AI.

那就是 AI。

And so, now let's put that together in a much cooler looking attractive package that cost five to six times more than the the things that you're buying today,

然后,把这些装进一个好看得多、酷得多的外壳里,价格是你今天在买的那些 那些东西的五到六倍,

but that was the that was the crazy opinion-based decision was okay, yes, it's going to cost $249, but it's going to save you $800 to $1,200 a year.

但那就是 那就是那个疯狂的、凭观点拍板的决定:好,没错,它卖 $249,但它每年能帮你省 $800 到 $1,200。

So, it could pay for itself literally within a you know, a year or two.

所以它真的能在,你知道,一两年内把自己的钱省回来。

So, that was the kind of that was the big idea and AI was brought to bear on that old problem.

所以,那就是 那就是那个大创意:把 AI 压上去解这个老问题。

And and hopefully solve it in a new way.

然后 但愿能用一种全新的方式解决它。

So, so it starts with the pain, long-time pain, maybe habituated away pain that you have to discover and new technology bonded with that to then to then bring innovation in, revolution in, and and and then redefine the space in a way, which is what we did,

所以,一切始于痛点——存在已久的痛,甚至是被习惯掩盖掉、需要你去重新发现的痛——再把新技术和它绑在一起,进而 进而带来创新、带来革命,然后 然后 然后在某种意义上重新定义整个品类,我们就是这么干的,

which is not with just the product, but how you installed it, you know, it was always installed by third-party installers as opposed to yourself,

而且不只靠产品本身,还包括安装方式——你知道,以前它从来都是第三方安装工来装,而不是你自己动手,

how you bought it, which was you bought it through the installer, you didn't buy it in Best Buy or somewhere else.

还有购买方式——以前你得通过安装工买,而不是去 Best Buy 或别的地方买。

So, it was we had to reinvent many different pieces of the puzzle to get Nest to be the Nest — it wasn't just the product.

所以,我们必须把拼图里很多块都重新发明一遍,Nest 才能成为 Nest——绝不只是产品这一块。

It was all the other things.

是其他所有环节加在一起。

Just like the iPod wasn't the iPod or the iPhone smartphone wasn't the iPhone wasn't the iPhone.

就像 iPod 不只是 iPod,iPhone 这台智能手机也不是 也不只是 iPhone。

It was it was the iPhone plus the App Store iTunes plus uh iTunes uh iPod plus iTunes and then the iTunes music store.

而是 而是 iPhone 加上 App Store,iTunes 加上 呃 iTunes 呃 iPod 加 iTunes,再加上 iTunes 音乐商店。

So, you have to think about the full the full thing you're trying to build not just the one piece even though that's what you might remember.

所以你必须想清楚你要造的完整的 完整的东西,而不只是那一件——哪怕大家最后记住的可能只有那一件。

You have to remember it's it's a it's a system that you're going to innovate with.

你要记住:你要拿来创新的,是 是 是一整个系统。

So, these two-part kind of formula you shared here with pain and new technologies.

所以你刚分享的这个两段式公式:痛点加新技术。

The second part is really interesting.

第二部分特别有意思。

Essentially, it's like what's the why now?

本质上就是在问:why now,为什么是现在?

What's like the new tech that has emerged that now allows us to solve this pain?

就是说,冒出来了什么新技术,让我们现在终于能解决这个痛?

It feels like that's a core part of — Okay.

感觉这是核心的一环——好。

It's cuz it's interesting cuz when you talked about the the iPhone keyboard, it was a similar story of like okay, we can actually sort of do the virtual keyboard for the first time in history.

因为 有意思的是,你之前讲 iPhone 键盘时也是类似的故事:好,我们真的可以做出虚拟键盘了,史上第一次。

Right, exactly.

对,没错。

It could be because of multi-touch.

可能就是因为多点触控(multi-touch)。

That's really what it was and then we were just on the verge of having fast enough processors, right?

关键真的就在这,而且当时我们正好处在处理器马上够快的临界点上,对吧?

And we were just on the verge and so it wasn't you know, if you look at the iPhone or you look Nest iPhone or iPod, you can see where all these technologies were just coming to light.

我们就卡在那个临界点上,所以不是,你知道,你去看 iPhone,或者看 Nest、iPhone、iPod,你能看到所有这些技术当时都刚刚冒头。

So, in the iPod it was just now mass storage that was portable and battery operated.

所以在 iPod 上,就是那会儿刚出现的、便携的、电池驱动的大容量存储。

That was really what it was and it was also MP3s or digital music, right?

关键真的就是这个,另外还有 MP3,也就是数字音乐,对吧?

Those were kind of and we also had um high-density we were the first products to have lithium-ion or lithium prismatic polymer cells.

那些算是,而且我们还有嗯高密度,我们是第一批用上锂离子或者方形锂聚合物电芯的产品。

So, it was new battery technology, new new mass storage portable mass storage, and this new uh generation of uh digital music.

所以是新的电池技术、新的新的大容量存储便携大容量存储,还有这呃新一代的呃数字音乐。

And we had ARM processors, right?

而且我们有 ARM 处理器,对吧?

And so and they're really, really low power.

所以,它们功耗非常非常低。

So, all of those things had to come together to do that.

所以,所有这些东西必须凑到一起,才做得成那件事。

Um and then on the iPhone, it was the it was multi-touch, but it wasn't just that, it was also the fact that now we had Wi-Fi everywhere.

嗯,然后到 iPhone 上,是是多点触控,但不只是它,还有一个事实:那时 Wi-Fi 已经到处都是了。

And we knew that 3G was coming.

而且我们知道 3G 快来了。

Cuz we were it was only 2 and 1/2 G when that was and that was very slow, but we had Wi-Fi.

因为我们当时那会儿只有 2.5G,非常慢,但我们有 Wi-Fi。

And so, it was And we had cameras, right?

所以,那是,而且我们有摄像头了,对吧?

Digital cameras.

数码相机。

We had the digital camera.

我们有了数码相机。

We had digital video, which was the we had YouTube at the time.

我们有了数字视频,那是,当时我们已经有 YouTube 了。

So, it was all of those things just on the verge to say this is what's going to be very different than what just came before it like a BlackBerry, which was really just a texting machine and nothing else.

所以,所有这些东西都刚好到了临界点,可以说:这将和之前的东西完全不一样——比如 BlackBerry,那其实就是台发短信的机器,别的什么都不是。

I'm going to close the loop on the on your advice on finding a great idea.

我想把你关于怎么找到好点子的建议收个尾。

I'm curious about kind of the flip side of uh when it's still when it's not good enough.

我好奇的是反过来的那一面,呃,就是当它还,当它还不够好的时候。

So, there's like so many gadgets out there that are solving some pain level.

市面上有太多小硬件了,都在解决某种程度的痛点。

Maybe there's a new that they integrated, but they're still like it's not a big business.

也许有个新东西,他们整合进去了,但它们还是,它成不了大生意。

It's not a real company.

成不了一家真正的公司。

What's kind of what's the threshold?

那个门槛大概是什么?

What's like a sign of okay, this isn't big enough?

什么信号能说明:好吧,这个不够大?

Well, you know, the iPod wasn't big enough.

嘿,你知道吗,iPod 当年就不够大。

It took three generations of the iPod before it became successful.

iPod 花了三代才算成功。

Everyone you know, well, anyone who knows you know, if they remember iPod before iPhone because iPhone swallowed everything.

每个人你知道,好吧,懂的人你知道,如果他们还记得 iPhone 之前的 iPod——因为 iPhone 把一切都吞掉了。

It's like the black hole of everything.

它就像吞噬一切的黑洞。

But, you know, iPod the first generation was only successful with the Mac geeks and the Mac geeks were less than 1% of the market.

但你知道,iPod 第一代只在 Mac 极客那儿卖得动,而 Mac 极客占市场还不到 1%。

And then the second generation was also that way.

第二代也是那样。

So, when we we get we we'd sell everything we'd sell everything we could for the most part in the first quarter and then it would die because it was just the Mac aficionados, the loyalists who'd come and buy everything.

所以我们我们拿到,我们我们基本上第一个季度就能把能卖的全卖光,然后销量就死掉了,因为买的全是 Mac 发烧友、死忠粉,他们会来把所有东西都买走。

And it wasn't until the third generation where we made it work on Windows did it actually start we had the iTunes music store, did it actually start to take off?

直到第三代,我们让它支持了 Windows,它才真正开始,我们有了 iTunes 音乐商店,它才真正开始起飞。

So sometimes you have to say we're on the right thing, but we need to make some changes to get this market going.

所以有时候你得说:方向是对的,但我们得做些改变,才能把这个市场带起来。

And that was a real opinion-based decision.

而那真的是一个靠观点拍板的决策。

To you know, we the team at the team that I was running, we were really clear that we had to have Windows connectivity out of the gate.

对你知道,我们,我带的那个团队,我们非常清楚:必须一上来就支持 Windows。

Or not out of the gate, but just after the first iPod shipped.

或者不是一上来,而是第一代 iPod 出货之后马上就要有。

And Steve said, "Over my dead body, no way. This is going to help us sell more Macs."

结果 Steve 说:"除非我死了,没门。这东西是用来帮我们多卖 Mac 的。"

So and then he and then you know, we're like, "Okay, we're making the second one. Oh, we're going to keep it with Mac only. We just got to fix a few of these things and then all of a sudden it'll take off."

所以然后他,然后你知道,我们就想:"好吧,我们做第二代。哦,还是只支持 Mac。我们只要修掉这几个问题,然后它突然就会起飞。"

And it was like, it didn't take off.

结果呢,它没起飞。

So then it was it's a long story about how that about how we finally got Windows connectivity, but there was always this skunk works thing project behind the scenes doing that.

所以后来,我们最终怎么拿到 Windows 兼容,这说来话长,但幕后一直有一个 skunk works(臭鼬工厂式秘密项目)在偷偷做这件事。

I did the same thing with stylus.

我在手写笔上干过同样的事。

Steve never wanted a stylus on the iPhone or the iPad.

Steve 从来不想在 iPhone 或 iPad 上放手写笔。

He never wanted He never wanted it.

他从来不想,他从来就不想要。

He's like, "Your finger is good enough. If we can't do it with the finger."

他就说:"你的手指就够用了。如果我们用手指做不到的话。"

It's like And I'm like, "But we're going to have a B2B context and we're going to have forms filling and people are going to write."

就好像,然后我说:"但我们会有 B2B 场景,会有填表单,人们要写字。"

And and he's like, "I don't care. Just That means we're going to get to like Windows pen."

然后然后他说:"我不管。就,那意味着我们会搞成 Windows pen 那样。"

Cuz he thought it was going to be like Windows pen.

因为他觉得那会变成 Windows pen 那样。

Which was you had to use the pen for everything as opposed to using your finger.

那玩意是你干什么都得用笔,而不是用手指。

So it was like, I want it instead of pen dominant, I want it finger dominant.

所以就是,我要的不是以笔为主,我要的是以手指为主。

But it That's what he was saying.

但它,他当时就是这么说的。

But then when we added the stylus, which was another skunk works project, all of a sudden it came out and was like, "Well, we had to have stylus, right?"

但后来我们加上了手写笔——那又是一个 skunk works 项目——它一发布,画风突然就变成:"嗯,我们必须得有手写笔,对吧?"

And now it's a a big feature of the product.

现在它是这个产品的一个一个大卖点。

Not everyone uses it, but it is a big feature for certain professionals who who really want that.

不是所有人都用,但对某些真正真正想要它的专业人士来说,它是个重要功能。

And artists and hobbyists and stuff.

还有艺术家、爱好者之类的。

And so sometimes you have to have those skunk works things that even if the opinion-based leader doesn't like it, you're like, "That seems like the right thing. Maybe not right now, but it's going You can see it on the horizon."

所以有时候你就得有那些 skunk works 项目,哪怕那个靠观点拍板的领导不喜欢,你心里想:"这看起来就是对的方向。也许不是现在,但它会,你已经能在地平线上看到它了。"

So you just keep working on those things.

所以你就继续做那些东西。

So but we had to like I said, the the iPhone wasn't a hit right away.

所以但我们得,像我说的,iPhone 也不是一上来就爆的。

It was kind of like a oh yeah, it worked on AT&T and it was 2 and 1/2 G and it was this and that and you know, it did it only worked in the US.

它有点像,哦对,它只能在 AT&T 上用,还是 2.5G,还有这毛病那毛病,而且你知道,它它只在美国能用。

So, we had to get multiple versions till we got out and that's in my book, I have the and uh it's called um a three I think it's three generations.

所以我们得出好几个版本才走出来,这在我书里写了,我有那个,呃它叫嗯一个三,我记得是三代。

Everything needs three generations as Bill there it is.

一切都需要三代,就像 Bill,看,就是它。

Three generations.

三代。

I've I've learned you make the product, you fix the product and then you fix the business.

我我学到的是:先做出产品,再修好产品,然后修好生意。

So, you have there's no I I've never seen anyone get it all right the first time.

所以你得,没有,我我从没见过谁第一次就把所有事全做对。

Like you want you would like to, but you get close, but make the product, fix the product after you get customer feedback and then make the business which means make the margins.

你想,你当然希望能,但你只能接近,所以:做出产品,拿到客户反馈后修好产品,然后做成生意——也就是把利润率做出来。

Like on the first iPods we weren't making any money.

比如第一批 iPod,我们根本不赚钱。

First iPhones we weren't making any money.

第一批 iPhone,我们也不赚钱。

Right?

对吧?

The second iPhone or I say and second iPod, okay, we start getting a little bit better numbers.

第二代 iPhone,或者我说,还有第二代 iPod,好,数字开始好看一点了。

But we got more or less the features sort of dialed.

但功能上我们差不多算调顺了。

Third one was like, okay, Windows, we got the margins, we're getting up the volume, we got all the right and like go.

第三代就是:好,Windows 支持了,利润率有了,量在往上走,该有的都齐了,冲吧。

Right?

对吧?

Reliability, whatever else it had to be.

可靠性,还有其他一切它该有的。

So, you need to stick with your idea even if it's not necessarily going the first time unless there's something really severely your brain damaged about whatever it was.

所以,你得咬住你的想法,哪怕它第一次没跑起来——除非那东西本身有什么真正严重的、脑残级的问题。

You have to restart, but sometimes you have to hang in there.

那种情况你得重启,但有时候你就得扛住。

And same thing with Nest, we had to hang in there with two generations of the the smoke detector and few generations of the thermostat before we made the business work.

Nest 也一样,烟雾报警器我们扛了两代,恒温器扛了好几代,才把生意做通。

Right?

对吧?

Not just make the product work.

而不只是把产品做通。

There's so many directions I can go here.

这里能展开的方向太多了。

One that's interesting is how often Steve Jobs was actually wrong.

有意思的一个是:Steve Jobs 实际上错得有多频繁。

[snorts]

(嗤笑)

And how many times you had to

还有多少次你不得不——

You're like takes a year still like, okay, finally

你就,得耗上一年,还得,好吧,终于——

We all were wrong at certain times, but you know, it's when you hit those you when you hit it big, when you get the right ones they over they they overshadow all the other stuff that you

我们所有人都有错的时候,但你知道,当你押中那些,当你干成一票大的,当你做对的那几件,它们盖,它们它们会把其他所有的都盖过去,你那些——

but that's how you have to try and iterate, you know, Jeff Bezos says the same thing.

但你就得这么去试、去迭代,你知道,Jeff Bezos 也说过同样的话。

I believe in the same thing.

我信的也是这一套。

You got to fail a few times till you get to till you find your way.

你得失败几次,直到你走到,直到你找到自己的路。

And um and uh but that you only fail if you stop.

然后嗯然后呃,但重点是:只有停下来才算失败。

If you keep iterating and keep going, well, then that's not failure.

如果你一直迭代、一直往前走,那就不是失败。

That's called learning.

那叫学习。

The other interesting uh part of the story you just shared here with with some of my favorite stories in your book, actually.

你刚分享的这个故事里另一个有意思的呃部分,其实也是你书里我最喜欢的几个故事之一。

The fact you uh you kind of implied this, but basically the first iPod was you had to have a Mac to use it.

你呃你算是暗示了这一点,但基本上第一代 iPod 是,你必须有台 Mac 才能用它。

And the idea is it it would we want you want to sell Macs.

而当时的想法是它它会,我们想,你们是想卖 Mac。

This is a way to get people to buy Macs.

这是让人们去买 Mac 的一种手段。

And it's like the way you tell it is basically this ended up saving Apple eventually.

而按你讲的版本,基本上是这件事最终反过来救了 Apple。

Not selling Macs, but people buy iPods.

不是靠卖 Mac,而是人们来买 iPod。

And that was like the became the big part of the business.

而那像是成了,变成了这门生意的大头。

Yeah, the mantra was Steve, you know, if we don't have Windows connectivity, the iPod doesn't cost $349.

对,当时反复讲的一句话就是:Steve,你知道,如果我们不支持 Windows,iPod 就不是 $349。

It costs $3,000 because you got to buy a Mac.

它是 $3,000,因为你还得买台 Mac。

And you got to move all your digital life over to it and everything else.

而且你得把你整个数字生活都搬过去,还有其他所有东西。

People are not about to take a a risk on this company that's almost bankrupt for $3,000.

人们不会为了 $3,000,去赌一家几乎破产的公司。

So, how are we going to do that?

那我们怎么办?

Like, okay, let's make sure it is only $349 and that they can try it.

就是,好,我们确保它只要 $349,而且他们可以先试试。

And once they try the brand, they go, "Ooh, that's pretty interesting. Maybe I should try other products from this company and give, you know, give them a shot."

一旦他们试过这个品牌,就会说:"哦,挺有意思的。也许我该试试这家公司的其他产品,给,你知道,给他们一个机会。"

Because that was just such a sublime experience.

因为那个体验实在太绝了。

And that's how it, you know, it all changed and that's how iPhone was able to be created cuz without the iPod, there I'm pretty sure there would have been no iPhone.

就是这样,你知道,一切都变了,iPhone 也因此才可能诞生,因为没有 iPod,我非常确定就不会有 iPhone。

There would have probably been no Apple.

很可能也不会再有 Apple。

Because it was close to bankruptcy.

因为它当时已经离破产很近了。

Wow.

哇。

That's crazy how close it was to that if some of these decisions went the wrong way.

想想真吓人:这些决策里但凡有几个走错了,它就真到那一步了。

Yeah, very close.

对,非常近。

Remember there was no retail back then, Apple retailers, none of that stuff.

记住,那时候还没有零售,没有 Apple 零售店,什么都没有。

You know, most people don't don't know how on the ropes Apple was back in 2001.

你知道,大多数人不不知道 2001 年的 Apple 有多命悬一线。

So many stories, but I want to I want to come back to the the customer journey thread that you touched on, which I think is really really important for people listening to this podcast to hear.

故事太多了,不过我想我想回到你刚才提到的那条客户旅程的线索上,我觉得这对听这期播客的人来说真的真的很重要。

Something that you kind of reinforce again and again in the book, and you have this awesome image that we're going to show of the entire customer journey.

这一点你在书里反复强调,你还有一张特别棒的图,画的是完整的客户旅程,我们待会儿会放出来。

And the kind of your point that you make is so many product builders focus on building the product and think, build the best product, we're going to win, and you have this very important advice of there's so much more to it.

你的观点大概是:太多产品 builder 只盯着做产品,觉得"把产品做到最好,我们就赢了",而你给了一条非常重要的建议——事情远不止于此。

Talk about especially the marketing piece.

尤其讲讲营销这一块。

Talk about what you think builders don't really get, even though they hear this advice in many ways.

讲讲你觉得 builder 们其实没真正领会的东西——尽管这类建议他们已经从各种渠道听过很多遍了。

When we build products, we define products when we build them, we have a good sense of the context when we are defining those things.

我们做产品的时候,是边做边定义产品的,在定义这些东西的时候,我们对当时的语境心里很有数。

We're we are we're living in that world. Okay?

我们我们就活在那个世界里。对吧?

And so we're like, oh, we're like this and these are our issues and this is who we are.

所以我们会想,哦,我们是这样这样的,这些是我们的问题,我们就是这样一群人。

And you know, maybe you put on personas — you know, you we we would strip out and figure out who our target customers were with their personas.

然后你知道,也许你会套上 persona(用户画像)——你知道,我们我们会一层层拆出来,搞清楚目标客户是谁,他们的画像长什么样。

You know, is it a a single mom with kids, or is it a dual income no kid family, or is it senior citizens or whatever?

你知道,是带孩子的单亲妈妈,还是双收入无孩家庭,还是老年人,或者别的什么?

And we would come up with these personas, and we would kind of live inside them as we're thinking about the product.

我们会做出这些 persona,然后在思考产品的时候,差不多是钻进这些画像里去生活。

But you have to also remember that these people don't live in those — that they live in the context, but they're not aware of your product in their context.

但你也得记住,这些人并不活在那些——他们活在自己的语境里,可在他们的语境里,他们根本不知道有你的产品。

And so you have to bring it home to them in and meet them where they are.

所以你得把产品送到他们跟前,到他们所在的地方去接住他们。

And so your marketing, your website, your you know, your Instagram ads, your whatever your earned, owned and and earned and owned media that you do —

所以你的营销、你的网站、你的,你知道,你的 Instagram 广告,你做的所有 earned 和 owned media(赢得媒体和自有媒体)——

you really need to put that your product in their context and make the visuals and make the words and everything sing to them.

你真的得把你的产品放进他们的语境里,让画面、让文案、让所有东西都唱到他们心里去。

And if not, they're not going to get it. Right?

做不到这一点,他们就不会懂。对吧?

And so too many times we just say, only if we just make the perfect product.

可太多时候我们只会说:只要我们把产品做得完美就行了。

No, you have to put all — for a consumer thing specifically, and it's it's also really good for a B2B product as well —

不,你得把全部——这一点对消费级产品尤其如此,而且它它对 B2B 产品也同样非常管用——

is make sure you understand your customer, and they go, you know, and when you say the right words, they go, "Oh, they get me." "Oh, I want to listen to these more."

就是要确保你真的理解你的客户,然后他们会,你知道,当你说出那些对的话,他们会说:"哦,他们懂我。""哦,我想再多听听。"

And this is before they ever got the product.

而这一切发生在他们拿到产品之前。

You need to get them to convert in some way, and they need to hear that you're you've already thought about their issues, or you know, and you're living in their shoes, and they're like, "Yes. Yes. Yes, more of that."

你需要让他们以某种方式完成转化,而他们需要听出来:你已经你已经想过他们的问题了,或者说你就站在他们的处境里,然后他们会说:"对。对。对,再来点这个。"

Is this an emotional point? Is this a rational point? Is it —

这是个情感触点?还是个理性触点?还是——

And you're you're weaving this this tapestry to get them to come to some kind of trial or purchase or conversion or something of the product.

你就是在在编织这样一张这样一张网,把他们引向某种试用、购买、转化,或者跟产品发生点什么。

And the best way to do that is my is word of mouth, right? By other early adopters.

而做到这一点最好的办法,在我看来,就是口碑,对吧?靠其他早期采用者传出去。

But you got to do the same thing for the early you know, not me, not the earliest early adopters, but the early adopters who other people trust to talk to.

但你得对那些早期——你知道,不是我这种人,不是最早最早那批尝鲜的,而是那些别人信得过、愿意听他们说话的早期采用者,做同样的事。

Cuz a lot of other people who are late adopters, they know, "Oh, that's that Well, that's wacky George. He tries everything." And then like, "No, no, no."

因为很多后期采用者心里清楚:"哦,那是那个——嗐,那是怪咖 George,他什么都要试一遍。"然后就是:"算了算了算了。"

But if so-and-so's tried it, "Oh, I should take notice to that." Right?

但如果是某某某也试过了,"哦,那我该留意一下了。"对吧?

And so, you what you want to do is make sure you understand your the gestation of your customer and where they are and where they are in the thing and who who you're trying to —

所以,你你要做的,是确保你理解你的客户的成长阶段,他们在哪儿,他们在整个进程里走到了哪一步,以及你想触达的到底是谁谁——

I I also updated the Crossing the Chasm uh you know, Crossing the Chasm graphic um in the book, saying how we go about this in our in in in in uh in our product developments.

我我在书里还更新了 Crossing the Chasm,呃,你知道,《跨越鸿沟》那张图,嗯,讲我们在在在,呃,在产品开发里是怎么做这件事的。

Because you really have to think about who your target user set is and your target marketing based on the version of product you're in, and how you're going to get those higher and higher volumes.

因为你真的得想清楚:基于你当前所在的产品版本,你的目标用户群是谁、目标营销打给谁,以及你要怎么把量做得越来越大。

And you And it really means about speaking the context.

然后你——它说到底就是要讲对语境。

So, maybe when you first ship, you can speak to those early adopters, and you can put it in enough words that they're going to convert.

所以,也许第一次发布的时候,你可以对着那些早期采用者说话,话说到位,他们就会转化。

But then the second version of the product, you're getting these later adopters, and you've got to speak in their language.

但到了产品第二版,你要争取的是那些更晚的采用者,你就得说他们的语言。

And you have And the third set of adopters, who are really laggards, you've got to really speak to them and, you know, go through that, and it could be totally different.

然后你还有——到第三批采用者,那些真正的落后者(laggards),你得真正冲着他们说话,你知道,把这一套再走一遍,而且打法可能完全不同。

And so, this was this was a very interesting um story that I it it it was so emblazoned in my mind.

所以,这是个这是个特别有意思的,嗯,故事,它它它深深烙在我脑子里。

Back in 2001 to '02, '03, you know, still when Apple had no presence outside of the US.

回到 2001 到 02、03 年,你知道,那时候 Apple 在美国以外还没什么存在感。

Apple was really it was selling in the US, some Canada, and some in Japan.

Apple 真的就——它就在美国卖,加拿大卖一点,日本卖一点。

But that was it, and that was the Macs.

就这些了,而且卖的还是 Mac。

So we were selling iPods into those areas.

所以我们当时就是往这些地区卖 iPod。

And so we had uh kind of the early adopter, and then we had some other language, and then and by the third fourth version of iPod, we had some really refined language for those kind of late adopters.

所以我们先有,呃,差不多是针对早期采用者的那套,然后又有另一套话术,然后到 iPod 第三、四代的时候,我们已经打磨出一套非常精细的话术,专门说给那些后期采用者听。

So then we said, "We're going to go back and get a push into Europe."

然后我们说:"我们要回过头去,往欧洲推一把。"

We're going to get we're going to get cuz iPod hadn't taken off in Europe.

我们要我们要——因为 iPod 在欧洲一直没起来。

So we're going to push you we're going to push iPod into Europe.

所以我们要推——我们要把 iPod 推进欧洲。

And so we were on, I think, the fourth generation or something like that.

那时候我们大概在第四代,差不多那个阶段。

And so what did we do in Europe?

那我们在欧洲干了什么?

We ran the same marketing as we were doing in the US in Europe.

我们把在美国跑的那套营销,原封不动搬到了欧洲。

And the thing is, it didn't resonate with the early adopters.

问题是,它打动不了那边的早期采用者。

It didn't resonate with the later adopters, because we didn't have the same messages.

也打动不了后期采用者,因为我们的信息压根不对路。

We were going for a different set of people.

我们瞄准的其实是另一拨人。

And we're like, "Ding ding ding ding ding with sales aren't working."

然后我们就:"叮叮叮叮叮——销量不对劲了。"

He said, "We got to change the marketing."

他说:"我们得改营销。"

"We got to meet those Europeans where they're at, cuz they're a low they're slower to adopt technology versus it starts with the coast and goes inward in the US, right?"

"我们得到欧洲人所在的地方去接住他们,因为他们接受新技术更更慢——不像美国,是从两岸开始往内陆扩散的,对吧?"

And so we're like, "Oh, we got to change things up."

于是我们说:"哦,我们得换打法了。"

And so, you know, sometimes it's when you get to new new areas, you have to rethink your marketing for that area and remember to meet them where they're at.

所以,你知道,有时候进到新的新的市场,你就得为那个市场把营销重新想一遍,记得到他们所在的地方去接住他们。

And where the if it doesn't have a installed base for word of mouth, you're going to have to get that word of mouth started.

而且那里——如果当地没有能产生口碑的存量用户,你就得亲手把口碑发动起来。

So work with those people to get that going.

所以要跟那些人一起,把这件事先转起来。

Now it's different with all software products and all these things, and many many um many uh products can go global right away, but marketing you still got to tell a story and you got to you know —

当然,现在有了各种软件产品这些东西,情况不一样了,很多很多,嗯,很多,呃,产品可以一上来就全球化,但营销——你还是得讲故事,你还是得,你知道——

so it's it just reminds me that even though we maybe compress the time for some pieces of the adoption puzzle, you know, because we can distribute faster,

所以这它只是提醒我:虽然在采用这块拼图里,有些环节的时间也许被我们压缩了,你知道,因为分发可以更快了,

doesn't mean we can the the the the the awareness can get accelerated, and that we can get people to intelligently understand what this product faster faster if we just say the words of somebody who might have known about the product for 3 years.

但这不代表我们能——认知这这这件事就能跟着加速,不代表我们光是照搬一个可能已经了解这产品 3 年的人嘴里的话,就能让大家更快更快地真正弄懂这个产品是什么。

I got to ask about maybe the most famous, I don't know, tagline of all time when a product was launched: a thousand songs in your pocket.

我得问问那个可能是有史以来最有名的——我也说不准——产品发布 tagline:一千首歌,装进你的口袋。

Songs in your pocket.

……歌,装进你的口袋。

Uh, is there a story behind that?

呃,这背后有什么故事吗?

Back in the day at Apple, and I I think it's still that, maybe it's changed now, but back in the Steve days there was different functions of Apple.

早年在 Apple——我我觉得现在可能还是这样,也许已经变了——但在 Steve 那个年代,Apple 是分成不同职能部门的。

And because they were all lean, because the company was only 4,000, 5,000 people, and then it was already doing Macs and everything, each function was kind of very very functional.

而且因为大家都很精简——公司当时只有 4,000、5,000 人,还已经在做 Mac 和其他所有东西——所以每个职能都非常非常专职。

And so the marketing, the marketing didn't get into the engineering and the design folks.

所以市场营销、营销团队是不掺和工程和设计那帮人的事的。

It was like separate, like Steve was the it was the hub, and he was in each of them putting them together, like I said, the uh the um you know, opinion-based decision-maker.

就是各干各的,Steve 是那个是那个枢纽,他穿梭在每个部门之间把它们捏合起来——就像我说的,呃,嗯,你知道,那个凭主见拍板的人。

And so when we heard the tagline for the first time, I was like, that's genius.

所以我们第一次听到那句 tagline 的时候,我就想:这太天才了。

Now, how long that happened, how what was the behind the scenes?

那这中间花了多久、幕后是怎么回事?

We were so we were just a tiny team, you know, we were getting this done in 10 months.

我们当时就我们就是个很小的团队,你知道,我们要在 10 个月里把这事干完。

So everybody was just running for it, right?

所以每个人都在为它狂奔,对吧?

Worse versus iPhone, which was we had discussions of it: should we call it the iPod phone or should we call it the iPhone?

而 iPhone 那次就不一样了,我们真讨论过:该叫 iPod phone,还是叫 iPhone?

Cuz Cisco had the iPhone back in the day and there was copyright issues and trademark issues.

因为当年 iPhone 这个名字在 Cisco 手里,有版权问题和商标问题。

So we were into that because it was also a 2 and 1/2 year development and we were in some and it was betting the farm and we were going to cannibalize iPod, right?

所以我们才会纠结这些,因为那是一个两年半的开发周期,我们当时——那是押上全部身家的一战,而且我们要亲手蚕食 iPod,对吧?

So there was a lot more discussions, but in those early days of 1,000 songs, it was everybody running in literally not it less than 9, it was really 5 to 6 months everything got done.

所以那时讨论多得多;但回到 1,000 songs 那个早期,大家真的是在狂奔——不到 9 个月,其实是 5 到 6 个月,所有事全干完了。

Um cuz we really started it in April and it shipped in end of October.

嗯,因为我们实际是 4 月才开工,10 月底就出货了。

So I think one of the core takeaways from what you shared here is even if you may have the perfect product, the marketing may be the gap that if something isn't working it may—

所以我觉得,你这里分享的一个核心要点是:就算你手里可能有一个完美的产品,营销也可能是那个缺口——如果有什么东西没起效,可能……

Absolutely.

绝对是。

And and the thing is I think I think we're starting to see that the cracks of it.

而且而且关键是,我觉得我觉得我们已经开始看到那个裂缝了。

Uh it might be more than cracks now.

呃,现在可能已经不止是裂缝了。

With like OpenAI.

比如 OpenAI。

What is it?

它到底是什么?

It's like, oh, it's your answering machine, whatever, you're like, what, well, what does it do for me, and now I got to keep paying you?

就像,哦,它是你的答录机之类的,然后你就想,什么,呃,它到底能为我做什么?而且我现在还得一直给你付钱?

Like it was fun as a demo, and if I but what am I using it for every day?

就像,作为 demo 它挺好玩的,可如果我——可我每天到底用它干什么?

And like, oh, Claude, it does Claude Code and it does, you know, code, you know, it's and then what happens, OpenAI is like, oh, we have Codex now.

然后就像,哦,Claude,它有 Claude Code,它能,你知道,写代码,你知道,它——然后呢,OpenAI 就说,哦,我们现在也有 Codex 了。

But then they were Sora and they were you know this and they were that, we're going to do sex chat, we're going to like what are you?

可他们之前一会儿是 Sora,一会儿你知道是这个,一会儿是那个,我们要做 sex chat,我们要——你到底是个什么?

And so it's like, oh yeah, you're the great first, you know, like Netscape.

于是就变成:哦对,你是伟大的先行者,你知道,就像 Netscape。

Everyone went out and bought Netscape Explorer or whatever it was called, like Netscape Navigator.

当年所有人都跑出去买 Netscape Explorer——还是叫什么来着,Netscape Navigator。

And then all of a sudden it evaporated.

然后突然之间,它就蒸发了。

Like well what do I use the net for?

就像,呃,我上网到底是干嘛用的?

Like I I got the tool to get onto it, but what do I use it for daily and what's and it had to develop.

就像我我拿到了上网的工具,可我每天用它干嘛?然后——这东西还得慢慢长出来。

And so OpenAI is now shifting like, oh, we got to get product teams and we got to start about product marketing and we got to so so you know, that is to me that's it's marketing.

所以 OpenAI 现在在转向,说,哦,我们得组建产品团队,我们得开始搞产品营销,我们得——所以所以你知道,在我看来,那就是就是营销。

But if you start if you are already thinking about the marketing, you're already going to start thinking about the product.

但如果你一开始——如果你早就在想营销,你自然就会开始想产品。

And that's the thing is when you're just thinking about the product you're like and it was really just a technology demo that went you know, viral.

而问题就在这:当你只盯着产品想的时候,你会——而它其实真的只是一个,你知道,爆火了的技术 demo。

And they're like, "Oh, yeah."

然后他们就:"哦,是啊。"

And they still keep winning on that.

而且他们还一直靠这个赢。

They never put product in till it was too late.

他们一直没把产品做进去,直到为时已晚。

Now, Anthropic's where they are, and valued more and higher revenue and all that other stuff.

而现在,Anthropic 走到了今天这个位置,估值更高、收入更高,等等这些。

So, you know, it it just it just even if it's a software only product, yes, there's lots of hardware and the servers and all that other stuff.

所以你知道,它就它就——就算是纯软件产品,没错,背后还有一大堆硬件、服务器之类的东西。

You need to think holistically, and you need to think about the entire customer journey, the marketing, the you know, the sales pieces, the distribution pieces, the product definition messaging, the target markets early on.

你需要从整体上思考,你需要一早就想清楚完整的客户旅程、营销、你知道、销售环节、分销环节、产品定义和信息传达、目标市场。

You can't leave it till later and then get it yeah, and then back calculate it.

你不能把这些留到后面,然后,对,再倒推回来补。

And that's why I say you should, you know, you should really make the press release before you you before you more or less start the project.

这也是为什么我说,你应该,你知道,你真的应该在项目差不多启动之前,就先把新闻稿写出来。

Yeah, there's a whole chapter on that.

对,(书里)有整整一章讲这个。

Uh we had the found the um like Amazon's also very famous for that.

呃,我们请过那位创始……嗯,比如 Amazon 也特别以这个出名。

There's a whole book on working backwards that goes really deep on this approach.

有一整本书讲 working backwards(逆向工作法),把这套方法讲得特别深。

But the weird thing is it's working backwards.

但奇怪的地方在于,这居然被叫做 working backwards。

See, that the thing saying working backwards, I would a movie be created that way?

你看,管这叫 working backwards 这件事——我——电影会是那样创作出来的吗?

Is it called working backwards when you say I'm going to make a script and I'm making the treatment and I'm going to really know what it is?

当你说"我要写剧本,我在做故事梗概,我要真正搞清楚它是什么"的时候,这也叫 working backwards 吗?

I'm going to know what the I know what my characters are and how I do character development.

我要知道那个——我清楚我的角色是什么、我怎么做角色塑造。

Like, is that really working backwards?

我说,这真的算 working backwards 吗?

It sounds like it's backwards.

听起来好像是反着来的。

It's like, no, that's the way you do it.

实际是,不,这本来就该这么做。

It's just because it's so technology led and technology and this is what I thought when I was 20.

只是因为一切都太技术主导了——技术、还有——我 20 岁的时候也是这么想的。

It was like, yeah, we're you know, now it sounds backwards.

那时候就像,是啊,我们你知道——于是现在这听起来倒成了"逆向"。

It's actually, no, that's actually insane.

其实,不,那种方式才是真的疯了。

It's not working backwards.

这根本不是什么 working backwards。

It's just an insane way of working.

那只是一种疯狂的工作方式而已。

Like, come on.

拜托。

Let's really think through this.

我们真的好好把这事想透吧。

I It says so much that you as one of the I don't know, most successful insightful builders are so into marketing.

我——你作为,怎么说,最成功、最有洞察的 builder 之一,竟然这么钻营销,这本身就说明了太多东西。

I think that's a really important takeaway for people.

我觉得这对大家是一个非常重要的启发。

Just how obsessed you are with that piece of building that I think a lot of builders don't think about at all.

就是你对造东西的这一环有多痴迷——而我觉得很多 builder 压根没想过这一环。

Well, when you live in that world and you live in the customer cuz you're coming from a customer point of view.

嗯,当你活在那个世界里、活在客户里——因为你是从客户视角出发的。

So, you have to see the lens and the customer only sees what they see through the lens of marketing and sales, right?

所以你必须看到那个透镜——客户能看到的,只有透过营销和销售这层透镜看到的东西,对吧?

And so, you have to be in their shoes and you go, "Okay, like when I do the when I do the press release, I can only have three or four key features."

所以你得站在他们的角度,然后你会说:"好,比如我写我写新闻稿的时候,只能放三四个关键功能。"

After that, it becomes gobbledygook for a customer.

超过这个数,对客户来说就全是天书了。

So, you're like, "Okay, what are those three or four things? Okay, what is that? That's what we're going to focus on."

于是你会说:"好,那三四样东西是什么?好,那是什么?那就是我们要聚焦的。"

And so, no, we're not going to add five more features.

所以,不,我们不会再加五个功能。

That's not going to make it sell better. Right?

加了也不会卖得更好。对吧?

Or oh, no, we're going to cut these two features and ship it.

或者,哦,不,我们要砍掉这两个功能然后发货。

It's like, "Well, wait a second, we cut out two of our three key tentpole features. How are we going to sell that anymore?"

这时就会:"等等,我们把三个关键台柱功能砍掉了两个,那这东西还怎么卖?"

So, it's it's it's a holistic design.

所以这是这是这是一个整体性的设计。

It's not you know, like because we think the technology the technology's in service of the customer.

不是你知道那种——因为我们认为技术、技术是为客户服务的。

Not we're going to jam the technology down the customer's throat and they're going to figure out how to use it.

而不是把技术硬塞进客户嗓子眼,让他们自己琢磨怎么用。

There's too much noise.

外面噪音太多了。

You got to make it frictionless and you got to fit it in their world and see from their point of view.

你得把它做到零摩擦,得让它融进他们的世界,从他们的视角去看。

You go, "Oh, that's what I need."

让人一看就说:"哦,这正是我需要的。"

General Magic was the perfect story for that.

General Magic 就是这方面最完美的故事。

You know, I don't know.

你知道,怎么说呢。

Your your viewers should definitely watch the movie General Magic cuz—

你们你们的观众绝对该去看《General Magic》那部电影,因为——

Absolutely.

绝对该看。

We made the iPhone 15 years too early.

我们把 iPhone 做早了 15 年。

And that was a classic case where we were just making the things that were really cool, but nobody needed it.

那是个经典案例:我们只顾着做那些特别酷的东西,但没人需要它。

Yeah, that documentary is incredible.

对,那部纪录片太精彩了。

It's like such a I like the very young version of you.

它真是——我喜欢那个特别年轻版本的你。

Yeah, very different.

是啊,完全不一样。

They're probably people won't recognize me.

他们估计——大家可能都认不出我。

Yeah, you have a whole chapter about just like not overworking in your in your career based on that experience.

对,你书里有一整章,就是基于那段经历,讲职业生涯里职业生涯里别过度工作。

Magic was for me, yeah.

Magic 对我来说就是那段经历,是啊。

Yeah.

是啊。

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That's — I want to talk about something else around the evolution of the product management role in builders.

网址就是—— 我想聊点别的,关于产品经理这个角色朝 builder 演化的事。

What's really interesting, this is kind of going in a different direction, but it's all connected.

真正有意思的是——这有点岔开话题,但其实全都连在一起。

Uh I feel like you were so ahead on this idea that we are builders versus product managers, engineers, design.

呃,我觉得在"我们是 builder,而不是产品经理、工程师、设计师"这个理念上,你走得特别超前。

Like, I have your book right here.

你看,你的书就在我手边。

It's called Build.

书名就叫《Build》。

And this is what everyone's starting to call product managers, people on product teams.

而现在大家都开始这么称呼产品经理、称呼产品团队里的人了。

Uh I'm curious just what you're seeing with that, this kind of converging of these roles.

呃,我就想知道你现在看到的情况,这些角色的这种融合。

Do you feel like everyone just becomes a builder and there's no more designer, engineer, product manager?

你觉得是不是所有人最后都变成 builder,不再有设计师、工程师、产品经理了?

Do you think they'll continue being these functions with but more merged?

还是说这些职能会继续存在,只是更加融合?

I don't know.

我也不知道。

What are you seeing with the with the product the discipline of product management specifically?

具体到产品、到产品管理这个职业,你看到的是什么?

Well, the discipline of product management sits between all of these functional roles.

嗯,产品管理这个职业,坐在所有这些职能角色的中间。

Okay, whether that's marketing, sales, uh distribution, yeah, sometimes manufacturing, depends on what the product is.

对吧,不管是市场、销售、呃、分销,对,有时候还有制造,取决于你做的是什么产品。

Um engineering, obviously.

嗯,工程,那是当然。

Um and so uh customer support.

嗯,还有,呃,客户支持。

So, when you sit between all of these things, you know, maybe those roles shift or change, especially depending on what it is you're building and and that kind of thing.

所以,当你坐在这一切的中间,你知道,这些角色也许会变、会调整,尤其取决于你在做什么东西,诸如此类。

But, you have to interpret, you know, what's going on between all of them and stitch them all together to make this this thing sing.

但你必须去解读,你知道,它们之间发生了什么,把它们全都缝合到一起,让这个这个东西真正出彩。

What we're saying and you know, is oh, I can just today in the AI world, I can just make a prompt and all of a sudden it gets spit out and you don't know what all those little functions are.

我们现在说的是,你知道,"哦,如今在 AI 世界里,我只要写个 prompt,东西唰一下就吐出来了",而你根本不知道那些小职能都是什么。

If you are not aware of each of those functions even in AI world of what those things are, they are very clear definitions of certain points of view for the customer and you have to consider them.

如果你不清楚每个职能是干嘛的——哪怕在 AI 世界里——它们其实是站在客户视角的一个个非常清晰的定义,你必须把它们考虑进去。

And to say that they're going to get washed away and an AI is going to come up with it.

然后有人说,这些都会被冲刷掉,AI 会自己搞出来。

It reminds me a lot of how software coding is getting done with um, like something like Claude today.

这让我想起如今软件代码是怎么写出来的,嗯,比如用 Claude 这样的工具。

You know, if I don't know, maybe it was a month ago when the Claude source code leaked.

你知道,大概,我不确定,可能一个月前吧,Claude 的源代码泄露了。

Right?

对吧?

Claude source code leaked.

Claude 源代码泄露了。

And everyone was like, oh my god, it leaked.

所有人都在喊,天哪,泄露了。

And then if you and and at the time and I'm sure and maybe I don't know, maybe they changed it, maybe they didn't, but at the time Dario was saying, you know, 90 to 100% of all our code is written by, you know, our, you know, Claude.

然后如果你——而且当时,我确定,也许我不知道,也许后来他们改了,也许没改,但当时 Dario 说的是,你知道,我们 90% 到 100% 的代码都是,你知道,我们的,你知道,Claude 写的。

And you know, we just monitor it and watch it.

然后你知道,我们只是监控它、盯着它。

We're like, oh, well, that's really interesting.

我们当时想,哦,这挺有意思。

And then the code leaks.

然后代码泄露了。

And then if you looked at the code, anybody who looked at the code, who's a real software architect and engineer, threw up.

然后你去看那些代码——任何看过那些代码的人,只要是真正的软件架构师和工程师,都吐了。

They were like, it made what?

他们的反应是:它写出来个什么玩意儿?

They're like, this stuff is brittle.

他们说,这东西太脆了。

Engineers were looking at it like, like this should be layered in four or five, you know, actually 12 or 15 different sub functions.

工程师们看着它,觉得,这应该分层拆成四五个,你知道,其实是 12 个、15 个不同的子函数。

This is the main loop of Claude of of of of of Anthropic's Claude.

这可是 Claude 的主循环,是是是是 Anthropic 的 Claude 的主循环。

The main loop.

主循环啊。

Not not just something off in the — This is the main loop and people are like, how can you do this?

不是不是什么犄角旮旯里的东西——这是主循环,大家都在问,你们怎么能这么干?

This looks brittle.

这看着就很脆。

There's like it's unreadable.

简直就是,没法读。

It's un — And they're like, "Well, the AI knows it."

没法—— 然后他们说:"反正 AI 认识它。"

But when you think about it and you have to maintain it, you can have an agent make code for you and it could work and it could test, but is it secure?

但你仔细想想,你还得维护它——你可以让 agent 帮你写代码,它能跑、能过测试,但它安全吗?

Is it maintainable?

可维护吗?

If there's something going wrong, can you roll things back and understand what's going on?

出了问题,你能回滚、能搞清楚发生了什么吗?

Like there's so many other aspects to writing code and delivering a product thing that you still need humans in the loop.

写代码、交付一个产品,还有太多别的方面,你仍然需要人在环里。

And so when I think of product design I think of software code with AI.

所以我一想到产品设计,就会想到 AI 写软件代码这件事。

And when you look at AI and if it's not architecting things and it's not segmenting things and looking at each of those things like I was saying, you know, like there's software architects and then there's software optimizers and then there's just general coders.

你再看 AI,如果它不做架构、不做拆分、不像我刚才说的那样逐个去审视——你知道,有软件架构师,有软件优化师,还有普通写码的。

And then there's security reviews.

然后还有安全审查。

And if you don't have those different mixture of experts around the code structuring it so that subsequent generations can get better and better and it just kind of devolves into this mass of things you don't know.

如果你没有这些各路专家围着代码,把它结构化,让后续一代一代越来越好,它就会退化成一坨你搞不懂的东西。

You're getting short-term gain for very, very long-term loss and that's, you know, that's called software debt, right?

你拿到的是短期收益,换来的是非常非常长期的损失,这就叫,你知道,这就叫软件债,对吧?

Technical debt.

技术债。

And everybody hates technical debt.

人人都恨技术债。

So you might be fixing something, but it might be it most likely is giving more technical debt, especially when you're at the high level.

所以你可能在修一个东西,但它可能——它多半在制造更多技术债,尤其当你站在很高的抽象层上干活时。

So now, how does that map to product management?

那好,这怎么映射到产品管理上?

So if you're a product manager and you type this in and you get some result, but you don't have a really good marketer, a really good marketing communications person, a really good good, you know, architect, a really good manufacturing manager, all these different things in this thing that you're getting

如果你是个产品经理,你把东西输进去,得到某个结果,但你没有一个真正优秀的营销人、一个真正优秀的市场传播人、一个真正优秀优秀的,你知道,架构师、一个真正优秀的制造经理——你拿到的这个东西里,没有这些不同的角色……

Foundation and people think well, my AI's going to be smarter.

……作地基。然后人们想,没事,我的 AI 会变得更聪明。

It's not proven to do that.

没有证据表明它能做到。

What's proven is if you properly architect it and have co- Claude Code go into certain sub segments or have Claude help you build the architecture, you modify, refine it, lock it in and say just work on these few things and you know, on these more limited scoped things, yeah, you can make that work

有证据的做法是:你把架构搭好,让 Cl—— Claude Code 去做特定的子模块,或者让 Claude 帮你搭架构,你来修改、打磨、锁定,然后说"就干这几件事",在这些范围收得更窄的事情上,对,你能让它成。

and I think that's the way we have to consider how we use these tools in a product management cape capabilities as well.

我认为在产品管理的能——能力上,我们也得这么考虑怎么用这些工具。

To just say it's all abstracted away, it's all going to be better and when you ask specific pointed questions and you want this thing fixed in your marketing thing or whatever, and they're going to be like, well, the AI should just figure that out, too.

要是只说"全都抽象掉了,一切都会更好",然后等你问出具体尖锐的问题,想修好你营销物料里的某个东西之类的,他们就会说,"呃,AI 应该也能自己搞定吧"。

It's like you have given up so much.

那你等于放弃了太多东西。

Like that's to me, sure you can write code, but there's going to be the difference between, you know, it's like the difference between H&M and a luxury brand.

在我看来就是,当然,你能写出代码,但这里会有差别,你知道,就像 H&M 和奢侈品牌的差别。

You can go get certain things that look like that and copies that and like and it but it doesn't last more than one washing or one season and it's this and you throw it away and it's cheap and blah blah blah.

你能买到看起来像那么回事的东西、仿它的东西,但洗一次、穿一季就不行了,就那样,你把它扔掉,反正便宜,等等等等。

Or you go to the luxury thing and you pay more and it's crafted, it's handcrafted, it's da da da da da da and you know, it's going to be around for a while like there is this dichotomy like fast and throwaway.

或者你去买奢侈品,花更多钱,它是精工细作、手工打造的,如何如何,你知道它能陪你很久——所以存在这种二元对立,快消的、用完即扔的。

So, you know, like what's called fast fashion, we got fast software.

所以,你知道,就像有所谓的快时尚,我们现在有了快软件。

But software, if you're going to build a real company, can't be throwaway.

但软件,如果你要建一家真正的公司,不能是用完即扔的。

Maybe it can, but I don't think it can be.

也许可以,但我不觉得行。

If you're really going to do this cuz you get just technical debt and you got to start over again.

如果你真要干这件事的话——因为你只会攒下一堆技术债,然后一切推倒重来。

So, you've got to really understand and how you're using these tools and a lot of these things that these AI coders can do, agent coders can do, can keep make you incredible prototypes.

所以你必须真正搞懂,你在怎么用这些工具——这些 AI 写码工具、agent 写码工具能干的很多事,能不断给你做出惊艳的原型。

Do more prototypes.

多做原型。

Do more of those things to help you get that informed gut to say we're going this direction, architect that in and then work on the sub segments below it and and and and all the expert systems that expert things that you need in each of those domains.

多做这些事,帮你练出那个"有依据的直觉",好拍板说我们走这个方向,把它架构进去,然后做它下面的子模块,还有还有还有每个领域里你需要的那些专家系统、专家的东西。

Yeah, and I think what you may also be saying here, which I think is really, really important, is that because it's so easy to build, people can just build all these features and additions,

对,我觉得你这里可能还在说一件事,我认为真的非常非常重要:因为构建变得太容易了,人们可以随手堆出所有这些功能和附加项,

and the value accrues to build something awesome, and the product mind becomes more important to help push this stuff from just a sloppy every feature, every checkbox to something awesome that people actually use.

而价值会积累到"做出真正出色的东西"上,产品思维变得更重要——去把这些东西从潦草的"每个功能都要、每个复选框都打勾",推向人们真正会用的出色产品。

Because at the end of the day, if you're building it for yourself, whatever, go have fun.

因为说到底,如果你是做给自己玩的,随便,玩得开心就好。

But if you're going to build it and you want to sell it, and like, you know, and you only need three key features to sell it to someone, like, it's going to have to be boiled down.

但如果你要做出来、想拿去卖,而且,你知道,你只需要三个关键功能就能把它卖给别人,那它就必须提炼到位。

It's going to be have to be figured out cuz you're still selling it to a human who needs to understand it.

它必须被想清楚,因为你终究是卖给一个需要理解它的人。

Now, do you think you could vibe code Flighty?

那么,你觉得你能 vibe code 出一个 Flighty 吗?

Mhm.

嗯。

Probably.

大概能吧。

Maybe now that Flighty exists, you could.

也许现在 Flighty 已经存在了,你可以。

Copy that.

照着它抄呗。

Like, you could do version two of Flighty, maybe vibe code it cuz you say, "Look at Flighty."

就是说,你可以做 Flighty 的第二版,也许能 vibe code 出来,因为你可以说"照着 Flighty 做"。

But the original Flighty?

但最初的那个 Flighty?

Like, that's to me, that's luxury software.

在我看来,那是奢侈品级的软件。

Right?

对吧?

It was understood how the pixels are done.

每一个像素怎么呈现,都是想明白了的。

So, you got to remember, is it version one or is it version two, three, four?

所以你得记住:这是 v1,还是第二版、第三版、第四版?

Because an opinion-based thing on highly innovative, differentiated stuff, it doesn't have a model for that.

因为一个靠观点驱动、高度创新、差异化的东西,模型里没有它的样本。

There's not that stuff in there.

那些东西不在里面。

You got to — You still need the very version one to be done.

你得—— 你仍然需要那个最初的 v1 先被人做出来。

So, and maybe you can prototype with these things.

所以,也许你可以用这些工具做原型。

So, I just, you know, we I could go on for hours, but whatever.

所以,我就是,你知道,我们——我能讲上好几个小时,但算了。

That's just one old guy's point of view.

这只是一个老头子的看法而已。

I think it's really important this insight that as it becomes easier to build, the things that stand out are the things that are really well thought through and great and luxury, almost as you described.

我觉得这个洞察真的很重要:当构建变得越来越容易,能脱颖而出的,就是那些真正深思熟虑、真正出色、几乎像你说的"奢侈品"一样的东西。

And and you can feel it, right?

而且而且你是能感觉到的,对吧?

And you go, "Oh my god."

你会脱口而出,"我的天哪。"

And, you know, I'm like, one of the biggest proponents of I like telling them, "Flighty, Flighty."

而且,你知道,我算是它最卖力的推荐者之一,我喜欢跟他们念叨,"Flighty,Flighty。"

Cuz I, you know, all the people in my in my sphere, they're all flying.

因为我,你知道,我圈子里我圈子里的人,全都在飞来飞去。

I'm like, "Have you tried it? Have you — It's insane, you know?"

我就说,"你试过没?你—— 太疯狂了,你知道吗?"

So, it's, you know, and then you get the word of mouth and you know, things take off because there has been that level of care and craft to it.

所以,就是,你知道,然后口碑就起来了,你知道,东西就起飞了,因为它带着那种程度的用心和工艺。

And yeah, maybe a lot of the sub functions of Flighty could be built and whatever from Claude Code or whatever, but the whole thing and the architecture and everything I don't think so.

对,也许 Flighty 的很多子功能可以用 Claude Code 什么的做出来,但整个东西、整套架构和这一切——我不这么认为。

And if someone hasn't tried Flighty, clearly download it and play with it.

如果有人还没试过 Flighty,那必须下载来玩玩。

This is I love that this is the example of a amazing product.

这是—— 我很喜欢,它就是"出色产品"的范例。

That's like a really cool product.

那真是个特别酷的产品。

All software.

全是软件。

It's all software.

一切都是软件。

Something along these lines.

大概就是这个意思。

As people hear you talk, clearly you are an amazing storyteller.

大家听你说话就能感觉到,你显然特别会讲故事。

And in your book, you often come back to the power of storytelling, the value of storytelling for product builders.

而且你在书里反复讲到讲故事的力量,以及它对做产品的人有多大价值。

What's I guess one is just why is that so important, do you think?

我想问的,一是你觉得这为什么这么重要?

And two is what's like one tip you could give people to get better at storytelling?

二是,你能给大家一个把故事讲得更好的诀窍吗?

Storytelling, that's how we passed information down or or got people to commit to doing something.

讲故事,这就是我们一代代传递信息、或者 或者说动别人下决心做事的方式。

Like stories are so who we are.

故事就是我们人类的本质。

We go to the movies for stories.

我们去看电影,就是为了故事。

We have books.

我们有书。

We have all this stuff.

我们有这一大堆东西。

And it's just so essential to who we are because we like to be taken on a journey.

它对我们这个物种如此根本,因为我们喜欢有人带着我们走一段旅程。

We like to, you know, and hopefully when you're buying a product or you know, licensing one or whatever it is, you're subscribing,

我们喜欢,你知道——但愿当你买一个产品,或者,你知道,拿一个授权,不管是什么,你订阅的时候,

you're taking on a journey that meets your expectations or out, you know, is is better than the what do you're you know, your the expectations were set.

你踏上的是一段旅程,它要么符合你的预期,要么,你知道,比 比当初,怎么说,你知道,给你设定的预期还要好。

It's much It's out sized that.

它远远 它超出那个预期。

And so, you know, Dave Chappelle is he just, you know, when it comes to comedy and storytelling, the way he weaves it,

所以,你知道,Dave Chappelle,他就是,你知道,说到喜剧和讲故事,他编织故事的那个方式——

he can weave a story for 20 minutes to get to the punchline and you're just you're you know, just in it, right?

他能把一个故事织上 20 分钟才抖出包袱,而你整个人就 就,你知道,完全陷在里面了,对吧?

I just love his comedy as opposed to the punchline guys who just you know, are extremely like the the short ones.

我就爱他这种喜剧,而不是那种只抖包袱的家伙,你知道,就特别 特别短平快的那种。

Um I It's something in our nature, human nature.

嗯,我 这是我们天性里的东西,人性里的东西。

You know, we were told stories when we were a kid, you know, we read the same or watched the same movies a hundred times when we were kids.

你知道,我们小时候听大人讲故事,你知道,小时候同一本书、同一部电影能翻来覆去看一百遍。

There's something about being taken on that journey that we love.

让人带着走那段旅程,这里面有种我们打心底喜欢的东西。

And people love to be educated that way. Right?

而且人们也喜欢用这种方式学东西。对吧?

Your best your your best college professors, high school teachers, whatever, they taught you why you should love, you know, certain math or certain physics or whatever

你最好的 你 你最好的大学教授、高中老师,随便谁,他们教你的是你为什么该爱上,你知道,某种数学、某种物理什么的,

and took you a journey of why it mattered and then you're like, oh, now I get it.

他们带你走一遍"它为什么重要"的旅程,然后你就,哦,现在我懂了。

You know, you can learn all the the basics of, you know, how to do something.

你知道,你可以学会,你知道,怎么做某件事的全部 全部基础。

But that doesn't really tie it into something that's meaningful.

但那并没有把它和有意义的东西真正连起来。

And so when you tie it to something that's human, right?

而当你把它和人性的东西绑在一起,对吧?

That's when it becomes uh and accessible for humans and it's relatable.

那一刻它才变得,呃,让人进得去、有共鸣。

That's when it goes and it can be a for anything.

那一刻它才能起飞,而且什么东西都适用。

And that's when great marketing, great sales, um um happens.

伟大的营销、伟大的销售,嗯 嗯,就是在那一刻发生的。

You know, and and great story telling through the product design, that's even better, right?

你知道,而且 而且通过产品设计本身来讲故事,那就更妙了,对吧?

Because it wasn't just perfume this pig and you put some, you know, on this bad product and you can say, oh, yeah, try it and then you're like, oh, and then it doesn't meet the expectations.

因为那就不是给猪喷香水——往一个烂产品上抹点,你知道,然后说,哦,来试试吧,然后你一用,哦,结果根本达不到预期。

But when it sings from the depths of the product, like you were bringing up with um, you know, the Nest Protect, the thermostat or the the smoke detectors and stuff.

但当故事是从产品深处唱出来的,就像你刚才提的,嗯,你知道,Nest Protect、恒温器,还有那些 那些烟雾报警器之类的。

When we had all that and then you could feel the love and care, that's when people go, oh, I love this and I want more from that brand or from that company or that team.

当我们把这些都做到位,你能感受到那份爱和用心,人们就会说,哦,我爱这个,我还想要这个品牌、这家公司、这个团队更多的东西。

That's what they want.

这才是他们想要的。

And so to get better at it, I've learned it because I watched my dad, he was in sales, right?

至于怎么练得更好,我是看我爸学会的,他是做销售的,对吧?

So I watched how he would sell Levi's.

我就看他怎么卖 Levi's。

And I would watch and he would be like, and it he wasn't always selling to sell.

我在旁边看,他会,而且 他不是永远为了成交而卖。

Sometimes he was convincing them not to buy something because that wasn't the best product they had.

有时候他会劝人别买某样东西,因为那不是他们店里最好的产品。

Buy this one instead.

改买这件吧。

And actually go to my competitor down the street because he was building a relationship and story time because he these people loved what it was.

甚至说,你去街那头我竞争对手那儿买吧——因为他是在经营关系、经营故事,时间长了,因为他 这些顾客就爱这种感觉。

So it sometimes is not just setting expectations and telling a story, but it's also saying, "Hey, maybe I'm not for you."

所以有时候,不光是设定预期、讲个故事,还得敢说:"嘿,也许我不适合你。"

And that's truth.

这就是真话。

That's also truth.

这同样是真话。

And so, like Steve always said, "The best marketing just tells the truth."

所以,就像 Steve 常说的:"最好的营销就是讲真话。"

Now, might might put nice words around it, nice creative and everything, but it's telling the truth.

当然,可能 可能会包上漂亮的词、漂亮的创意什么的,但它讲的是真话。

And so, when I watched Steve prepare for and like I said, when we did the 2 and 1/2 years with the iPhone, he was honing the story of the iPhone every day.

所以,我看 Steve 准备——就像我说的,我们做 iPhone 那两年半里,他每天都在打磨 iPhone 的故事。

He didn't give it to marketing.

他没把这事丢给市场部。

He knew what that thing was and what those key um features were, like we talked about, like

他清楚那东西是什么,那些关键的,嗯,功能是什么,就像我们聊过的,

and micromanage those features cuz he knew those were the going to things going to the world's going to take uh take notice to.

他会微观管理那些功能,因为他知道那些就是 就是全世界会,呃,会注意到的东西。

And he would refine the story and then tell other people who were unwatched by, like friends who are really smart, and say, "I'm going to give you the pitch."

然后他会打磨这个故事,讲给没参与其中的人听,比如特别聪明的朋友,说:"我来给你过一遍这个 pitch。"

And give you the pitch.

然后就真给你讲一遍。

And he would refine, refine, refine.

然后他就改、改、改。

And um and so, when you saw him come on stage, it was just cuz he had done it a you know, 100,000 times or at least 10,000 times, right?

所以,嗯,当你看到他站上台,那只是因为他已经练了,你知道,10 万遍,至少也有 1 万遍,对吧?

And he he knew it like boom, boom, boom, boom, boom.

他 他烂熟于心,就是啪、啪、啪、啪、啪。

Just it just came off.

就那么自然地流出来。

And so, I watched and I learned from that.

我就是这么看着、学着的。

And that's what we did for like the Nest learning thermostat.

Nest 学习型恒温器,我们就是这么干的。

That's what we learned, you know, we did for each of those things.

这就是我们学到的,你知道,每一个产品我们都这么做。

It was just that same storytelling over and over.

就是同一套讲故事,一遍又一遍。

What does it matter What Why does it matter?

它有什么 什么 它为什么重要?

Why does it matter?

为什么重要?

And because too many times when we're technology-led, we talk about the what.

因为太多时候,我们这些技术导向的人,只讲"是什么"。

We don't talk about the why.

不讲"为什么"。

And the why is where the storytelling is.

而"为什么"才是故事所在。

Because you want to take the journey of why it matters to you.

因为你想走的,是"它为什么对你重要"这段旅程。

You know, if you're talking it's talking about the what, you're just talking to another geek.

你知道,如果你讲的 讲的是"是什么",那你只是在跟另一个 geek 聊天。

Love geeks, no problem.

我爱 geek,没问题。

I'm one of them.

我自己就是。

But and we can relate on that level.

但 而且我们能在那个层面产生共鸣。

But general most people who are not in the technology world, they want a story and they want something that that touches them in some way.

但一般 大多数不在科技圈的人,他们要的是一个故事,要的是某种能 能触动他们的东西。

One of the lesson I'm hearing from what you just described is telling the story over and over and over and refining it over time is where the best stuff comes from.

从你刚才讲的里面,我听到的一课是:把故事讲了一遍又一遍又一遍、随时间不断打磨,最好的东西就是这么来的。

Not just here's I just came up with this and it's going to be amazing.

而不是"看,我刚想出来这个,它肯定会很棒"。

Yeah, oh absolutely.

对,哦,绝对是。

Cuz you you need and and telling it to other people who don't who don't It's to see if it resonates.

因为你 你需要 而且 讲给那些不 不了解的人听,就是为了看它有没有共鸣。

I remember I remember the number of times I told the Nest story before Nest came out because I was like, "This is crazy, this thermostat thing."

我记得 我记得 Nest 发布前,我把 Nest 的故事讲了多少遍,因为我自己都觉得:"这太疯了,这个恒温器的玩意儿。"

You know, I'm like, "Okay, let me set up the virus of doubt which was Do you know how much you spend on your energy bill every every year for your heating and cooling?

你知道,我就想:"好,我先种下怀疑病毒(virus of doubt),也就是:你知道你每 每年在暖气和制冷上要花多少电费吗?

Don't you hate your, you know, thing?"

你难道不恨你那个,你知道,那玩意儿吗?"

Now, there's an there's another way there's another way to look at the story tell.

另外,还有 还有另一种 另一种看讲故事的角度。

And this is I put this in the book.

这个我 我写进书里了。

Oh, I don't know I didn't put this in the book.

哦,不对 这个我没写进书里。

We all have seen infomercials. Right?

电视购物广告我们都看过。对吧?

You know those ones that drag on for a half an hour, an hour at late night TV, you know, on some random every channel now, right?

就是那种深夜电视上拖上半小时、一小时的,你知道,现在随便哪个台都在放,对吧?

And they just sit there and they tell you the story from all the different directions.

他们就坐在那儿,从各个角度给你讲这个故事。

They give you the virus of doubt.

他们给你种下怀疑病毒。

They're like, "Oh, here's this cheese grater.

他们说:"哦,看这个奶酪刨。

And you know, when you you have this bad cheese grater your and your knuckles bleed and, you know, I whatever and it's hard to clean

然后你知道,你 你用那个烂奶酪刨,你的指关节都刮出血,你知道,反正就是,还很难清洗,

and and they over exaggerate everything and they show you all the pain points of it.

然后他们 他们把一切都夸大,把所有痛点都演给你看。

And then they show how wonderful, easy it is to use in this whatever they're selling.

接着再展示他们卖的这个东西用起来多美妙、多轻松。

And then it's easy to buy and then it's easy to return and then and it's overly dramatic.

然后购买很容易,退货也很容易,然后 整个夸张得不行。

And we all know, you know, it's like wrestling.

我们都心知肚明,你知道,这就像摔角。

It's all an act and whatever.

全是演的,怎么说呢。

It's not, you know, there's probably no real list there.

它不是,你知道,那里面八成没多少真货。

But it is storytelling in a way.

但从某种意义上,它就是讲故事。

And if And not that you should do that because they they overhyped the expectations, but look at the techniques that are used, the psychological techniques, the emotional techniques to get there.

如果 倒不是说你该照搬,因为他们 他们把预期吹过头了,但你去看那里面用的技巧,那些心理技巧、情绪技巧。

And then dial it back and go, "Okay, I'm going to do that but with truth."

然后把火调小,说:"好,我也这么干,但我讲真话。"

And that's when things start to go pop pop pop pop.

这时候事情就开始砰砰砰砰地起飞了。

Or at least that's what I've seen.

至少我见到的是这样。

And so I always use that as another metric.

所以我一直把它当另一把尺子。

And it's not just telling the story over and over, it's what what story you are telling.

而且不光是把故事讲一遍又一遍,关键是你讲的 讲的是什么故事。

And so I try to think of that as well.

所以这一点我也会琢磨。

But not I obviously clowny and cheesy and everything else, but it is a caricature of of doing good marketing.

当然不是 那种明摆着的小丑式、俗气的东西,但它确实是好营销的一幅 一幅漫画式样本。

I feel like this is a really interesting lens into the press release first or working backwards ideas,

我觉得这是看"先写新闻稿"或者 working backwards(逆向工作法)这类想法的一个特别有意思的视角,

create the infomercial first and just go to extreme.

先把电视购物广告做出来,直接推到极端。

Sure, you could.

行,可以啊。

Oh my god.

我的天。

No, what you don't want to do for sure.

不,那绝对是你不想真干的事。

But it's like a cool lens to go really far and then kind of pull back the best parts and make it honest.

但这个视角挺酷的:先冲到很远,然后把最好的部分往回收,再让它变得诚实。

I think we just came up with a really good idea here. Um

我觉得我们刚刚想出了一个特别好的点子。嗯。

[clears throat]

(清嗓子)

I want to come back to the iPhone.

我想再回到 iPhone 这个话题。

So I think it came out like 20 years ago almost at this point, right?

到现在它差不多是 20 年前发布的了,对吧?

It launched 2017, 2007, something like that.

它是 2017……2007 年发布的,差不多那个时候。

So what's crazy is people are still trying to build the next iPhone, especially with the AI.

疯狂的是,大家还在试图造出下一个 iPhone,尤其是在 AI 这一波里。

Everyone's just like, what's We've had this thing forever.

所有人都在想:怎么……这东西我们都用了这么多年了。

What the hell?

搞什么鬼?

Like hasn't anything changed?

难道就一点没变过吗?

I'm curious.

我很好奇。

I'm I imagine people ask you this question.

我……我猜肯定有人问过你这个问题。

I'm curious just like what do you think the next iPhone may look like with AI?

我就是好奇,你觉得 AI 时代的下一个 iPhone 会长什么样?

What's like the device that you think emerges over time?

你觉得随着时间推移,最终会冒出来一个什么样的设备?

Do you have a vision?

你有自己的构想吗?

Okay, there's the what it could look like long-term and there's what it could look like soon.

好,这得分两层:一个是长期它可能长什么样,一个是近期它可能长什么样。

And so a lot of people like, "Okay, there's the long-term thing and and when we can trust the models and when they have memory and when they do this stuff," then we're still going to need a display,

很多人会说:"好,长期是一回事,等我们能信任模型了、等它们有记忆了、能干这些事了"——但到那时我们照样需要一块显示屏,

cuz sorry people, unless we're plugging it into our brain like a BCI brain computer or there's some laser thing going into our retina, we're going to need a display.

因为抱歉了各位,除非我们把它插进大脑,搞 BCI 脑机接口那种,或者有什么激光直接打进视网膜,否则我们就是需要一块显示屏。

So so barring those kinds of technologies, we're going to need a display.

所以,所以除非那类技术出现,不然我们就得有显示屏。

And so the best display that we have is a smartphone-like thing, okay?

而我们手头最好的显示屏,就是智能手机这样的东西,OK?

It's not going to be this tiny thing.

它不会是个特别小的玩意儿。

We saw what happened with Humane and all that other stuff.

Humane 和那些东西的下场我们都看到了。

So you're going to have some kind of cuz the best way to visualize visual information is with a display, right?

所以你还是会有某种——因为呈现视觉信息最好的方式就是一块显示屏,对吧?

So, we're going to have some kind of small slab, maybe it's foldable like we see today, whatever, so that you can access it.

所以我们会有某种小板子,也许像现在这样可以折叠,随便什么形态,让你随时能用上它。

You maybe many things you don't need a display for, but a lot of things you still do, right?

很多事你可能不需要屏幕,但还有很多事你依然需要,对吧?

Because you might not be tapping and swiping and all that stuff.

因为到时候你可能不再是点点划划那一套了。

So, I am of the opinion that long term, if you look at how a device is layered today, and this is many, many devices, and iPhone specifically started this, which was, you know, tapping and swiping. Right?

所以我的观点是,长期来看——你看今天设备的交互是怎么分层的,很多很多设备都这样,而且这套就是 iPhone 带头搞起来的——第一层就是,你懂的,点按和滑动。对吧?

That was That was the first thing is, you know, you use your finger.

那是……那是排第一的,你懂的,用手指。

Then after that was keyboard.

然后第二层是键盘。

And then after that, the tertiary thing was a voice input.

再往后,排第三的才是语音输入。

We need to flip it.

我们得把它倒过来。

We need to absolutely flip it, and we have to say, and this is what I always wanted to do with Nest, which is I want to remove displays,

我们必须彻底倒过来,我们得说——这也是我做 Nest 时一直想干的——我要把显示屏去掉,

and we need to have voice as the number one primary feature, and you build around voice.

我们得让语音成为排第一的核心交互,一切围绕语音来构建。

Then we have keyboard if necessary, and then we have tapping and swiping. Okay?

然后必要时才是键盘,最后才是点按和滑动。OK?

It should go exactly the opposite.

顺序应该完全反过来。

And the problem why we know most of us don't go around talking to our phones and everything,

而问题在于——我们都知道大多数人不会整天对着手机讲话——

and we saw this also happen with cars, there was tactile buttons, and then there was the touch screens, and then they also added the voice in,

同样的事在汽车上也上演过:先有实体按键,然后是触摸屏,后来又把语音加了进来,

but nobody really uses voice in the car unless it's some accessibility thing, right?

但没人真在车里用语音,除非是出于无障碍需求,对吧?

Because voice was always added at the end,

因为语音永远是最后才补上去的,

because it was always like, well, it sort of works, and it's it's a gizmo, but it's, you know, it's like like Alexa was for person 1.0 or Siri was, whatever.

因为大家对它的感觉一直是:嗯,勉强能用,是个小噱头,但它就……你懂的,就像最早那版 Alexa 1.0 或者 Siri,随便啦。

But when we actually have really good voice input with not just it understands just like Whisper Flow or something cuz that's great.

但等我们真有了特别好的语音输入——不只是"它能听懂"那一层,像 Whisper Flow 之类,那当然已经很棒了。

And what what I'm saying is the intelligence behind it with memory and everything else.

我、我说的是它背后那层智能,带着记忆和其他所有能力。

So, it's then we can start to say and and we can start to use that much more specifically and then deprecate those other things.

到那时候,我们才能开始……才能开始更有针对性地用它,然后把其他那些交互逐步淘汰掉。

But, we've always have to have them there as a crutch for voice because voice has never been able to deliver.

但我们一直不得不留着它们,给语音当拐棍,因为语音从来没真正兑现过。

So, that's the long-term thing.

这就是长期的图景。

So, it'll have some kind of display, but it's going to be much more voice primary and then you're going to have the other things as secondary and tertiary.

所以它还是会有某种显示屏,但会以语音为主,其他交互退到第二、第三位。

In the middle now or sometime soon, it's going to look much much like the the smartphone is because we're not going to get away from their all app interface anytime soon.

而中间这段——现在或者不久之后——它会长得非常非常像智能手机,因为我们短期内摆脱不了那套全 app 的界面。

We're not going to get, you know, we're going to we'll move some things, but we don't trust it yet.

我们不会……你懂的,我们会把一些东西挪过去,但我们还不信任它。

It's going to take a while till we trust it.

建立起信任需要一段时间。

And we are literally turning over a lot to this trusted thing. Right?

我们可是真要把一大堆事情托付给这个"受信任的东西"。对吧?

Because tapping and swiping, we know what that is for the most part.

因为点按滑动,我们基本知道那是怎么回事。

We know that we can trust ourselves when we're tapping and keyboarding or whatever.

我们知道,自己点屏幕、敲键盘的时候,信得过自己。

This other thing we don't know.

但这个新东西,我们心里没底。

And so, it's going to take a lot of time.

所以这会需要很长时间。

Reminds me of kind of General Magic in a way for us to be able to get en masse to trust it.

这多少让我想起 General Magic——要让大众集体信任它,还得走那么一遭。

And we're already seeing this with coding agents and everything else, you know, oh, they deleted my source code.

这一幕在 coding agent 那些东西上已经出现了,你懂的:"啊,它把我的源代码删了。"

And I again, I'm not trying to be an old guy who's saying it's not going to work.

再说一遍,我不是要当那个念叨"这行不通"的老头。

Sure, it's going to work in certain things.

当然,它在某些事情上会成。

I'm saying for consumers every day in the things they want.

我说的是普通消费者每天真正想要的那些事。

And it's cheap enough so it doesn't cost them a lot. Right?

而且还得足够便宜,别让他们花大钱。对吧?

Today, people are like, "Yeah, I'm going to try ChatGPT or whatever it is $20 a month or $200 a month."

今天人们会说:"行,我去试试 ChatGPT 什么的,一个月 $20 或者 $200。"

That is unsustainable for if you think consumers are going to pay that.

要是你觉得消费者会一直掏这个钱,那是不可持续的。

There's just no way.

根本没戏。

Unless it's incredible.

除非它好到离谱。

But, they're not going to you know what I mean?

但他们不会掏的,你懂我意思吧?

Like, they tried it and now they're getting kind of their Siri a lot of them are getting their Siri 1.0 with this.

就像,他们试过之后,现在拿到手的——很多人拿到手的,等于又是一个 Siri 1.0。

Like I paid for it, but it's really not all that yet.

那种"我付了钱,但它真还没那么神"的感觉。

And it's like full self-driving.

跟完全自动驾驶一个道理。

Like I paid for full self-driving.

我为完全自动驾驶付过钱。

It's 15 years later.

15 年过去了。

I'm still waiting for full self-driving.

我还在等我的完全自动驾驶。

So, I think we again understand what we think we want,

所以我觉得,我们又一次是清楚自己"以为"想要什么的,

but where the technology is and and and the social adoption and the social trust that needs to be created around that is going to take a lot of time and it's going to take a lot of iterations to get there.

但技术走到哪一步,还有还有围绕它必须建立的社会接受度、社会信任,这些要花很长时间、很多轮迭代才能到位。

Especially and if especially if you're going to have to pay for it.

尤其……尤其是当你还得为它掏钱的时候。

It's really interesting to hear you say that long-term even will get a need a screen.

听你说长期来看我们甚至还是需要一块屏幕,真的很有意思。

I cuz I think a lot of people are trying to go to just just like an AirPod or like some kind of magical AI device.

因为我觉得很多人在往"只要一个 AirPod"或者某种神奇 AI 设备的方向冲。

Surely and like how are you going to look at a map if you want to look at a map?

当然啦,那你想看地图的时候怎么看?

You're going to just you're going to listen like put on the voice stuff in your car and never look at the map on your car and say, "Oh, turn left in 200 ft. Turn left in 100 ft."

难道你就光听?就像在车里开着语音那套、从来不看车上的地图,听它说:"200 英尺后左转。100 英尺后左转。"

You're like, "Shut up. I can't hear you anymore."

你只会说:"闭嘴吧,我听不下去了。"

I like I just want to glance over.

我就……我只想瞟一眼。

So, I I I I don't buy it.

所以我、我、我根本不买账。

Like unless you have a jack in your brain or in your eye or some other way it's getting into your cortex.

除非你脑子里或眼睛里插了个接口,或者有别的什么方式能直接进你的大脑皮层。

That is so interesting.

这太有意思了。

And you're not a fan of like the Humane approach I think was like a little projection on your hand as a screen replacement. Right?

而且你不看好 Humane 那种路线——我记得是往手上投一小块影像来替代屏幕。对吧?

Was that part of it?

是有这么个设计来着吧?

Yeah, why?

对啊,图什么呢?

What?

搞什么?

It's just a It's different, not better.

那就是个……那只是"不同",不是"更好"。

So funny.

太搞笑了。

I guess the advantage obviously is it's like a small little device you could just put somewhere versus like a screen, but yeah.

要说优势,显然就是它是个小小的设备,随手一放就行,不像一块屏幕,但也就那样吧。

Yeah, and you're like, "Oh, it's like you know, it's like the the hologram projections of Star Wars or something."

对,然后你会想:"哦,这就像,你懂的,就像星球大战里的全息投影什么的。"

You're like, "Yeah, that's cool, but you still need to you you still need a you know, a a screen or something to you to project on."

接着你又会说:"酷是挺酷,但你还是需要……你还是得有一块,你懂的,一块屏幕之类的东西,才能把它投上去。"

So, it is a screen at the end of the day.

所以说到底,它还是块屏幕。

You got to still project it onto something.

你总得把它投到什么东西上。

Yeah, it's well cuz everyone keeps saying, "How is it possible that the end ideal product is a piece of glass that we look at?"

对,因为所有人都在问:"终极理想的产品,怎么可能就是一块我们盯着看的玻璃?"

And you're what you're sharing here is just like that's actually maybe the ideal

而你……你现在讲的意思恰恰是:那也许就是理想形态。

Yeah, and like I said, you fold it up, you put it in your thing and it rolls out or whatever else.

对,就像我说的,你把它折起来,往兜里一塞,或者它能卷开,随便什么形式。

But, I still think there's going to be that thing.

但我还是觉得,那块东西会一直在。

If you look at her, if you remember the movie Her, they had they had glass.

你去看 Her——如果你还记得电影 Her——里面有、里面就有玻璃屏。

There was glass there for certain for certain things.

某些、某些事情上,那里面还是有玻璃屏的。

Wow.

哇。

I don't I completely don't remember

我不……我完全不记得了

To go back and watch the movie.

那你得回去把电影再看一遍。

It's there.

真有那个画面。

Oh my god, that movie.

天哪,那部电影。

Wait, I nailed it.

等等,我这不全说中了嘛。

Oh, man.

哦,天呐。

Go Spike.

Spike 好样的。

Mhm.

嗯哼。

It's Spike Spike Jonze, right?

是 Spike……Spike Jonze 拍的,对吧?

Yep.

没错。

I don't even know.

我都不知道怎么说。

I wanted to ask also just it's interesting that basically everyone is getting into hardware now.

我还想问一个,挺有意思的——现在基本上所有人都在往硬件里冲。

Like, you've been at this for so long building hardware in AI, and now it's just like the hottest thing.

你在 AI 硬件这行干了这么多年,现在它突然成了最火的东西。

Everyone is building hardware.

人人都在做硬件。

So funny.

太好笑了。

Thoughts?

你怎么看?

I don't know.

我也说不好。

How does that feel?

这是什么感觉?

Look, I I was building hardware when it wasn't in vogue, in 1995 and 96.

你看,我在硬件根本不吃香的时候就在做硬件了,1995、96 年。

Everyone was like, "Tony, you're" — and this was in the valley — "Tony, you're crazy. It's all about the internet. We don't need any hardware."

所有人都说,"Tony,你"——这还是在硅谷——"Tony,你疯了。现在一切都是互联网。我们不需要什么硬件。"

And then, iPod comes, like, and I was pitching new businesses in '99 and 2000.

然后 iPod 出现之前,99 年、2000 年我在到处推销新业务的点子。

They're like, "Well, that's the stupidest idea ever."

他们说:"这是史上最蠢的主意。"

Then, the iPod comes out.

然后 iPod 上市了。

"Tony, you want to leave Apple and start that business you wanted to do with hardware?"

"Tony,你要不要离开 Apple,去做你一直想做的那个硬件生意?"

You know, and then and then it was like, "Yeah, okay."

你懂的,然后然后风向就变成了"行,可以啊"。

And then, it was all software mobile stuff again.

再然后,又全变成软件、移动那一套了。

Like, "Okay, we don't need anything," cuz but we we can't get to the next level of software if we don't make the next level of hardware.

就是"行了,我们什么硬件都不需要"——可问题是,不做出下一代硬件,我们我们就到不了下一代软件。

And it has to — the revolution has to happen completely.

而且这场革命必须是完整发生的。

Like, you got to have the mobile network and the mobile network software for the mobile network to work.

就像,你得有移动网络,还得有跑在移动网络上的软件,移动网络才能转起来。

You had to have the MP3 player and the MP3, you know, format bits to make that work.

你得有 MP3 播放器,还得有 MP3 的,你懂的,格式那些东西,这事才成立。

We're seeing with AI, we got to have AI plus all the data centers and edge compute to make that work.

现在 AI 也一样,你得有 AI,加上所有的数据中心和边缘算力,这套东西才能跑通。

So, and then over time, the hardware becomes less — it becomes more mundane.

然后随着时间推移,硬件会变得没那么——变得越来越平淡无奇。

Like, "Okay, it doesn't change as much."

就是"好吧,它没什么大变化了"。

But, all the software starts to then, you know —

但这时候所有软件就开始,你懂的——

So, I've always just been continually going through the things that I love to do and doing the things at the the the the the full stack level because that's where I know is innovation.

所以我一直就是持续做我热爱的事,在那个那个那个全栈层面上做事,因为我知道创新就在那儿。

That's what we had to do at Nest.

在 Nest 我们就必须这么干。

We had to innovate at the software level, the hardware level, the network level to get the first thermostat out and then the Nest Protect and all that stuff.

我们必须在软件层、硬件层、网络层同时创新,才能把第一代温控器做出来,然后是 Nest Protect 和那一堆产品。

If we look now going on, people are like, uh, if you're a SaaS company or if you're a software only company, your software company's worthless because anyone can vibe code it into the thing.

看看现在的情况,大家都在说,呃,你要是家 SaaS 公司,或者纯软件公司,你这软件公司一文不值,因为随便谁都能 vibe code 出一个来。

And and now they're like, "We're only funding companies that have atoms in their business plan with software."

然后然后现在他们又说:"我们只投商业计划里有原子(实体硬件)加软件的公司。"

I'm like, "Duh."

我心想:"废话。"

Like like where where have you guys been?

就是你们你们这帮人之前都干嘛去了?

So it's just it's just funny to watch these cycles go and happen and it's like, "Okay. All right, you guys can go chase your tails."

所以看着这些周期一轮一轮转,真的真的挺好笑的,我就想:"行。好吧,你们继续原地打转去吧。"

"I'm going to just keep here doing these full system kind of products and businesses."

"我就守在这儿,继续做这些全系统级的产品和生意。"

"Yes, they're a lot harder and yes, they cost more money and yes, they're going to take longer to scale and adopt and blah blah blah, but they have staying power for years, right?"

"没错,它们难得多;没错,它们烧钱更多;没错,规模化和普及都要更久,等等等等——但它们能撑很多年,有持久力,对吧?"

And and they bring and they bring new new features that you could have never had if you just did software only cuz you need especially let's say in robotics where you need new sensors and you need this and new that what have you, right?

而且而且它们能带来纯软件永远给不了的新功能新能力,因为你需要——尤其比如在机器人领域,你需要新的传感器,需要这个新的那个,诸如此类,对吧?

Look at Waymo, you know, it's like it's an electric car with you know, electric car with tons of sensors and and everything.

你看 Waymo,它就是一辆电动车,你懂的,一辆装满传感器和和各种东西的电动车。

It was it's a hardware platform.

它是它是一个硬件平台。

Maybe it doesn't look as streamlined as maybe a smartphone, but it's an incredible hardware platform with an incredible software platform and that is something that we're going to be able to innovate on and it it'll become a platform for something else, I'm sure.

它可能看起来不像智能手机那么精简流畅,但它是一个了不起的硬件平台,配上一个了不起的软件平台,我们能在这上面持续创新,而且我敢肯定,它它还会变成别的东西的平台。

You know, delivery or this or whatever else.

你懂的,送货啊,或者这个那个,随便什么。

When Evan Spiegel's on the podcast, Snapchat founder, he said exactly this.

Evan Spiegel 上这个播客的时候——Snapchat 创始人——他说的就是这个。

This is why they're they've spent so much money on these specs and he's just like, "This is the only way to survive in software is you need to have a hardware component now."

这就是他们他们在那些眼镜(Specs)上砸这么多钱的原因,他的原话就是:"软件行业活下去的唯一方式,就是你现在必须有一块硬件。"

Yeah, I just — very interesting.

对,我就是——很有意思。

Everything old is new again and and and you know, I've been in this game 35, 40 years.

一切旧的都会重新变成新的,而且而且你懂的,我在这个游戏里待了 35、40 年了。

I just — you just see it.

我就是——你一眼就能看出来。

You're like, "Okay, I was there at '99 when the bottom fell out and you know, AI is different but it's — there's a lot of similarities."

你会想:"好吧,99 年市场崩盘的时候我就在场,你懂的,AI 是不一样,但——相似的地方太多了。"

And you know, we're going to have the Gen 1 companies, the Gen 2 companies and you know, when people really understand product instead of selling technology platforms that people have to figure out for themselves.

你懂的,会有第一代公司、第二代公司,直到人们真正理解产品是什么,而不是卖那种要用户自己琢磨怎么用的技术平台。

So, you know, it's it's it's fun to watch.

所以,你懂的,看着这一切真的真的真的挺有乐趣。

It's a game.

这就是一场游戏。

Okay, maybe one more question before we get to our very exciting lightning round.

好,在进入我们激动人心的快问快答环节之前,再问最后一个问题。

What are you What are you most excited about these days in terms of, I don't know, gadgets or hardware technology that's emerging?

你现在你现在最兴奋的是什么?比如,我也说不好,正在冒头的新玩意儿或者硬件技术?

Is there anything you're like, "Oh, Pay attention"?

有没有什么东西让你觉得"哦,这个要留意"?

I've been doing this AI plus hardware thing now, not just at Nest, but in many of the startup companies that we funded at Build.

AI 加硬件这件事我已经做了很久了,不只是在 Nest,还有我们在 Build 投的很多创业公司里。

And so, company like Simbe Robotics, you know, it's Simbe Robotics.

比如像 Simbe Robotics 这样的公司,你懂的,就是 Simbe Robotics。

We were doing robotics way back — now it's not a humanoid, but it does inventory inventory of retail stores.

我们很早很早就在做机器人了——它不是人形机器人,但它给零售门店做盘点盘点。

And we've been at it, I don't know, eight years now, seven years.

这事我们干了,我记不清了,七八年了吧。

And now it's just taking off, right?

现在它正好起飞,对吧?

And it does have AI and it has a robotic platform and it's like and it really solves real pain points for the retailers of inventory,

它确实有 AI,有一个机器人平台,而且它真的解决了零售商在库存盘点上的真实痛点,

and the workers hate doing inventory, counting everything on every shelf and all that stuff.

店员也讨厌盘点,把每个货架上的每样东西都数一遍,那些活儿。

So, it really works.

所以,它是真管用。

And like I love seeing that stuff.

我特别喜欢看到这种东西落地。

You know, I — we're doing the same thing at Greyparrot with AI and and recycling.

你懂的,我——我们在 Greyparrot 也在做同样的事,AI 加加回收。

Like it's literally figuring out what things should go in this recycling bin versus that and doing it really fast with cameras and and all this stuff.

它真的就是在判断哪个东西该进这个回收箱、哪个该进那个,用摄像头和和那一整套东西,速度飞快。

It's like and we've been at that for a few years.

这个我们也做了好几年了。

And we have AI plus textiles.

我们还有 AI 加纺织。

Like most textiles you know, are have uh you know, uh weaving errors and and and and color errors and defects and things like that.

你懂的,大多数纺织品都有,呃,你懂的,呃,织造瑕疵、还有还有色差、缺陷之类的问题。

And so, people still make all of these these products, but then they have to incinerate them cuz they're not perfect at the end because we they don't catch the quality problems early enough in the in the in the product product.

所以人们还是把这些这些产品全部做出来,但最后因为不够完美只能烧掉,因为他们没能在生产生产环节足够早地抓住质量问题。

And we're doing AI plus cameras to to spot all the stuff.

我们就在用 AI 加摄像头来来把这些问题全揪出来。

And again, another thing.

看,又是一个例子。

And we're doing this — We've been doing AI and drug drug design now for 10 years at Recursion and that's taking off,

我们还在做——我们在 Recursion 做 AI 加药物药物设计已经 10 年了,现在也起飞了,

and it's like so I'm really interested in not just these frontier models and this whole thing is really good AI that you can trust.

所以我真正感兴趣的不只是这些前沿模型,这整件事的核心是真正靠谱、你可以信任的 AI。

Scope correctly with this solving real problems every day as opposed to pipe dream AGI, you know, okay, you can go solve that.

范围框得准,每天解决真实问题,而不是画大饼的 AGI——你懂的,行,那个你们去搞吧。

I'm going to go and build all these businesses that really matter right now and we're finally getting traction because people like AI and robotics and now all of a sudden we're in vogue,

我要去做这些现在就真正有价值的生意,而且我们终于有了增长势头,因为大家喜欢 AI 和机器人了,突然之间我们成了风口上的人,

and we've been here really working on our product market fit, working on our marketing, working on version 3.0 of the device and everything and people are adopting them and that's what's wonderful to see.

而我们一直守在这儿,踏踏实实打磨 PMF(product market fit,产品市场契合),打磨营销,打磨设备的 3.0 版本和所有细节,现在用户真的在用了,这才是最美妙的。

So I'm excited by all that.

所以这一切都让我兴奋。

We have we have another one like AI infusion, you know, and doing that or finally doing um tons of software with chemical reactions,

我们还有还有一家,比如把 AI 灌注进去,你懂的,或者说终于把,嗯,大量软件用在化学反应上,

and now we're we're turn we have a agricultural clean agricultural fuel and oils company that is cleaning up farms all around Central America.

现在我们我们还有一家做清洁农业燃料和油品的公司,正在把整个中美洲的农场一个个清理干净。

So like and we're almost all atoms plus software in some way and so it's just nice to be sitting here and um and knowing that we made these bets a long time ago and we're doing it now.

所以我们几乎全都是某种形式的原子加软件,坐在这儿,嗯,知道这些赌注是我们很久以前就下的、现在正在兑现,这感觉很好。

We're not necessarily, you know — I was early on in Grok that, you know, right?

我们不一定是,你懂的——我很早就投了 Grok,你懂的,对吧?

Cuz I was like and it was cheap then and it was like, yeah, that's the right way to go and and and my friends were in Cerebras and I got into that,

因为我当时就觉得,那会儿还便宜,我就想,对,这才是正确的方向,而且而且而且我朋友在 Cerebras,我也进去了,

and then, you know, it's like but these are long-term plays and they're finally coming to fruition but we did invest in it not when it was hyped and it's you know, we were doing it back when unicorns valuations were billions of dollars.

然后,你懂的,这些都是长线布局,现在终于开花结果了——但我们投的时候它们还没被炒起来,你懂的,我们下手是在独角兽估值还只是几十亿美元的年代。

Today, if you don't have a $5 round raised, you're not anything.

如今,你要是没融过一轮 $5(十亿量级)的钱,你就什么都不算。

It's like, okay, well, that doesn't work from a venture perspective.

可问题是,好吧,从风险投资的角度看,这根本行不通。

Like with those kinds of — you never get the venture returns.

这种价位进场——你永远拿不到风投级别的回报。

You can't invest in things when when the valuations are already nine digits or 10 digits and you you think you're going to a small portfolio that's — Uh-uh, that's not the kind of game I want to play.

估值都已经九位数、十位数了你还还往里投,还指望靠一个小组合赚到——呵,那不是我想玩的游戏。

So, I I'm glad that we have well positioned in the all these companies that have real good product market fit that came in the right valuations that and that we can really help and make big change and deliver painkillers.

所以我我很庆幸,我们布局的这些公司都有扎实的 PMF、都是在合理估值时进的,我们能真正帮上忙、推动大的改变、交付"止痛药"级的产品。

And we'll let everybody else over there play.

至于其他人,让他们在那边玩他们的去吧。

So, that's what's exciting to me.

这就是让我兴奋的东西。

No, man.

哇,老兄。

There's this quote that I I used the other day on a different podcast that I think applies to you.

有一句话,我我前几天在另一个播客上用过,我觉得放在你身上正合适。

It's a quote from the Bible that you were made for a time like this.

出自圣经的一句话:你正是为这样的时刻而生的。

It feels like all the things are converging around the things that you have been doing for so long and the technology is finally getting exactly as described to actually something amazing.

感觉所有东西都在向你做了这么多年的事情汇聚,而技术也终于像你描述的那样,真正变成了了不起的东西。

The same thing happened to General Magic, right?

General Magic 也是一样的故事,对吧?

General Magic — iPhone too early — and then I just kept added and added and then then doing the iPhone.

General Magic——太早的 iPhone——然后我就一直往上加、往上加,再后来后来就做了 iPhone。

So, it's just — you just — you stick with it.

所以就是——你就——你得咬住不放。

Like there's too many people who chase their tail and chase whatever the hottest thing is.

太多人在原地打转,追着当下最火的东西跑。

When it's already hot, it's already too late to be in it.

等它已经火了,再进场就已经太晚了。

For people that don't know what you do these days, you talked about all these companies you work with.

有些人可能不知道你现在在做什么——你刚才提到了这么多你合作的公司。

Help people understand what what it is you spend your time on, in case they may want to try to work with you on this stuff.

帮大家了解一下你把时间都花在了哪些事上,万一有人想在这些事上找你合作呢。

I think the the first thing to know is that I'm we invest in deep technology.

我觉得首先要知道的一点是,我、我们投的是深科技。

So, that could be hardware, it could be software, software plus hardware, it could be chemical, could be all kinds of different stuff.

它可以是硬件,可以是软件,可以是软硬结合,可以是化学,什么样的都有。

But remember we talked earlier about what's the pain?

但还记得我们之前聊过的吗:痛点是什么?

And is there new technology that comes out to solve that pain in a new way?

有没有新技术出现,能用一种全新的方式解决那个痛点?

Or And so, what what we do is I've learned that I invest in the deep technologies that are going to unseat the incumbents, because it's going to change the market or the product in such a dramatic way that customers will choose this.

或者——所以我们做的事、我学到的是:我投那些能把在位者拉下马的深科技,因为它会以极其剧烈的方式改变市场或产品,剧烈到客户一定会选它。

So, we're not we're not just feature the the com- competing on features or better marketing or whatever.

所以我们不是、我们不是在拼功能,也不是在拼谁营销做得更好之类的。

We're fundamentally a different product.

我们从根本上就是一个不同的产品。

Now, it might take longer to get the market to shift to it, but it's fundamentally different.

当然,让市场转向它可能要花更长时间,但它在根本上是不同的。

Just like I brought up Grok and Cerebras and these kinds of thing.

就像我前面提到的 Grok 和 Cerebras 这类公司。

It's fundamentally different.

它在根本上就是不同的。

And so, at Build, what we do is we invest in those technology companies that can be that seed that can unseat things.

所以在 Build,我们做的就是投资那些能成为种子、能掀翻现状的技术公司。

And maybe they go the distance, or maybe they are the key enabling tech that allows another startup to go to the distance, that kind of stuff.

也许它们自己能走完全程,也许它们是关键的使能技术,让另一家创业公司走完全程,诸如此类。

And so, that's what we invest in.

这就是我们投的东西。

And we do it in in the environment, in societal benefits, and health benefits.

而且我们是在环境、社会效益、健康效益这些方向上做的。

That's where we focus.

这就是我们的聚焦点。

And you know, at times we've had a portfolio of over 200 companies.

你知道吗,我们的投资组合最多的时候超过 200 家公司。

And we do we do that, but we don't just invest.

我们在做、在做这件事,但我们不只是投钱。

When we get involved, many of the companies we advise.

我们参与进去之后,很多公司我们会给他们做顾问。

And we come in, help them with product management, operations, we help them with financing, we help them with org development, uh you know, just all kinds of different ways, that a lot of times in marketing and communications, right?

我们会进场,帮他们做产品管理、运营,帮他们搞融资,帮他们做组织建设,呃,你知道,各种各样的方式,很多时候是在营销和传播上,对吧?

Because we talked about storytelling.

因为我们前面聊过讲故事。

Storytelling's really important.

讲故事真的很重要。

And a lot of deep technology people, they're incredible, you know, engineers, scientists, researchers, what have you.

而很多做深科技的人,他们非常了不起,你知道,工程师、科学家、研究员,什么样的都有。

They have a really good idea, but they don't necessarily know how to form the product around it, or form the marketing around the product they're building, or help the marketing to inform the product, and vice versa.

他们有一个非常好的想法,但不一定知道怎么围绕这个想法塑造产品,或者围绕正在做的产品塑造营销,或者让营销反过来指引产品,反之亦然。

And so, we try to encomp- encapsulate that and and really bring that to bear, so they don't they don't hit it on the fourth version.

所以我们试着把这些打包、打包起来,真正用到他们身上,让他们不至于、不至于到第四个版本才做对。

They try to get very close to the first or second version, so they can get on that three that three version um cycle to get to a a a uh company.

他们要尽量在第一版或第二版就非常接近答案,这样才能踩上那个三、那个三版本,嗯,周期,做成一家、一家、呃,公司。

And so, that's what we do.

这就是我们做的事。

So, we get to have a lot of fun.

所以我们玩得特别开心。

We get to work play in all these different place uh spaces, health, medicine, drugs, robotics, uh uh um you know, chips, these kinds of things.

我们能在所有这些不同的地方、呃、领域里工作、玩耍:健康、医学、药物、机器人,呃、呃、嗯,你知道,芯片,这类东西。

So, that's what's That's just what's wonderful to us, when we get to just be kids in the candy store and work with all these incredible smart entrepreneurs and everything.

所以那就是、那正是我们觉得美妙的地方:我们就像进了糖果店的小孩,能跟这么多聪明得不可思议的创业者一起工作。

So, that's one thing I do.

这是我做的一件事。

The other thing I do is I'm a designer at residence at MIT.

另一件事是,我在 MIT 做驻校设计师。

So, I just finished up my first year there um with the MIT Media Lab and architecture and design, and help to uh you know, give lectures and and um and work with work with students, amazing, amazing, smart students I with the great technology, but help them with the customer journey.

我刚在那儿完成了第一年,嗯,跟 MIT Media Lab 还有建筑与设计学院合作,去、呃,你知道,做做讲座,然后、嗯,跟学生、跟学生们一起工作——非常非常聪明的学生,手里有很棒的技术,而我帮他们梳理客户旅程。

Like, try to make sure that they see this stuff early on in their career, not after 10 years and then they finally understand, "Oh, wait a second. What am I really building? Who is it for?"

就是说,尽量让他们在职业生涯早期就见到这些东西,而不是熬了 10 年之后才终于明白:"哦,等一下,我到底在做什么?这是为谁做的?"

"Not just what is it I'm building, but why am I building it? And for who?"

"不只是我在做什么,而是我为什么要做它?为谁而做?"

And so, we're trying to get that into the into some of the later undergraduate and graduate uh students, so we can, you know, watch them change the world more quickly.

所以我们想把这些灌输给、灌输给一些高年级本科生和研究生,呃,这样我们就能,你知道,看着他们更快地改变世界。

Incredible.

太厉害了。

I love just all the levels of ways you are helping people.

我特别喜欢你在这么多层面上帮助大家。

There's the investing, there's this book, there's MIT, there's these conversations.

有投资,有这本书,有 MIT,还有这些对谈。

It's fun.

很有意思。

It's just so much fun, you know.

真的太好玩了,你知道吗。

I love I love how much fun you're having.

我太喜欢、太喜欢你这种乐在其中的状态了。

Is there anything else you wanted to share that we didn't cover?

还有什么我们没聊到、你想分享的吗?

We should really just talk about ethics and morals and your your point of view on that.

我们真应该聊聊伦理和道德,还有你、你在这上面的立场。

As a product manager, as a product designer, you need to really consider these things.

作为 PM、作为产品设计师,你必须认真考虑这些事。

I understand we have lots of big questions about AI and is it going to be a disaster for the for the you know, for the next generation and for our societies and all that other stuff,

我明白,关于 AI 我们有很多大问题——它会不会对、对,你知道,对下一代、对我们的社会是场灾难,诸如此类,

but I think that you really need to be well grounded and have real principles when you're designing something and don't let those things go astray.

但我觉得,你在设计东西的时候,真的要站得稳、有真正的原则,别让这些东西跑偏。

Just like you wouldn't go astray with a bad user interface or something like that.

就像你不会在用户界面这种事上跑偏、做出个烂界面一样。

Make sure you're not trying to addict your users.

确保你不是在想方设法让用户上瘾。

And if anybody is, there's always other jobs, and there's always other better companies.

如果有谁在这么干——外面永远有别的工作,永远有更好的公司。

And don't chase the money for tearing apart what it is, the fabric of the society that we built.

别为了追逐金钱,去撕裂我们建立起来的社会肌理。

Uh obviously there's going to be innovation, and there's going to be change.

呃,当然,创新会有,变化也会有。

And but when it you're really doing it, and you can see that you're doing it, and you're like trying to get people hooked, or you're like, "Ah, I can more dopamine, or what have you."

但当你真的在干这种事,而且你自己能看见你在干——你在想办法让人上钩,或者你心想:"啊,我可以再多来点多巴胺"之类的。

That's when, you know, you have to start really looking at things.

那个时候,你知道,你就必须开始认真审视了。

And a lot of times people are young, and they they think, "Oh, that's great. That's what I want."

很多时候人还年轻,他们、他们会想:"哦,这挺好,这就是我想要的。"

But when you start to have kids, and you start to have families, and you start to see the And you're not just about you.

可当你开始有孩子、开始有家庭,你开始看到那个……你就不再只关乎你自己了。

You You're You're You're not trying to just get out of your family.

你、你、你、你就不再只想着逃离你的家庭了。

You know, uh you out of your when you were growing up.

你知道,呃,就是你成长过程中想逃出去的那种。

You know, "I'm individual, and I want what I want."

你知道,那种"我是独立个体,我想要什么就要什么"。

You know, you really need to start thinking in it systemically about how what the benefit that you're bringing to the society as a whole, not just to the business that you're in, and trying to bring in whatever revenue you're trying to do.

你知道,你真的得开始系统性地思考:你给整个社会带来了什么好处,而不只是盯着你所在的生意,想着把你要的那些收入搞进来。

Um because the end of the day, users will feel that.

嗯,因为到头来,用户是能感觉到的。

And then I think And will will reward that, as we see with Apple with privacy, right?

然后我觉得,他们会、会为此回报你,就像我们在 Apple 的隐私这件事上看到的,对吧?

And people say, "Oh, they're behind because they're so private, and there's this."

有人说:"哦,他们落后了,就因为太注重隐私,还有这样那样的。"

But it's a double-edged sword.

但这是把双刃剑。

You know, I remember when we had a very pointed discussion when the iTunes music store and and when it was turning into video, um was being specified and when we're thinking about it.

你知道,我记得有过一场非常尖锐的讨论,当时 iTunes 音乐商店正、正要转向视频,嗯,正在定规格,我们正在琢磨这件事。

And everyone's like, "Oh, this is going to be great. We're going to do movies. We're going to do TV shows. That's going to all be great. We're going to make a lot of money with this. And the studios, everybody's behind it."

所有人都说:"哦,这肯定很棒。我们要做电影,要做电视剧,一切都会很棒,我们要靠这个赚大钱。片厂那边,所有人都支持。"

And then somebody goes, "Yeah, well, we should have porn, of course."

然后有人来了一句:"对了,我们当然也该上色情内容。"

Steve was like, "What? Is that the kind of world you want your kids to grow up in? And Apple is related with that? And Apple's about Is that what we want to do?"

Steve 直接就是:"什么?你想让你的孩子在那样的世界里长大吗?还让 Apple 跟那个扯上关系?Apple 的价值是……这是我们想做的事吗?"

And it was very clear it was shut down.

非常明确,这事当场就被毙了。

And we need leaders like that.

我们需要这样的领导者。

You know, we need leaders who are very clear as opposed to I'm going to make a huge service for everyone and they're all sex chat sex chatbots for everyone.

你知道,我们需要立场非常清晰的领导者,而不是"我要给所有人做一个巨大的服务",结果全是情色聊天、给所有人的情色 chatbot。

I just think, you know, when you start normalizing those things and you start telling other generations that's a value and you start and I understand that there everyone has their own what's right and what's wrong and here I am the old guy, you know, again.

我只是觉得,你知道,当你开始把这些东西正常化,开始告诉下一代人"这是一种价值观",你开始……我也明白每个人都有自己的是非标准,而我又成了那个老头子,你知道的。

Uh I I think we, you know, we can go a little too far.

呃,我、我觉得我们,你知道,我们可能走得有点太远了。

I'm for individual rights and for everyone to be a thing,

我支持个人权利,支持每个人活成自己想要的样子,

but when major companies are are doing this in the guise of certain kinds of behaviors they're trying to achieve, um you know, when we're selling we're turning uh personal connection into a product with AI chatbots and making them really, you know, uh devolve uh you know, social interaction to the point where I'm going to have a perfect interaction with this thing because the world is so messy.

但当大公司在、在打着幌子干这些事,好达成他们想诱导的某类行为,嗯,你知道,当我们在卖……我们在用 AI chatbot 把人与人的连接变成一件商品,让它们真的,你知道,呃,让社交互动退化,呃,退化到这种地步:"我要跟这个东西来一场完美的互动,因为真实世界太乱了。"

It's like we're we're losing humanity with that.

这就像我们在、在因此丢掉人性。

And we're just for for for gain.

而这一切只是为了、为了、为了利益。

So, I I I wish that the other product designers out there really take it to heart.

所以,我、我、我希望外面的产品设计师们真的把这话放在心上。

Not saying we got to be lily white and, you know, being in a in a in a church every weekend and Bible banging.

我不是说我们得纯洁无瑕,你知道,每个周末泡在、在、在教堂里狂热布道那种。

I'm not saying that at all.

我完全不是那个意思。

I'm not MAGA.

我不是 MAGA 那派的。

I'm not any of that stuff.

那些标签我一个都不沾。

Just saying, hey, think about it.

我只是说:嘿,好好想想这件事。

A lot of people look at the iPhone as this like thing now that everyone's hooked on.

很多人现在把 iPhone 看成那种、就是所有人都上瘾的东西。

It's like gotten it's so good.

它好像已经变得、它太好用了。

We're just like it's too good.

我们就觉得:它好用得过头了。

Uh and there's all this data showing all the impact it has on people and things like that.

呃,还有一大堆数据显示它对人产生的种种影响之类的。

Just like how do you think about that and the the impact the iPhone has had on people?

你怎么看这件事,以及 iPhone 对人们造成的这种、这种影响?

Well, the first thing is the iPhone wasn't set out to be that.

首先,iPhone 的初衷根本不是这样。

We do, you know, there's unintended consequences and the unintended consequence was social this social media happened.

我们确实,你知道,凡事都有意料之外的后果,而这个意外后果就是社交……社交媒体出现了。

And social media Apple's not a social media company, right?

而社交媒体——Apple 不是一家社交媒体公司,对吧?

But it does distribute the apps or make available those apps, right?

但它确实在分发这些 app,或者说让这些 app 触手可及,对吧?

And so the way I think about it is, you know, we have lots of junk food and we have an obese nation or obese world because of all the junk food,

所以我的看法是,你知道,我们有一大堆垃圾食品,正是因为这些垃圾食品,我们才有了一个肥胖的国家、肥胖的世界,

and it takes us to regulate our our in our our consumption to do that and and get healthy tools and you know, when and and you know, others nutritional elements on the back of things and you if you want to make a better decision, you can,

得靠我们自己去管住我们、我们的、在我们、我们的摄入,还要、还要有健康工具,你知道,还有、还有,你知道,包装背面那些营养成分信息,这样你如果想做出更好的决定,你就做得到,

and I hope AI and these assistants will help people get better control uh of those kinds of things where our lizard brain is being you know, stimulated in a way that like consume more, consume more of physical food, right?

我也希望 AI 和这些助手能帮人们更好地控制,呃,这类事情——我们的蜥蜴脑正在被,你知道,以一种"再吃点、再多吃点实体食物"的方式刺激着,对吧?

And now the same thing's happening in digital food,

现在,同样的事情正发生在数字食粮上,

but we have digital food that doesn't have the nutrition labels, doesn't have the warnings, doesn't have the regulation that it needs to have just like we do with our physical food.

但我们的数字食粮没有营养标签、没有警示、没有它本该有的监管——不像我们对实体食物那样。

Because oh, we can't you can't let innovation, you know, whatever uh you know, be slowed down.

因为"哦,我们不能、你不能让创新,你知道,怎么说呢,呃,被拖慢"。

I think I think there's I'm not saying again being a nanny and all the other stuff, but we got to have some balance and it's just swung too far,

我觉得、我觉得有……我再说一遍,我不是要搞保姆式监管那一套,但我们得有个平衡,而现在钟摆已经甩得太偏了,

and I still think that the platform companies like Google and Apple could be doing a lot more around digital consumption tools and information to help people make better decisions for themselves, for their families and what have you.

而且我仍然认为,Google、Apple 这些平台公司在数字消费工具和信息上,本可以多做很多,帮人们为自己、为家人等等做出更好的决定。

Because, you know, you could go to the refrigerate get a iPhone's just a refrigerator.

因为,你知道,你可以走到冰箱前拿……iPhone 就是一台冰箱。

You can put in junk food or you can put in good food and even if you put in good food, you could go to the good food every 5 seconds, right?

你可以往里放垃圾食品,也可以放好食物,而且就算放的是好食物,你也可能每 5 秒就去拿一次,对吧?

You have a refrigerator in your kitchen.

你厨房里就有台冰箱。

You can put good food or bad food.

你可以放好食物,也可以放坏食物。

You can open it all the time and keep consuming.

你可以随时打开它,不停地吃。

we need to learn habits, we need to teach habits, we need to put in regulations, we need information, we need tools to help us monitor and manage that stuff and they need to be supplied,

我们需要学习惯,需要教习惯,需要立规矩,需要信息,需要能帮我们监测、管理这些东西的工具,而且这些工具得有人提供,

and we We to just like we have rules around, you know, who can buy something when they're 21 or under 21.

而且我们、我们得……就像我们有规定,你知道,满 21 岁或不满 21 岁,谁能买什么东西。

We need all those kinds of things.

这类东西我们全都需要。

And it needs to happen.

而且这必须发生。

Um, because because why?

嗯,因为、因为什么?

Sure, you could have a short-term gain in your customers, but if you make your customers unhealthy, you're not going to have customers.

当然,你可以在客户身上赚到短期收益,但如果你把客户搞得不健康,你以后就没有客户了。

Let me just say for folks that haven't read your book, I just want to uh, communicate how great it is.

我想替那些还没读过你书的朋友说一句,我只是想,呃,表达一下这本书有多棒。

There's very few books that are both tactically useful, that give you like, here's how to do a thing, and also just inspire you to build and make great things.

很少有书能同时做到既有战术上的实用性——告诉你"这件事具体怎么做"——又能激励你去创造、去做伟大的东西。

And Build does that in such a great way.

而《Build》在这一点上做得特别出色。

Uh, I think everyone knows about it.

呃,我想大家都知道这本书。

I don't know if everyone's read it.

但我不确定是不是每个人都读过。

So, highly encourage you to read it.

所以,强烈建议你去读一读。

Two final questions.

最后两个问题。

Where can folks find you online if they want to maybe learn about the stuff you're up to now?

如果大家想了解你现在在忙的事,可以去哪里找到你?

And how can listeners be useful to you?

以及,听众们能帮到你什么?

Great. Well, let's see.

好。嗯,我想想。

Well, thanks again.

首先,再次感谢。

This was fun interview.

这次访谈很有意思。

I really enjoyed it.

我真的很享受。

I think if you want to interact with us, we're at buildc.com.

我想,如果你想跟我们互动,我们在 buildc.com。

So, Build Collective, but we're buildc, b u i l d c.com.

就是 Build Collective,但网址是 buildc,b-u-i-l-d-c 点 com。

You can go and see the companies we invest in, and you can find ways to contact us there.

你可以去看看我们投资的公司,也能在那里找到联系我们的方式。

Um, and how can uh, viewers help me? Um, or help us?

嗯,观众怎么能,呃,帮到我?嗯,或者说帮到我们?

I think learn about the companies, see if you can model whatever you're doing in some of the learn from insights, you know, there's a lot of websites that we helped to create.

我觉得,去了解这些公司,看看你正在做的事能不能对照着来、从那些洞察里学点东西,你知道,有很多网站是我们帮忙做出来的。

A lot of the marketing we created for deep tech, through those through those those investments we made.

很多深科技的营销是我们一手做的,通过那些、那些、那些我们做的投资。

So, you can see some well-done marketing.

所以你能看到一些做得很好的营销。

I hope you like our our website for buildc, to show you how what we think is a really great website that, you know, only doesn't sell things necessarily.

希望你喜欢我们、我们 buildc 的网站,它展示了我们心目中一个真正好的网站长什么样——你知道,它不一定非要卖东西。

You know what I mean?

你懂我的意思吧?

Uh, like, you know, point and click and and purchase.

呃,就是,你知道,点一下、下单、然后购买那种。

But, um, uh, I I I I just I it just get the get them rebuild and apply.

但是,嗯,呃,我我我我只是、就是让大家去重新打造、去实际应用。

You know, that's I think that's the most thing is rebuild, read other things like that, um, and really hone your craft.

你知道,那就是、我觉得最要紧的就是重新去做,再读读其他类似的东西,嗯,真正打磨你的手艺。

Make better products, make a better world, because the world only gets better by the things we make and how what we bring.

做更好的产品,做一个更好的世界,因为世界只会因为我们做出的东西、我们带来的东西而变好。

And so that to me, that's the that's the most important way to help me, is by making other cool products like Flighty or other things that are like, I love this thing.

所以对我来说,那是、那是帮我最重要的方式:做出别的很酷的产品——像 Flighty,或者其他那种让人一用就"我爱死这东西了"的产品。

So make great stuff, people, and don't think the AIs will, you know, use them for the the tools that they they can help with, but don't have cognitive surrender.

所以各位,去做伟大的东西,别以为 AI 会替你做——你知道,在它们、它们能帮上忙的地方把它们当工具用,但不要认知投降。

Don't allow your Don't surrender to the machine.

不要让你的——不要向机器投降。

We can use the machines, but don't cognitively surrender, and make better stuff.

我们可以用机器,但不要在认知上投降,要做出更好的东西。

Make better stuff than myself or any of the teams that we back can make, because we do have better tools now, so please do.

做出比我自己、比我们投资的任何团队能做的更好的东西,因为我们现在确实有了更好的工具,所以请一定去做。

Amazing.

太棒了。

Tony, thank you so much for being here.

Tony,非常感谢你来做客。

Hey, Lenny, that was great.

嘿,Lenny,这次聊得太棒了。

Really appreciate it.

非常感谢。

Uh looking forward to seeing what your what your audience creates.

呃,期待看到你的、你的听众们会创造出什么。

Same.

我也是。

Bye, everyone.

各位,再见。

Thank you so much for listening.

非常感谢收听。

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