Inside Legora: Jude Law Generated $50M Pipeline | Are They Undervalued at $5.5BN?

How much did the Jude Law cost?

那条 Jude Law 广告花了多少钱？

I can tell you it was worth every penny.

我可以告诉你，每一分钱都值。

Was it?

真的吗？

So last month alone, we generated over $50 million of qualified pipe.

就上个月一个月，我们做出了超过 $50M 的合格 pipeline。

Joining me in the hot seat, we have Patrick Forquer, CRO at Legora, the fastest growing enterprise business ever to hit 100 million in ARR.

今天坐在嘉宾席的是 Patrick Forquer——Legora 的 CRO，史上最快冲到 $100M ARR 的企业软件公司。

When I started, we were at 40 people. Today we're over 500.

我入职那会儿全公司 40 人，今天已经超过 500 人。

Get your notebooks out.

把笔记本掏出来吧。

This is a masterclass in company scaling.

这是一节关于公司规模化的大师课。

When we get into a deal, we get into a pilot.

我们只要进入一个 deal，就能跑成一个 pilot。

We convert pilots 78% of the time into a closed-won opportunity.

pilot 转成 closed-won 订单的转化率是 78%。

It's a death match on every deal. It's super competitive.

每个 deal 都是一场死斗，竞争极其激烈。

We've got to play defense and offense at the same time. And that's what makes it fun.

我们得同时打防守和进攻——这也是它好玩的地方。

This market is being made right now.

这个市场正在被造出来。

This is one of the hottest markets of all time.

这是有史以来最火的市场之一。

It's more about time than money right now.

现在拼的是时间，不是钱。

When you have momentum and you have an advantage, press the advantage.

手里有势头、有优势的时候，就要把优势压实。

Ready to go.

准备好了。

Patrick, dude, I've heard so many good things.

Patrick，哥们儿，我听了一堆关于你的好话。

I was literally just chatting to Schaan and to Logan before this show.

录这期之前我刚跟 Schaan 和 Logan 聊过。

They gave me phenomenally helpful insight. Uh, especially Logan.

他们给了我非常有用的角度——尤其 Logan。

So, thank you so much for joining me, dude.

所以非常感谢你来录这期，老兄。

Oh, thanks so much for having me. It's awesome to be here.

谢谢你邀请我，能来这儿太棒了。

So, you were at Braze for six years.

你在 Braze 待了 6 年。

Yeah.

是的。

What was the single biggest sales lesson that you took with you from Braze to Legora?

从 Braze 带到 Legora 的最大一条销售经验是什么？

That's a great question.

这问题问得好。

Um, I think the biggest thing that we did really well at Braze that I've sort of taken over is implementation change management.

呃，我觉得 Braze 做得最到位、被我带过来的，是实施阶段的 change management（改变管理）。

So, Braze is really hard to implement — or at least it was when I was there.

Braze 是很难落地的产品——至少我在的时候是这样。

You're on a legacy product. You're consolidating 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 different tools into one tool.

客户原本用着老系统，你要把他们的 4、5 个工具收敛到 Braze 一个工具里。

Implementations take 6 to 12 months — it's a lot of effort.

实施周期 6 到 12 个月，工作量极大。

There's a lot of stakeholder management, technical work streams, all these different things.

大量的干系人协调、技术工作流，林林总总。

And for us at Legora, obviously we have an amazing product, but at the end of the day our focus and obsession is around helping our customers adopt those Legora tools into their workflows — which is really hard.

在 Legora，产品当然很出色，但说到底我们最 obsessed 的是怎么让客户把 Legora 嵌进他们日常工作流——这件事非常难。

So taking the general change management strategies and learnings from Braze and bringing them to Legora is probably the biggest thing.

所以把 Braze 那套 change management 的策略和经验搬到 Legora，是我带过来最大的一件事。

I had Matt Fitzpatrick on the show — and this is why I don't normally send out the schedules, because they just go by the wayside very quickly.

我之前请过 Matt Fitzpatrick——这也是为什么我一般不提前公布节目排期，因为变化太快了。

But Matt Fitzpatrick, the CEO of Invisible, which is a data provider, he was like: "Oh, you can't sell into enterprise without FDEs today."

Matt 是数据公司 Invisible 的 CEO，他原话是："今天卖 enterprise，没有 FDE 根本卖不动。"

Is that true?

这是真的吗？

And when you reflect back on what works in change management, what's the biggest advice?

那回头看，change management 里真正起作用的是什么？你最大的建议是什么？

Yeah. So there's a couple things that are still true, and I think some things that are different in an agentic world.

嗯。有几条在 agentic 世界里依然成立，也有几条变了。

The things that are still true: you still need a tremendous amount of executive sponsorship and support.

依然成立的是：你仍然需要大量的高管 sponsorship 和支持。

The joke we used to make when I worked in consulting was: the two things people hate the most are the way things are, and change.

我做咨询的时候有一个老梗：人们最讨厌两样东西——现状，和变化。

So you need top-down sponsorship, you need bottoms-up champion-building — all the normal adoption frameworks you'd use in traditional change management.

所以你得有 top-down 的高管支持，也得 bottom-up 培养内部拥护者——这些传统 change management 的 adoption framework 都还在。

I think the biggest thing with agentic work, and why FDEs are required — and we have both forward-deploy engineers but also forward-deploy legal engineers, who are typically big-law attorneys who understand how individual practice areas work within a law firm as well as how corporate legal departments work within that broader context.

agentic 工作最大的不同，也是为什么必须配 FDE——我们既有 forward-deploy engineer，也有 forward-deploy legal engineer，后者通常是 big-law 律师出身，既懂律所内部各业务线怎么运转，也懂企业内部法务团队怎么跟外部律所协作。

With an agent tool like Legora, you log in and you see the agent — it's like the proverbial blank page.

用 Legora 这种 agent 工具，你登进去看到的是 agent——这就像那张白纸。

There's no sequential step of things that you click, like in SaaS.

不像传统 SaaS 那样有固定步骤让你一步步点。

In SaaS it was like: "you used to do things this way, now you do things this way, here's why this is better, here's the business impact."

SaaS 那套是："以前你这么做事，现在改成这样做，这是为什么这样更好，这是它带来的业务价值。"

With an agent, it's: what do you want it to do?

而 agent 直接问你：你想让它做什么？

Most people don't think about their work in terms of systems thinking — in terms of "what's the goal, what are the steps to achieve it, what tools/skills/resources do I need at each step, who's in the loop at each decision inflection point."

而大多数人不会用 systems thinking 拆解自己的工作——目标是什么、要哪些步骤、每一步需要哪些工具/技能/资源、每个关键决策点谁参与。

Most businesses don't write things down like that. They don't think like that.

大多数企业没把这些写下来，也没这么思考过。

So having these forward-deploy folks, you can do two things.

所以配上 forward-deploy 团队后，你能做两件事。

Integrate Legora into the broader tech ecosystem, so we have access to all the various tools and resources we need to accomplish the goal.

第一，把 Legora 接进客户更大的技术生态，让我们能调用所有完成目标需要的工具和数据。

But also leveraging these legal engineers to say: "Hey, we know how XYZ M&A workflow works in practice. This is how you do it before agents — this is how you do it in Legora."

第二，让这些 legal engineer 跟客户讲："我们知道某某 M&A 工作流实际怎么跑，过去你是这样做的，在 Legora 里现在是这样做的。"

That's the hard yards, and where we spend a lot of time.

这是最累的活，也是我们花时间最多的地方。

What level of contract do we need to justify an FDE model, which is more costly?

FDE 这种模式成本更高，那合同金额要到多少才划得来？

It's human hours upfront. It's margin reduction. What level of ACV do you think is needed?

前期投入的是人天，挤压的是毛利。你觉得 ACV 要到多少才合理？

Well, it's a great question — and people keep asking me why we raised so much money, and I'm like: lawyers are expensive, man.

问得好——总有人问我们为什么融这么多钱，我说：律师贵啊，老兄。

We can afford to take this very human-centric approach right now.

所以我们现在能负担得起这种重人力投入的模式。

But we do it for pretty much anything six figures and above — you've got to really lean in and make that happen.

基本上 6 位数合同以上的客户都按这套来，必须 lean in 把客户跑通。

Because otherwise what you do is you sell — you're in danger of selling software that doesn't get used.

否则你卖出去的，是有可能没人用的软件。

And we're very focused on adoption frameworks and making sure that if we sell you 10 licenses, you use all 10 and you get a lot of value out of it.

我们非常看重 adoption framework——卖给你 10 个 license，就要保证这 10 个全部跑起来，并且真带来价值。

We're going to go to metrics that matter, adoption frameworks — I do just want to ask, on the advice side, there's a lot of operators at traditional SaaS companies, traditional enterprise companies, contemplating: should I move to an AI company?

我们待会儿会聊到 metrics that matter、adoption framework——但我想先问一个建议层面的问题：现在很多传统 SaaS、传统企业软件的操盘手都在纠结，要不要跳到 AI 公司？

There's so much hype. There's so much buzz around them.

外面噪音那么大，热度那么高。

I don't want to be left behind.

大家都怕被落下。

Braze is an incredible company, but it's a traditional company.

Braze 是一家很厉害的公司，但它是一家传统公司。

What advice would you have for those operators who are thinking about moving to an AI-first company, a next-gen company?

对于那些考虑跳到 AI-first 公司、下一代公司的操盘手，你会给什么建议？

Yeah, for sure. And I've become that person at Braze that people call when they're, "Oh, I'm thinking about leaving, how'd you think about it" and so on.

行。我现在成了 Braze 老同事的"咨询热线"——总有人来问我："我想跳出去，你当时是怎么想的？"

So I've had this talk a lot with friends and colleagues.

这种对话我跟朋友、前同事聊了很多遍。

The first thing is always: what do you want to do?

第一个问题永远是：你到底想干什么？

Because I can tell you, working in this world is completely insane and unhinged and all-consuming.

因为在这个圈子工作真的是疯狂、失控、吞噬一切。

So you've really got to want to do it.

你必须打心底想做这件事。

You've got to want to lean in, and it's very different than traditional SaaS.

你得愿意 lean in——这跟传统 SaaS 完全不一样。

The pace of development, the pace of the market in terms of competitive dynamics — it's very different.

开发节奏、市场节奏、竞争动态——一切都不一样。

You've got to really want to come in and build and figure stuff out and do things differently — get a little uncomfortable.

你必须愿意进来从头建、自己摸索、用不一样的方式做事——接受不舒服。

If you're okay with that, I'm always encouraging people to make the leap.

只要你接受这些，我永远鼓励大家跳过来。

What's insane and unhinged?

"疯狂、失控"具体指什么？

If you think about the news that comes out every week — the competitive set, the model capabilities, who's buying what — there's so much hype, even in just our space.

你想想每周冒出来的新闻：竞争格局、模型能力、谁在买谁——光是我们这个赛道里就已经噪音满天。

Every time we win a deal or lose a deal, there's a PR announcement about it.

我们每赢一个 deal、每丢一个 deal，外面就有一篇 PR 出来。

So the level of pressure, the level of development, and the product development specifically —

所以那种压力、那种迭代速度，尤其是产品本身的迭代——

The product from Legora a year ago, I thought was incredible — I quit my job and joined the company, I was so excited about it.

一年前的 Legora 产品我已经觉得很惊艳了——所以我才辞职跳过来，非常兴奋。

But that versus what we have now is night and day.

但跟我们现在的产品比，简直是天壤之别。

So your ability to stay on top of it, to learn and to have that level of deep product expertise, is really tough.

所以你想跟上节奏、不断学习、保持那种深度的产品 expertise，是非常难的。

You've got to take it very seriously in terms of enablement and education.

所以你必须严肃对待 enablement 和 education。

I can't remember if it was Logan or Schaan — so I'm going to give credit to both of them.

我不记得这句话是 Logan 说的还是 Schaan 说的——干脆两个人都算上。

Okay.

好。

But they said that you've been phenomenal in terms of bluntly creating a new playbook for this era.

不过他们说你最厉害的地方，是直接给这个时代写出了一套新 playbook。

Yeah. And I think what's challenging with what you said there — with the transience of models, competition, you name it — is your playbook becomes relatively irrelevant.

嗯。你刚刚说的那点确实棘手——模型、竞争都在快速变化，旧的 playbook 很快就失效了。

Yes.

是。

What remains from traditional SaaS playbooks, and what is useless now — get rid of it?

传统 SaaS playbook 里哪些还能用，哪些已经没用了、可以扔？

The one area I still like to ground my team in is: we want to be customer-obsessed.

我反复跟团队强调的一条还是：我们要 customer-obsessed。

There's a guy, Brian Walsh of Force Management, who taught me this phrase — positive business intent.

Force Management 的 Brian Walsh 教过我一个词：positive business intent（积极的商业意图）。

So if you're there, you're showing up, and you're genuinely taking the point of view of: "I'm here to help, I'm here to help transform your business and make a big impact and help you win" — people can feel that.

如果你真的抱着"我来是为了帮你、帮你转型、帮你赢"的心态出现在客户面前——对方是能感受到的。

And be prepared, be professional, come with a point of view.

你要做足准备、要专业、要带着观点上场。

Understand their business. Do your homework.

研究客户的业务，做好功课。

All the stuff that you would do from a preparatory perspective — you still have to do.

所有传统准备工作——你今天依然得做。

You still have to prepare and take the point of view of deeply understanding their business, so you can understand the impact you can make long-term.

你依然要做准备、深入理解他们的业务，这样才能讲清楚长期能带来的价值。

That's still the same.

这一条没变。

But, you know, at Braze we never ran pilots — in Legora we run pilots all the time, as an example.

但举个例子：在 Braze 我们从不跑 pilot，在 Legora 我们一直在跑 pilot。

So there's a tremendous amount of education you have to do.

这意味着你要做大量教育工作。

As we were talking before the show, I think AI literacy in the market — not just legal, AI literacy generally — is very, very low.

就像我们录之前聊到的：市场上 AI literacy（AI 素养）整体非常非常低，不只是法律行业。

Even when we're working with firms who have put a ton of investment and enablement into it — the models are developing, the capabilities are developing, and staying on top of it is a big challenge.

就算是那种在 AI 上投入巨大、做了很多 enablement 的律所——模型在进化、能力在进化，要跟上是非常吃力的。

We view part of our job as being that partner to help you stay up to speed with the cutting-edge technology and everything you can do with it.

我们认为自己的工作之一就是当那个伙伴——带客户跟上前沿技术，告诉他们能用它做什么。

So that part is quite different.

这一块是跟过去差别很大的。

Totally get that.

完全 get 到。

Does the traditional sales playbook of old work in a new AI world?

老的传统销售 playbook 在新的 AI 时代还管用吗？

I think it's a blend. There's certain things you have to throw out.

我觉得是个混合体——有一些东西你必须扔掉。

So the traditional SaaS playbook is: you don't want to demo.

传统 SaaS playbook 的一条铁律是：别急着 demo。

For example, the old-school SaaS thing — the products weren't very good — you want to hold the demo as long as possible, do discovery, build rapport, do all these things, and then you demo in the second or third meeting.

比如老派 SaaS 的逻辑——因为产品本身不够好——你要尽量拖 demo，先做 discovery、建立 rapport，搞一堆这种东西，到第二、三次见面才 demo。

That's what the old-school guys would tell you.

老派的人都会这么教你。

With Legora and with agentic tools, you still have to do discovery and still come with a point of view, but you have to use the product to show what the future looks like — especially for us in a category-creation moment.

在 Legora 这种 agentic 工具上，你仍然要做 discovery、仍然要带观点，但你必须用产品本身把"未来长什么样"演给客户看——尤其是我们这种正在 create category 的阶段。

You're dealing with what they call traditionally unrealized pain.

你面对的是所谓"未被意识到的痛点"。

We're not typically replacing a tool — occasionally we are, but more often than not, we're the first tool of its kind coming into the organization.

我们一般不是来替换某个现有工具的——偶尔会，但更多时候我们是这家组织里第一款这类工具。

And so you have to be willing to be audible, ready to ask questions, and then be able to pivot really quickly into building an agentic workflow off the cuff as you're talking to someone.

所以你要能在现场临场应变、随时提问，再迅速地、当场就把一条 agentic workflow 给客户拼出来。

And that's quite difficult.

这件事相当难。

Can we actually use that as a way of explaining the valuation?

能不能拿你刚说的这个，来解释一下估值？

I think people question the multiple — as we said, it raised a lot of money, and at a $5.5 billion post, which is public, people are like "wow, you have to assume a lot."

很多人质疑这个倍数——你们融了不少钱，估值 $5.5B post（这个数公开了），大家会说"哇，这要假设的东西太多了"。

You gave me an answer before which I'd love for you to share, because I thought it was a good one.

你之前给过我一个答案，我觉得特别好，能不能在这里分享一下？

How do you think about that expansion — from where we are to where we can be in terms of what Legora does?

你怎么看 Legora 从现在到未来能做到的那种空间扩张？

Yeah. So if you look at the legal tech market, I think $40 billion is the number that's floating around.

行。你看 legal tech 这个市场，目前大家普遍引用的数字是 $40B。

Depends on who you talk to, but legal tech generally is a $40 billion market.

看你问谁，但 legal tech 整体大概就是个 $40B 的市场。

So then if you look at us, at our competitive valuation, that sort of doesn't add up.

那你拿我们的估值跟这个市场比，说实话——是对不上的。

But then if you look at legal services more broadly, that's a trillion-dollar market.

但如果你把视野放到 legal services 整体，那是一个万亿美元市场。

And certainly there's a bunch of work within that that's not work done by law firms — it's more rote, repeatable, document-extraction-type work.

里面相当一部分工作不是律所在做的——那种更 rote、可重复、像文档抽取类型的活儿。

And that's where we see ourselves really playing in the long term — not just the legal tech market, but there's an element of the services market as well, where there's a high degree of application for Legora.

长远来看我们想啃的就是这一块——不只是 legal tech，还有 legal services 里 Legora 大有用武之地的那部分。

Oh, honestly, it's a savage. Well, I can't wait for him to create an AI, Harry.

说真的，这哥们儿太狠了。等他自己也搞个 AI 出来吧，Harry。

Um, if Legora can do that, I'll pay double.

如果 Legora 能帮他干，我愿意付双倍。

But if we start at the pipe — what's the biggest lesson in how to construct an effective pipe in an AI world, and how that pipeline-building process is done?

那我们从 pipe 开始聊——在 AI 时代搭一条有效的 pipeline，最大的经验是什么？怎么搭？

This has been a big point of evolution for us.

这一块我们这一年迭代很大。

For example, we just did a big brand campaign with Jude Law.

比如我们刚跟 Jude Law 做了一支大型品牌广告。

But before you do something like that, you have to do a ton of work on the plumbing — what's our inbound lead scoring, how do we do data enrichment, how do we do lead routing and lead scoring from a probabilistic perspective?

但在你能砸这种广告之前，得先把"管道"做好——我们 inbound lead scoring 怎么打？data enrichment 怎么做？lead routing 和 lead scoring 怎么用概率模型跑？

There's a ton of infrastructure you have to put in place first, before you can really go big on inbound.

在大规模拉 inbound 之前，得把基础设施搭起来。

On that basis, we've done a ton of work leading up to that campaign — even last year, getting our systems in place, getting the territory assignments in place, all the rules and SLAs around: if we get a lead, you have to respond within this amount of time.

所以为了这次广告，我们提前做了大量工作——光去年就在落地系统、territory 分配、各种规则和 SLA：拿到 lead 多久之内必须响应。

Even last year, from an SMB perspective, we had so many leads that we weren't able to follow up with as many as we wanted in a timely way.

就拿去年来说，SMB 那边的 lead 多到我们根本来不及及时跟进。

So the other thing was staffing — we've had to hire a tremendous amount.

所以另一件事就是招人——我们招了非常非常多。

When I started, we were at 40 people. Today, we're over 500.

我入职的时候公司 40 人，今天已经超过 500 人。

And we still need more people and more systems to keep up with the demand.

就这样我们还得继续加人、加系统，才跟得上需求。

How do you do lead scoring today? Is it simply size of contract?

你们今天 lead scoring 怎么打？是看合同金额吗？

Yeah. So right now you look at the size of the firm, you look at the number of attorneys and compliance workers internally, and then you look at where they're located — and you're routed to the right team.

嗯。现在的打法是：看律所规模、看内部律师和合规人员的数量、看他们在哪个地区——再路由给对应的销售团队。

Okay. Gotcha. Geo plays a role in that.

行，懂了。地理位置也是个因素。

Mhm. Yeah. So we've got teams all over the place. In Europe, we have pods looking after every major market.

嗯。我们团队布在各地。欧洲那边每个主要市场都有专门的 pod 在覆盖。

For example, in Germany we're doing so well that we just opened an office in Munich.

比如德国市场跑得特别好，我们刚在慕尼黑开了办公室。

So you run the GM model. I'm seeing this more and more — where you have like mini CEOs of each country.

所以你们跑的是 GM 模式。我现在看到越来越多公司这么干——每个国家配一个迷你 CEO。

ElevenLabs has very much pivoted to that.

ElevenLabs 就全面转向了这套打法。

Yeah. Exactly. So we've got Leo who runs our European business, and then under Leo we've got a number of folks from a country perspective, with a team behind them to go execute.

对。Leo 管欧洲业务，他下面按国家配人，每个人后面再带一个执行团队。

So we have to be really cognizant of European data sovereignty, different regulatory compliance things — we have to have teams who really specialize in that.

所以我们必须对欧洲的数据主权、各种合规要求非常敏感——团队里得有真正懂这块的人。

I know — you've got to get a permit to go to the bathroom. I'm sorry.

我懂——在欧洲连上厕所都得申请许可。开玩笑。

Exactly. Exactly.

真的真的。

Oh, you want to get up to go to the bathroom? You need a permit for that. Yeah. 25.

"你想起身去上厕所？你得有许可证。"是吧。25 道手续。

How much did the Jude Law cost?

那条 Jude Law 广告花了多少钱？

I can't say the exact number, but I can tell you it was worth every penny.

具体数字我不能说，但我可以告诉你：每一分钱都值。

Was it? Okay.

真的？好吧。

Yeah. 100%. So, last month alone —

真的。100%。光是上个月——

People are going to watch this and they're going to say Harry's an ambassador and it's bias.

大家看到这里会说"Harry 你是站台的，带偏的"。

I wasn't sure about it.

说实话我自己一开始也没把握。

Yeah. Well, tell me it was worth it — I'm thrilled, because I want it to be.

来吧，告诉我这钱花得值——我希望它值，我巴不得它值。

So last month alone, we generated over $50 million of qualified pipe.

就上个月一个月，我们做出了超过 $50M 的合格 pipe。

And that's not just inbound leads — that's pipeline that we talked to, qualified, and moved into a sales conversation.

而且这不只是 inbound lead，是我们已经跟客户聊过、qualify 过、推进到了 sales conversation 阶段的 pipeline。

Can I move along? What were the months before, to give us context — is that good or bad?

那之前几个月呢？做个参照——这数字到底算高还是算低？

That was a pretty big jump month-over-month.

环比是一次比较大的跳涨。

I don't know the exact number, I don't want to misquote — but from that perspective, we're seeing a ton of interest and demand.

具体数字我记不准，不想乱说——但整体上，我们看到的兴趣和需求是爆量的。

So lawyers give a [bleep] about Jude Law.

所以律师们真的在乎 Jude Law。

Honestly it wasn't even necessarily for the lawyers in the big markets who already know about us — it's more for the folks who don't.

说真的这条广告不是给那些大市场里已经知道我们的律师看的——是给那些还不知道我们的人看的。

We just want that brand awareness.

我们要的就是 brand awareness。

Because I can tell you, when I started — I was our first US hire — the first office we had in the US was my apartment in Brooklyn.

我入职那会儿——我是 Legora 在美国的第一个员工——美国第一间办公室就是我在布鲁克林的公寓。

And as I was slowly building out the team, no one knew who we were outside of the people sort of in the know in the legal tech community.

我慢慢搭团队的时候，legal tech 圈外几乎没人知道我们。

So for us, we were late to a lot of deals.

所以很多 deal 我们都进得太晚了。

And when we get into a deal, when we get into a pilot, we convert pilots 78% of the time into a closed-won opportunity.

但只要我们能进到一个 deal、跑进 pilot，pilot 转成 closed-won 的转化率是 78%。

So we're doing really well in terms of funnel progression — but the biggest challenge we had was just not being in the room.

所以漏斗推进我们其实做得很好——最大的问题就是根本没被请进决策的房间。

And so for us, brand awareness is everything.

所以对我们来说，brand awareness 是一切。

The strength of our brand is better than ever.

现在我们品牌的强度比以往任何时候都高。

And yeah, the Jude Law campaign wasn't for everyone, but overall we got really positive feedback — and the biggest thing is just brand awareness for us.

这条 Jude Law 广告不是所有人都买账，但整体反馈非常正面——对我们来说最关键的还是品牌认知度。

Super interesting on brand — I had Nik from Revolut on the show.

关于 brand 这点很有意思——我之前请过 Revolut 的 Nik。

And he said one of the biggest lessons he always had is: he always thought brand awareness was fluffy [bleep] — and actually, it's one of the most powerful drivers of the business.

他说他最大的一个教训是：他原本一直觉得 brand awareness 是"虚的"——结果它居然是业务最强的驱动之一。

Yeah. And that's one thing we report on to the board.

是的。这也是我们每次都向 board 汇报的指标之一。

Stuart and our marketing team have created a framework for how we score our brand efficacy in different markets, and we track that.

Stuart 和市场团队搭了一套框架，给品牌在各个市场的效力打分，我们在持续追踪。

We're making big progress, and we have a lot more coming.

进步很大，后面还有更多动作要出。

Can I ask you about the pilots there?

能聊聊你们的 pilot 吗？

The undeniable truth is, you are in a two-sided fight — or however we want to say it — it's you versus Harvey.

没法回避的事实是：这是一场两强对决——或者随便怎么形容——就是你们 vs Harvey。

How do you advise founders? I don't want to make this Legora versus Harvey, but how do you advise founders — there are a lot of markets where it's Brex versus Ramp, or Stripe versus Adyen — how do you advise founders when it's one versus the other in that sales process?

你会怎么建议创业者？我不想把这期搞成 Legora vs Harvey——但很多市场都是 Brex vs Ramp、Stripe vs Adyen 这种两强对峙——在那种销售场景里你会怎么建议？

At the end of the day, it comes down to preparation and execution.

归根结底，就两件事：准备 + 执行。

One of the companies I really admire and try to model after is Ramp, like you said — we talk a lot about them internally in terms of how they've built the execution layer from a go-to-market perspective.

我特别敬佩、想对标的一家公司就是 Ramp——我们内部经常聊他们的 GTM 执行层是怎么搭起来的。

If you talk to anyone who's engaged with a Ramp sales team, they're always prepared.

谁跟 Ramp 销售打过交道都会发现：他们永远是有备而来。

They don't have to take things back to get answers. There's a degree of professionalism and preparation that goes into every conversation.

他们不需要把问题带回去再回复你——每一次对话背后都有那种专业度和准备度。

And also — so often in go-to-market, people talk about using AI to automate different processes, like "I want to update my opportunity notes" or "draft this email" — and of course we do all that stuff.

另外——GTM 圈里大家聊 AI，总在聊"我要 AI 帮我更新 opportunity 笔记""帮我起草邮件"——这些当然我们也都做。

But the other thing people don't think enough about is: how are you using AI to deliver more differentiated services and insights?

但大家想得太少的是另一面：你怎么用 AI 给客户提供更差异化的服务和洞察？

We have a lot of data from pilot participants — how can we give insights into that data that help the firms and companies we work with make decisions around adoption frameworks, ROI, and so on?

我们手上有大量 pilot 参与者的数据——怎么把这些数据变成洞察，帮客户做出 adoption framework、ROI 这些层面的决策？

So we use pilot data to encourage net-new customers.

所以我们用 pilot 数据去拉动新客户。

We say: "Hey, 84% of people that use this type of email actually convert better."

我们会说："看，用这类邮件的 84% 客户转化更好。"

Can you — what?

能举个例子吗？

Yeah, exactly. So within a law firm context, for example, we'll segment by practice area.

好。比如在律所场景下，我们按 practice area 切分。

A big firm's got, say, 10 practice areas, and you have X number of people within each practice area.

大型律所大概有 10 个业务领域，每个领域有 X 个人。

We can report out on consumption and usage by practice area.

我们能按 practice area 给出消耗量和使用情况的报表。

We also track and create frameworks and use-case banks for actual applications and workflows that we're building.

我们还会沉淀框架，建立 use case 库，记录实际跑通的工作流。

So say within that example, we've got 10 practice areas. Seven of them, we see really high usage — we're creating and capturing new use cases, and we're sharing that back with them regularly.

假设这 10 个业务领域里，7 个使用率特别高——我们持续沉淀新 use case，再定期同步给客户。

But maybe there are three where we're not.

但可能另外 3 个领域跑不起来。

And you can start measuring things like: did the quality of your work increase? Did you decrease the amount of non-billable work your associates were doing? Were you able to attract more talent?

这时候你可以开始量化：你的工作质量有没有提升？你 associate 的非计费工作时间有没有下降？你招聘吸引力有没有变强？

Using a tool like Legora, people get excited about using the latest and greatest in AI.

能用上 Legora 这种工具，律师对"接触前沿 AI"是真的兴奋的。

And so if you take that and apply it to the three practice areas where maybe we're not doing as well, we can show them insights as to who's really leaning in and who's not, and where we need help from a change management perspective.

所以拿这套去对那 3 个跑得不好的业务领域，我们能告诉客户：谁在认真用，谁没在用，哪些地方需要 change management 帮一把。

Totally get that. That makes sense.

完全 get 到，这逻辑通的。

So one — it's execution and being prepared. Anything else on how to navigate that "Brex versus Ramp, Harvey versus Legora" dynamic?

所以一条是 execution + 准备到位。Brex vs Ramp、Harvey vs Legora 这种两强对峙，还有别的招吗？

One of my biggest bits of advice for founders is always: be respectful.

我给创业者最大的建议之一永远是：保持尊重。

Knocking your competition is not — in a sales process — it just doesn't come across that well.

在销售过程中贬低对手——给人的感觉就是不专业。

Exactly.

完全同意。

Sell yourself. Don't bash them.

卖你自己，别黑对方。

Exactly. And we try to stay in our lane and focus on ourselves.

就这样。我们尽量守住自己这条道，专注做自己的事。

Now obviously, as you mentioned, we have one big competitor — and it's a death match on every deal.

话又说回来，确实如你所说，我们有一个大对手——每一单都是死斗。

It's super competitive. We have a ton of respect for them.

竞争极其激烈，我们对他们怀有十足的敬意。

It's not like anyone at Legora thinks every deal is going to be a cakewalk — it's the exact opposite.

没有人在 Legora 觉得任何一单是 cakewalk——恰恰相反。

They're very good. They're very aggressive. We take them extremely seriously.

他们很强，进攻很猛，我们极其认真对待。

So we screen for intelligence. We screen for effort. And we screen for competitiveness.

所以我们招人的时候筛三样东西：智力、勤奋、好胜心。

Because at the end of the day, you got to really want to win.

说到底，你得是真心想赢。

You got to go out, execute, out-deliver, and evolve your playbook.

你得走出去执行，比别人交付得更狠，并且 playbook 要不停演化。

We run pilots very differently now than we did a quarter ago, or the quarter before.

我们今天跑 pilot 的方式，跟一个季度前完全不一样，跟两个季度前更不一样。

That's interesting. How do you run them differently today than you used to?

有意思。今天跑 pilot 跟以前有什么不一样？

We have a lot more tools. We have a lot more reporting. We have a lot more specialty in terms of implementation change management.

工具更多，报表更多，implementation change management 的专才更多。

Going back to the firm context as an example: you can't just have a litigation attorney go talk to an M&A team.

拿律所举例：你不能让一个 litigation 律师去跟 M&A 团队聊。

You've got to have an M&A attorney go talk to an M&A team.

必须是懂 M&A 的律师去跟 M&A 团队聊。

As we've scaled from just me to a much bigger team in the US, we've hired specialists who focus on different areas of law — who can go in bed with our clients and the folks in pilots, and build those bespoke workflows for them.

从一开始只有我，到现在美国团队规模很大，我们专门招了不同法律领域的专才——他们能跟客户和 pilot 用户深度绑定，为他们搭定制化的工作流。

We're able to get on-site. Getting on-site is super critical — because people don't pay attention on Zoom. We all know that.

而且我们能上门——上门极其关键，因为大家在 Zoom 上根本不专心，这个大家都知道。

So when you say getting on-site, what do you mean? In the sales process it's like: get into their office?

你说的"上门"具体指什么？销售过程中就是要去客户办公室？

Yes. I encourage every GTM and every legal engineer: if you're not in their office by the second or third meeting, something's wrong.

是的。我跟每个 GTM 和 legal engineer 都强调：第二次或第三次见面前你还没进过客户办公室，那一定有问题。

Certainly, some companies — especially on the corporate side — are hybrid or remote, and you can't always do it.

当然，企业端有些客户是 hybrid 或全 remote，没法每次都上门。

But for a deal of really any size — because for firms, this is a bet-the-company type decision — this is an existential decision-making process.

但只要 deal 规模有一点点——对律所来说，这是赌公司命的决定——这是关乎存亡的决策流程。

From that perspective, you're going to bet on the team just as much as you're betting on the product.

从这角度看，客户既是在赌产品，也是在赌团队。

You're betting on a team that's going to meet you in the future with the solutions and adoption frameworks that are going to help you get there.

他们赌的是：这个团队未来能不能拿出方案和 adoption framework，把他们带到他们想去的地方。

It is about the decision — because this is their core investment in the AI technology field, if you look at it from the partnership perspective as a law firm.

这就是关乎决策——因为从律所合伙人视角看，这是他们在 AI 技术上的核心投资。

With that in mind, and with the stickiness that can come — how do we think about giving it away for free and margin reduction in order to have market share gain?

那考虑到它的高黏性——你们怎么看"免费送 + 让利毛利 = 抢市场份额"这种打法？

Yeah. We don't give Legora away for free.

嗯。我们不免费送 Legora。

We try to have price integrity. We try to be very transparent around what our pricing model is and how we go after things.

我们守住价格底线，定价模式和打法尽量透明。

But in a competitive dynamic, we do face that from various competitors.

但竞争场上，我们确实碰到对手免费送的情况。

All give it away for free.

他们都在免费送。

They have.

是有的。

From our perspective, I always make the joke when I'm talking to folks in a competitive dynamic — when you're getting down to the decision-making process, you're focusing on the product score from the pilot, the commercial model, the roadmap.

从我们的视角，进入决胜阶段时我总开个玩笑——客户要看 pilot 的产品评分、商业模式、产品路线图。

One thing we do is we have what we call the "8 Mile" talk track.

我们有套话术叫"8 Mile talk track"。

At the end of 8 Mile, where he just says everything that's wrong with him, about him and his family — we sort of say: "This is exactly what's going to happen if you pick us. This is what the counter is going to be. This is where they're going to go."

就像电影《8 Mile》结尾，主角把自己和家人所有的黑点全部自爆出来——我们也一样，在最后跟客户讲："你选我们之后，对方接下来会说什么、会出哪些招，我们提前给你讲清楚。"

We have a pretty good point of view on what will happen, and it usually does — so we try to stay ahead of it.

我们对接下来会发生什么判断挺准，而且基本都被验证——所以我们提前把话讲在前头。

Do people churn when they're embedded in a product? If switching isn't frequent and it's supremely sticky —

客户一旦深度嵌入产品，他们还会流失吗？如果切换成本高、黏性极强——

If I'm Max and you're Patrick, easy one: I just say, "Let's give it away for free to everyone for the first year. Let's get everyone on it for free, get them embedded."

如果我是 Max 你是 Patrick，简单——我会说："第一年统统免费送，让所有客户白用，把他们 embed 进来。"

"We'll tell all our investors our margin is going to suck. There's no revenue. It's going to suck. But next year we're going to be at a billion-five in revenue."

"跟所有投资人讲我们毛利会烂、收入会烂，但明年我们冲到 $1.5B。"

Well, that's one way to look at it. But the way I think about it is: first of all, if a company's not spending any money on a product, does it matter?

这是一种看法。我的视角是：首先，一家公司如果不为这个产品花钱，它对客户有多重要呢？

Then they're not going to put the resources and attention into it that they need to.

他们就不会投入相应的资源和注意力。

And we really need our customers to lean in and want to change.

我们真的需要客户 lean in、真的想变。

Because at the end of the day, we can have the best team — focused on all the right things — but if the customers aren't leaning in, it's going to be tough.

说到底，我们就算有最强的团队、做对所有事，但客户自己不投入，也很难跑通。

So going to zero is not helpful in that dynamic.

所以把价格打到零，在这种 dynamic 里反而帮倒忙。

But I see what you're saying — and we do try to be easy to work with, so we try to be as flexible as we can.

不过我懂你的意思——我们尽量让合作容易，灵活度尽可能给。

There's a very interesting behavioral economics study: they gave away a yoga class for free in a park, and it had a 52% attendance rate.

有个很有意思的行为经济学研究：公园里免费瑜伽课，到课率 52%。

Then they charged $35 — and it had 92%.

改成 $35 一节，到课率 92%。

Exactly. Yeah. Exactly.

对，就是这道理。

It's like people commit to what they pay for.

人会为他们付了钱的东西买单。

Exactly. And you have to have value — you place value in your partners, and we find that to be true.

对。你必须让 partner 在合作里"有 skin"——这一点屡试不爽。

I interviewed Winston at Harvey — I thought one of their GTM approaches was very smart: using PE as an expand-funnel into the clients that they have in law.

我之前采访过 Harvey 的 Winston——他们一个 GTM 打法我觉得很聪明：用 PE（私募股权）作为扩张漏斗，去触达那些 PE 投过的法律客户。

How do you think about that?

你怎么看这套打法？

Yeah, that's definitely an angle.

嗯，这是一条路。

And certainly within the legal services ecosystem more broadly, you look at the influence on decision-making on tooling.

在更大的 legal services 生态里看，谁在影响工具采购决策？

For example, if you're selling to a corporate, they're going to ask all their law firm panel what tools they're using.

你卖给一家企业，他们会问自己的律所天团："你们都在用什么工具？"

If you're selling to a law firm, they're going to ask their big corporate clients what tools they're using.

你卖给律所，他们会问自己的大企业客户："你们都在用什么？"

And certainly private equity —

私募股权那边——

Who has the power? Do the PE firms have power over the law firms, or do the law firms have power over the PE?

谁有真正的权力？PE 压得动律所，还是律所压得动 PE？

I think it depends on the firm and depends on the PE company.

看具体律所、看具体 PE 公司。

But there's definitely a lot of interconnectivity, and one of the most fun things about selling into this market is that every deal is very different.

但他们之间联系非常紧密——卖到这个市场最有趣的一点就是：每一单都不一样。

Selling to a law firm, there's a lot of personalities. Stakeholder management can be very different from firm to firm.

卖到律所，里面有各种 personality，stakeholder 协调从一家到另一家完全不同。

There's innovation teams, there's knowledge management, but there's also partners — and the degree to which partners want to lean in and get involved varies.

他们有创新团队、有 knowledge management，也有 partner——partner 愿意 lean in 的程度差别极大。

And then there's AI committees and all these subcommittees — so it's very intricate, the decision-making process.

还有 AI 委员会，还有一堆子委员会——决策流程非常错综。

One client of a firm might have an outsized voice at the table for or against you — you have to be very mindful of that. That map is very complex.

律所的某一个客户可能在采购决策桌上有超大的发言权——这一点要极其敏感。整张图谱非常复杂。

Many different clients, processes. Biggest lessons or advice on lead scoring — going back to that — anything you see people doing wrong?

客户多、流程多。回到 lead scoring 这块，你看到大家最常做错的是什么？最大的教训或建议？

The one thing that remains true is: the longer you let a lead sit, the worse the conversion rate.

有一条永远成立：lead 在你手里放得越久，转化率越低。

So we just try to optimize for the highest-intent signal with the fastest response time.

所以我们就是奔着两件事优化：最高的意向信号 + 最快的响应时间。

We automate a lot of that — sending out the calendar invite for the initial call, on the right system, with the right person.

很多东西我们都自动化了——首次通话的日历邀请、配对正确的系统、配对正确的人，自动完成。

We just try to be as fast and accurate as possible with that.

这一块我们就是死磕速度和准确度。

No, dude — it's exactly like a deal. When you're "Oh, we'll see you in two weeks" — and if you miss something or something gets dropped (and this happens to everyone), your chances of converting go way down.

不，老兄——这跟做 deal 完全一样。一旦你说"那两周后再见吧"，中间有任何事情被漏掉、被掉链子（这事每个人都遇到过），转化率就直线下滑。

That remains true, and I don't think we have any big insight beyond that.

这条永远成立——除此之外我们也没什么特别深的 insight。

Cool — you're advising me, I'm an early-stage founder. Biggest advice on sales qualification — the hard questions to ask, what not to ask, the way to do it?

行——假设你在指导我，我是早期创业者。销售 qualification 你最大的建议是什么？哪些是硬核问题，哪些不该问，方法是什么？

For us, it's a couple of things. Going back to the pilot example: one thing we've learned is some firms say, "Oh, we have this really onerous info-sec process, so we want to do a pilot, but we don't want to go through info-sec — we'll just do it on test documents or publicly available things."

几件事。回到 pilot 这个例子：我们学到的一个教训是，有些律所会说"我们 info-sec 流程极其麻烦，所以我们想跑 pilot，但我们不想走 info-sec，就拿测试文档或公开材料跑一下吧"。

That's a recipe for low engagement, low excitement, and generally doesn't work out well.

这种打法的结果通常是参与度低、兴奋度低，最后跑不通。

So you've got to have a little bit of give-get — there's pain on the front end of identifying the use cases you want to test, identifying the stakeholders involved in the pilot.

所以必须有点 give-get——前期要把你想测的 use case、参与 pilot 的 stakeholder 都确定下来，这一段会有点痛。

As you can imagine, working with firms like Dentons, big law firms, and EY — the info-sec process is non-trivial.

你可以想象，跟 Dentons、其他 big law、以及 EY 这种合作，info-sec 流程一点都不轻。

So if you can get buy-in on identifying success criteria for the pilot, who's going to be involved, what use cases we're going to test, what metrics are involved — and you can go through that initial painful period — then you've got something.

所以你如果能让客户在前期就 buy in：pilot 成功标准是什么、谁参与、测哪些 use case、量哪些指标——熬过这一段最痛的时期，后面就有戏。

How do you bring in people with true buying power? I imagine they're not always on the first calls.

那些真正有 buying power 的人怎么拉进来？他们一般不会在前几次会议上。

How do you make that transition of, "I'm so pleased, Patrick, that you're excited about Legora — can we please try and get your boss in now, because I want to progress this"?

怎么过渡到这种话术："Patrick，我很高兴你对 Legora 这么兴奋——能不能把你老板请进来一次？我想推进这个事情。"

I have to say one of the things about Legora that's floored me — at Braze, we had this problem.

Legora 有一件事让我特别意外——这件事我在 Braze 时一直是难题。

At Braze, the executive buyer was the CMO, and getting access to a CMO was so hard. We'd get it done very rarely, and we'd sort of bend over backwards to get it done.

在 Braze，executive buyer 是 CMO，能够直接见到 CMO 极其困难。我们能拿到的机会非常少，而且每次都得绞尽脑汁。

With Legora — because there's so much chatter in the market about AI, and the firms and corporates both want to understand what others are doing — we actually get access to power pretty easily.

在 Legora 完全不一样——因为整个市场 AI 噪音很大，律所和企业都想知道别人在干什么——我们居然很容易就能直接接触到决策层。

And people want to learn.

而且对方愿意主动学。

On the law firm side, they're getting asked by their clients: "How are you using AI? What tools? What use cases? Where will we see this value in our bill?"

律所那边，他们被客户追问："你们怎么用 AI？用什么工具？哪些 use case？我们的账单上能在哪里看到 AI 带来的价值？"

On the corporate side, they're getting a ton of pressure from the board and the CEO: "Go figure this [bleep] out, we need to optimize XYZ process, AI everything."

企业那边，board 和 CEO 在给他们压力："快搞清楚这玩意儿、把 XYZ 流程优化掉、AI 把一切重做一遍。"

So we get access to senior stakeholders who want to lean in and learn from us.

所以我们能见到那些愿意 lean in、愿意跟我们学习的高管。

But typically, if you don't have that access early — to your question — what we try to do is focus on the highest-value use cases and highest-value impact as quickly as possible.

但回到你的问题，如果一开始拿不到这种 access，我们的打法是：尽快锁定最高价值的 use case 和最高价值的 impact。

You want to grab attention really fast. And luckily for us, the Legora product is awesome.

你必须迅速抓住对方注意力。幸运的是 Legora 产品本身很好。

So coming in with a perspective on the company and the role based on the ICP you're talking to, talking about high-value use cases, learning what's most important to them, and showing them how we'd solve that quickly — they're like, "Wow, I want to show this to my boss."

你根据 ICP 提前研究好这家公司和对方角色，带着 high-value use case 去聊，听他们讲对他们最重要的是什么，再当场快速展示我们怎么解决——他们就会说："哇，我要拿这个给我老板看。"

That's been a successful framework.

这套框架我们验证有效。

I come from an industry that is traditionally called sheep-like in terms of following others. I don't understand why anyone would attribute that to us.

我自己来自一个传统上被叫做"羊群跟风"的行业（VC）。我完全搞不懂为什么有人会这么形容我们。

To what extent is legal a sheep-like industry where it's like: "Oh, Clifford Chance, Slaughter and May, you name it — they use X"? To what extent do they follow others?

法律行业是不是也这种"羊群跟风"——Clifford Chance、Slaughter and May 用什么，剩下的就跟着用？跟随程度有多大？

There's certainly an aspect of flight-to-safety during these category-creation moments — because this is all new.

这种 category-creation 阶段确实有 flight-to-safety 的成分——因为一切都是新的。

The general understanding of how agents work, how AI works, how to think about use-case design is still being developed.

大家对 agent 怎么工作、AI 怎么工作、use case 该怎么设计，整体认知还在形成中。

The executive buyers at the firms and companies generally aren't as up-to-speed on that. Some are, but broadly probably not.

律所和企业的 executive buyer 整体在这方面跟不太上。少数人懂，但整体上还不行。

So there is this flight to safety — people want to feel like "you never got fired for hiring IBM."

所以确实有 flight to safety——大家想要那种"买 IBM 永远不会被开除"的安全感。

Do you not feel both you and Harvey are IBM at this stage?

你们和 Harvey 现在难道不已经是 IBM 这种存在了吗？

I was going to say — last year we were the new entrant, trying to make our name.

我刚要说——去年我们还是新入局的，还在打名号。

You were not IBM.

你们当时还不是 IBM。

We were definitely not last year.

去年绝对不是。

At this point, working with the firms we work with — having Dentons, Linklaters, and other big firms advocating for us — really goes a long way.

到了今天，我们合作的是 Dentons、Linklaters 这种大所——他们公开站台对我们影响巨大。

I think we have that stamp now, but that's been a journey we've been on.

现在那个"安全章"我们算是有了——但这一路走得不容易。

You've got 20 of the AmLaw 100. Yeah. And Harvey got 40 or 60.

你们拿下了 AmLaw 100 里的 20 家。Harvey 是 40 或 60 家。

I don't know their numbers. Yeah.

他们具体数字我不清楚。

I think they said 50 of AmLaw.

他们说是 50 家。

Yeah. 50. Yeah.

50 嘛。

Does that mean we're fighting over the next 30, or does that mean we're fighting for each other's, candidly?

那是不是意味着我们在抢剩下那 30 家？还是说我们在互相抢对方的客户？

Both.

两者都有。

It does, for sure.

没错，确实如此。

They know who we work with, we know who they work with. We're both trying to get in.

他们清楚我们的客户名单，我们也清楚他们的——双方都在互相渗透。

We're very aware that they know who our customers are, we know who theirs are. We're both going aggressively after it, and also scaling up quickly to go after the next 50 — or whatever the number is.

我们非常清楚他们盯着我们的客户名单，我们也盯着他们的。双方在猛攻彼此客户的同时，也在扩规模去抢剩下那 50 家。

So we've got to play defense and offense at the same time. And that's what makes it fun.

所以我们得同时打防守和进攻——这也是这场仗好玩的地方。

God, the old SaaS world feels quite nice.

天啊，老 SaaS 世界听上去舒服多了。

Yeah, exactly. There's like 30% growth a year, quarterly cycles —

就是。每年 30% 增长、季度节奏——

Do you guys pay attention to social? Because for VCs, no — but like you saw last week, Paul Graham tweets and then Matt Miller tweets back.

你们关注社交媒体吗？做 VC 的不怎么关注——但你上周也看到了，Paul Graham 发推，Matt Miller 回怼。

I'm not saying anything about either individual — I like them both immensely.

我对两个人都没什么不敬，他俩我都非常欣赏。

But — does it impact the team?

但这种事会影响你团队吗？

I don't know how much it impacts the team. We definitely hear about it.

影响多大说不准，但确实会传到团队里。

When PG tweeted that, my phone blew up. Shout out to him, by the way. That was awesome.

PG 发那条推的时候我手机直接炸了。顺便致敬一下，他那条挺帅的。

I do wear shorts everywhere. He's a guy after my own heart.

我也是走哪都穿短裤——他真是我精神同好。

Yeah, even in Scandinavia.

对，连斯堪的纳维亚都穿。

I try not to think about it too much. Obviously we've got Chayen and others really advocating for us in the public sphere — we really appreciate that, but I leave that stuff to them. I'm not on Twitter.

我尽量不太想这些。我们有 Chayen 和其他 VC 在公开场合替我们发声——非常感激，但我把这一块留给他们。我不用 Twitter。

Do you bring VCs in to help you win deals?

你们会拉 VC 上场帮你们赢 deal 吗？

Definitely. 100%.

当然，100% 会。

The cool thing about the space we're in: VCs like Iconiq, General Catalyst, Bessemer — they have huge legal networks themselves.

我们这个赛道有意思的是：Iconiq、General Catalyst、Bessemer 这种 VC，他们自己就有庞大的法律网络。

They're big spenders on legal services more broadly. So they have big networks and are advocating for us whenever they have the opportunity.

他们本身在 legal services 上花钱很多。所以他们既有人脉，又一逮到机会就替我们站台。

And certainly our competition does the same thing. That's an element of these opportunities.

当然对手也在做同样的事。这就是这种 deal 里的一个变量。

I always tell founders that I work with: use your cap table as a weapon.

我一直跟合作的创业者说一句话：把你的 cap table 当武器用。

Absolutely. Exactly.

完全同意。

What do Harvey do better than you?

Harvey 哪些地方比你们做得好？

That's a good question. That's a hard one.

这问题问得好。挺难答的。

I don't want to give an inch — but certainly the strength of their brand is hard to deny. They've done a great job.

我一点都不想让步——但他们的品牌强度确实是公认的，他们做得很好。

They were the first entrant, they've built this amazing brand, and kudos to them.

他们是最早入场的玩家，搭起了一个很强的品牌，这一点必须给他们竖大拇指。

When we said earlier about playbooks — going back to something Schaan said — he said training in particular is something where we've done incredibly well, ramping people.

刚刚聊到 playbook——Schaan 说过一句话——他说你们在培训、特别是新人 ramping 上做得极好。

What's the biggest lesson on how to do training well, because it's not easy actually?

把培训做好最大的经验是什么？这事其实并不简单。

This is another thing that, as a leader, is very different from the SaaS environment.

这件事从 leader 视角看，跟 SaaS 时代也完全不一样。

In the SaaS world, it's much more predictable, on a very slow operating model.

SaaS 世界里节奏可预测得多，运营模式慢且清晰。

You do quarterly releases with some monthly shipping in between ahead of the quarterly release. You've got all this documentation. You do a big certification — go through all these programs.

季度发版，季度发版前每个月会出一些小功能。文档全。大型 certification、培训项目都跑完。

With Legora, we do big product things every week, and the team has to stay on top of that.

在 Legora，每周都有大型产品变化，团队必须跟上。

There's no way you could do a global certification program for every big feature we launch, in real time, all the time.

不可能为每个大功能、随时随刻、跑一个全球 certification。

So we have to do a lot at a team level, regional level — and we do a lot async with video content. We use Notion really heavily.

所以我们大量东西放在团队层级、区域层级——用 async 视频内容做了很多。我们重度使用 Notion。

The product teams really embed with the individual sales and legal engineering teams and engagement folks, to make sure we're all up to speed.

产品团队深度嵌入到各个销售、legal engineering、engagement 团队里，确保大家都跟得上。

But you can't do it all centrally. You have to distribute through both async video and Notion content, as well as team-level enablement.

不可能全集中处理。必须分布式：async 视频 + Notion 内容 + 团队层 enablement。

So we activate on our product guys in that way.

所以产品同事是按这种方式去赋能整个组织的。

Don't worry about being too specific — how does that look for sales training, then? First week, what do I get? A Notion link and a load of video libraries?

具体一点也没关系——那销售培训第一周大概什么样？我会拿到一个 Notion 链接和一堆视频库吗？

No. So this is actually something we've really elevated, and something I'm really proud of.

不是。这恰恰是我们这一两年抬升最多的环节，也是我个人特别自豪的事。

When I first joined, Vilgot told me to go to Best Buy and buy an Apple computer, and then I went and watched a couple of videos of Max doing a demo.

我刚入职的时候，Vilgot 让我自己去 Best Buy 买一台苹果电脑——然后看了几条 Max 做 demo 的视频，就这样。

Now, every two weeks, we have a new hire class — and at this point, it's between 40 and 50 people joining every two weeks.

现在每两周一批新人入职——目前每两周有 40 到 50 人。

We send everyone to Stockholm doing an immersive 5 days.

所有人都被送到斯德哥尔摩，做一个 5 天的 immersive。

This is not like something where you're just going to do a couple of video things and walk around Stockholm.

这不是那种"看两段视频，再去斯德哥尔摩转一圈"的形式。

This is intense, immersive. We expect GTMs and LEs to come out of that week ready to go.

非常高强度、非常沉浸。GTM 和 LE 走出来就要能上场。

From a ramp perspective, it's a straight line up. We expect to drop people in and see them be very productive very quickly.

从 ramp 曲线看，是一条陡直的上升——我们就是要把人扔进去，看他们迅速产出。

When you say "ready to go," do you mean they're ready to sit on calls on their own with clients?

"能上场"是说他们能独立上客户电话？

That's quick.

那也太快了。

It's very quick, yeah.

非常快，是的。

I had a guy do a demo in his second week with one of the biggest companies in the world, and he killed it.

有个新人入职第二周就跟全球最大公司之一做了 demo，表现炸裂。

Obviously I joined the call because of the nature of who the company was.

当然因为客户太重要，我也一起进了那个会。

Now Patrick decided to sit that one.

所以 Patrick 那次特地参与了。

Yeah. I was there for guidance, but we expect productivity to happen very quickly. So we do an immersive first week.

对，我在场提供 guidance。但整体上我们期待产出非常快。所以第一周就是 immersive。

What does that mean — "immersive first week"? Sorry to be specific, but there's so many founders listening literally taking notes. What does it mean?

"immersive 第一周"具体是什么意思？抱歉问得细，但听众里有很多创业者真的在做笔记。

We have a cross-functional education program focused on everything from: this is our sales stages, this is our opportunity cycle, this is the entry and exit criteria.

我们有一套跨部门的培训体系，涵盖：销售阶段、opportunity cycle、各阶段的 entry/exit 标准。

We do a full day of demo work.

完整一天专门做 demo。

We have a huge library of Gong and video content from a demo perspective — but we also do a lot of role plays.

我们有大量 Gong 录音和 demo 视频库——但同时也做大量 role play。

We do a lot of education on the market generally — because we hire a lot of lawyers and a lot of technologists.

还有大量市场层面的培训——因为我们招了很多律师，也招了很多技术背景的人。

The lawyers you have to train up on how the tech stack works; the technologists you have to train up on subject-matter expertise from a legal services perspective.

律师那边要教技术栈怎么工作；技术那边要教法律服务的领域知识。

So we have a ton of content on industry education, product education, competitive landscape.

所以我们沉淀了大量内容：行业培训、产品培训、竞争格局。

The competitive landscape, as mentioned, changes every week. So we have to update all the product information, new product info.

如前所述，竞争格局每周都在变。我们必须实时更新所有产品信息。

So we basically have a university-style 4-day program where every department comes and enables the new hires on that program and how we operate.

所以本质上是个大学风格的 4 天项目：每个部门都来给新人讲他们这块怎么做、怎么协作。

We have all that available in the new-hire Notion. And all the reps have their own personalized ramp page where we track all the metrics we're looking at from a ramp perspective.

所有内容都在新人 Notion 里。每个销售有自己的 ramp 个人主页，所有 ramp 相关指标都在那儿追踪。

Of the 40 to 50, how many do you think make it?

这 40 到 50 人，最后留下多少？

That's a good question. When we move on from sales folks, we do it typically within the first quarter — and we actually have really high retention rates relative to the market.

好问题。销售岗的人，如果要"放走"，一般在第一个季度内就会发生——而我们的留存率相比市场水平其实很高。

What are the signs that someone's not going to make it?

什么样的信号意味着一个人撑不下去？

We score demo quality using AI. We use Gong, and you can create a scoring mechanism for how the call went — the discovery framework, the demo flow, etc.

我们用 AI 给 demo 质量打分。用 Gong，能根据 discovery framework、demo flow 等给整通通话打分。

When we get a red flag on that, our enablement team goes in, looks at the call, and does a playback with that person.

出现红色信号，enablement 团队就介入，回放通话、跟当事人一起复盘。

If you look at call quality scoring plus opportunity development from a pipeline perspective, you can see pretty quickly who's tracking.

把通话质量评分 + pipeline 上 opportunity 推进情况一起看，谁跟得上一目了然。

We know what good looks like and we know what good doesn't look like — you can see within about 45 days.

什么是好、什么不是好我们都很清楚——大概 45 天就能看出来。

So is it [bleep] then — the traditional notion that "enterprise is really difficult to understand whether someone's a good sales rep, because the sales cycles are long"?

那传统观念"企业级销售周期太长，根本看不清谁是好销售"——这是不是扯淡？

From a traditional SaaS perspective, that might still be true. With us — even our enterprise folks, when they come in, they're going to be buried in deals within 60 days.

在传统 SaaS 视角下可能还成立。我们这里——就算是 enterprise 岗的新人，进来 60 天就会被 deal 埋了。

Our best people are closing deals typically within 90 days, even on an enterprise team.

最强的 rep 通常 90 天内就能 close 一单——哪怕是 enterprise 团队。

Because we're very hot right now. This market is being made right now.

因为我们现在非常 hot。这个市场正在被造出来。

From an opportunity point of view, it's not like you have to go take your territory list, get your BDR, do account-based marketing, get the initial meetings — that's the traditional model.

从 opportunity 角度看，不需要按传统套路——拿到 territory 名单、BDR 配合、做 ABM、约首会——这是老一套。

I've ramped cold territories before, I've managed teams that have done that in SaaS. This isn't that.

我以前自己从零跑过 cold territory，也带过这种 SaaS 团队。这次不是那套。

This is one of the hottest markets of all time.

这是历史上最火的市场之一。

When we drop GTMs into their book, they're into pilots — typically something like five pilots within their first quarter.

我们把 GTM 扔进他们的客户簿，他们就开始跑 pilot——一般第一季度内就要跑 5 个 pilot。

We're asking people to get very productive very quickly — because we can't do a bunch of handholding for a long period of time.

我们要求新人快速产出——因为我们没条件长期 handhold。

And we have so much inbound and so much interest that the volume of opportunities they're working is much higher than it would be in a traditional SaaS environment.

而且 inbound 和需求量太大，他们手里 opportunity 的数量远超传统 SaaS 时代。

Would you rather hire someone who has experience selling to law firms, or someone who has experience selling this size of deal?

如果让你选，更想招一个有卖律所经验的，还是有卖这个 deal 量级经验的？

I would rather have someone who has this size of deal.

我更想要懂这个 deal 量级的人。

Really?

真的？

Because legal tech traditionally — we're selling much bigger deals than traditional legal tech companies. ACV is like $250–500K —

因为传统 legal tech 的 deal 量级很小——我们的 deal 比他们大得多。ACV 大概 $250–500K——

It depends on the segment, but roughly. And we're doing a lot of seven-figure deals.

看 segment，大致是这个范围。同时还有大量七位数的 deal。

A lot of legal tech companies were more niche, so their ACVs and ARRs weren't what ours are.

很多 legal tech 公司更 niche，ACV 和 ARR 都不在我们这个量级。

We have hired some folks from legal tech, and some have done really well. But they're not used to sending a million-dollar proposal across the line.

我们也招过 legal tech 出身的，有些表现极好。但他们不习惯发出去一份百万美元的 proposal。

I'd much rather have someone strong in understanding organizational dynamics and change management, who's confident sending large proposals and working that angle.

我更想要那种懂组织动态、懂 change management、敢于发大 proposal、能从这个角度去推的人。

What was the hardest deal to win, and why do you think you won it when you reflect on it? Like a win postmortem.

你赢得最难的 deal 是哪一单？回头复盘，你觉得为什么赢了？

I'm thinking about — I don't know if I want to say the name — but it was a big global law firm we won.

我现在想的是——名字我先不说——一家全球大型律所，我们拿下了。

How big was it?

多大单？

It was sort of medium seven-figure deal.

大致中等七位数。

Wow.

哇。

Yeah. And for us it was hyper-hyper-competitive. It was global.

是的。对我们来说极其极其激烈。还是 global 客户。

We were using the full force of our global team in the US, Europe, the UK, and Australia. So all four regions were activated working this from a pilot perspective.

我们动用了美、欧、英、澳四个区域的全部力量，全部上场跑 pilot。

It was very close. There was influence on both sides.

差距非常小。双方都拼命施加影响力。

Do you know when it's close? How?

你怎么知道局势胶着？根据什么判断？

It came down to — this is how we knew how close it was — it came down to an executive presentation of our CEO and their CEO in front of their executive panel.

最后一关——这也是我们知道有多胶着的方式——双方 CEO 都要在客户的 executive panel 面前做一次 executive presentation。

And that's how they ended up making the decision. And we won.

他们就是根据那场对决做出决定的。我们赢了。

Oh, I would be nervous if I was back —

天，如果是我在场会紧张死——

Dude, he's an alien. You want to be on form. You sleep well the night before.

老兄，Max 是个外星人。你只要做好自己，前一晚睡好就行。

Honestly, the biggest thing we have going for us is that we have Max, and no one else does.

说真的，我们最大的杀手锏就是我们有 Max，别人没有。

He inspires a lot of confidence.

他一站出来就让客户安心。

Is that very rare to have CEO-to-CEO bake-off?

CEO 对 CEO 的 bake-off 是不是很罕见？

In my career, yes. But in terms of the Legora experience, no — because these are such important decisions.

在我整个职业生涯里，挺罕见。但在 Legora 这边一点也不——因为客户这种决策实在太关键。

Yeah. If you're a top law firm, I don't think it feels unreasonable.

是的。如果你是顶级律所，要求双方 CEO 上场也不过分。

No. You want to know who you're betting on. You want a deep understanding of who they are, what the vision for the company is.

是的。他们要知道自己在赌谁，要深入了解对方是什么人，公司愿景是什么。

Does that align with your vision? Does it align with your values, product strategy, and execution?

是否跟客户自己的愿景一致？是否跟客户的价值观、产品策略和执行能力一致？

People really want to get into the nitty-gritty and understand not just Max, myself, the team more broadly — but the chops of the folks delivering the services.

客户希望深挖到细节：不仅看 Max、看我，还要看整个团队，看实际交付服务的人有没有本事。

They look at all of that. It's a really fine-tooth comb they go through this with.

这些都要看。他们是用一把"细齿梳"在过。

Okay, dude. Everyone has a flip side. Take me to a deal you lost — and when you look back on it, what's the postmortem? What more could we have done?

行哥们儿，凡事都有 B 面。说一个你输掉的 deal——复盘的话，你觉得本来还能怎么做？

I'm thinking about one right now — and as always with enterprise, it goes back to multi-threading: who you get to and who you don't.

脑子里就有一个——企业级销售的老问题：multi-threading——你触达到了谁、没触达到谁。

Within a law firm context in particular, the decision-making is sometimes opaque, and oftentimes there's these panels.

在律所场景尤其如此，决策机制有时候是不透明的，经常是一个 panel 在拍板。

Sometimes there's five people on a panel. Sometimes you meet all five, sometimes four out of five, sometimes one — in terms of one-to-one engagement and relationship.

假设 panel 上有 5 个人。有时候你能跟 5 个人都建立关系，有时候 4 个，有时候只有 1 个。

There was one key member of the panel that we never got time with and weren't able to build a relationship with. And they did.

这一单里，panel 中有一位关键成员我们始终拿不到时间，也没建立关系。但对手建立了。

Oftentimes with a panel decision, the loudest voice gets what they want. And we weren't able to get that. So that was really painful.

panel 决策里通常嗓门最大的人决定结果——我们没拿下他，所以输得非常痛。

Is the days of steak buying dinners over? Or actually not?

那种"请客户吃牛排晚餐"的时代是过去了，还是其实没过去？

It's not like it used to be. Back in the early days when I was first — I graduated college in 2008 — that was still in the era of steak lunch, steak dinner, a lot of entertainment and sales.

没以前那种规模了。我 2008 年毕业那会儿，还是牛排午餐、牛排晚餐、大量招待 + 销售那一套。

It's definitely evolved. More so these days, people want to do activities — get out, maybe not go to a steak dinner, do something a little more fun.

现在变了。大家更愿意做"活动"——出去玩、不一定吃牛排，搞点更有趣的。

Oh god, it reminds me of mini-golf dates.

天哪，让我想到迷你高尔夫约会。

Yeah, well — not quite like that. But relationships are still really important. And certainly for us, it's actually conferences.

差不多但没那么夸张。关系还是非常重要。对我们来说，主战场反而是 conference。

There's so many conferences and so many events — any chance we have to show up and show off our team —

conference 和活动很多——任何能让我们露脸、让我们团队被看到的机会——

Because in traditional tech, there's been a realization that being a brand logo on a viral podcast clip is the new gold.

因为在传统 tech 圈，大家发现：能上一段爆款 podcast 切片上做品牌 logo，才是新的"黄金机会"。

Yes — and having a banner at a conference that no one really wants to go to, not so much in traditional tech.

而那种"没人想去的 conference 拉横幅"，在传统 tech 圈现在不流行了。

Is that not the case in legal?

法律行业不是这样吗？

Legal tech right now is having this renaissance. There's so many new players, so much money coming in.

legal tech 现在处于文艺复兴。新玩家很多，钱涌进来很多。

But going back to the conference point — you can waste money on conferences or you can make money on conferences. It depends.

回到 conference 这点——你可以在 conference 上烧钱，也可以在 conference 上赚钱，看你怎么用。

We've got a pretty good playbook for that.

这块我们有比较成熟的 playbook。

What did you spend money on that was an absolute banger, and what did you learn from it that I should know?

你花过哪笔钱效果绝顶？你从中学到了什么我应该知道的？

When they go really well, these fireside-chat-type executive dinners.

效果最好的是 fireside chat 那种高管晚宴。

We hosted one — some of our investors' office is at Zero Bond in New York — and one thing remains true: everyone still wants to go to a fancy restaurant and hear someone smart speak.

我们办过一场——我们某个投资人办公室在纽约的 Zero Bond——有一条永远成立：大家依然愿意去高级餐厅、听一个聪明人讲话。

So we still find these AI thought-leadership dinners are super effective.

所以我们发现这种 AI 思想领袖晚宴非常有效。

They cost a lot of money, and you have to get some talent in the room from a thought-leader point of view — and have them do a fireside chat with Max.

花费很高，必须邀请有分量的 thought leader 来现场——再让他们跟 Max 来一场 fireside chat。

Those are highly, highly effective — something we do very often and really well.

效果极佳——我们做得很多，也做得很好。

Okay. Love that.

行，喜欢这个。

What have you spent money on and you're like, "Guys, I can't believe we [bleep] spent money on this"?

那有什么钱是你花完之后想"哥们我们居然花这钱"的？

Going back to the conference thing — I think we averaged a conference a week last year.

还是回到 conference——去年我们大概平均一周一场 conference。

We showed up at every conference you could think of — and some of them we repeated this year, and some of them we're like, "We're never doing that again."

能想到的 conference 我们去了个遍——有些今年继续，有些我们说"再也不去了"。

I love that. Speaking of — we said earlier, would you rather have someone versed in law or someone versed in deal size?

这条好。说回来——你刚才说，宁可要懂这个 deal 量级的，而不是懂法律的？

When we think about incentivizing teams, sales comp packages are really hard to get my head around.

说到激励，我老觉得销售薪酬这块怎么都想不明白。

Traditional SaaS — going back to traditional versus new world — 4x is good.

回到传统 vs 新世界这条线：传统 SaaS 是 OTE 4 倍工资就算好。

Then I have Becca from Clay who's like 6 to 7x. And then I have my dear friend Carles from ElevenLabs who went very viral saying 20x. And I'm like, "Oh my god, I feel like such an insignificant human being."

然后我请了 Clay 的 Becca，她说他们是 6-7 倍。然后我朋友——ElevenLabs 的 Carles——爆红地说他们 20 倍。我心里"我的天，我活得真没意义"。

I heard that 20x number — I got so many messages. I follow him obviously.

那个 20 倍我也听到了——我手机都收爆了。我当然关注他。

All my friends who are in this business were like, "Wait, what's your multiple? Did you hear this guy?"

所有干这行的朋友都问我："你们家倍数多少？看到这哥们儿说的了吗？"

Everyone got that. I feel a little bit bad for the rest of the CROs.

大家都被问爆了。我替剩下的 CRO 们感到难。

How do you think about effective sales comp setting today?

那你今天怎么看销售薪酬该怎么定？

Well, just to start: ours right now — it depends on the market, segment, and region — but ours are between 8 and 12x. That's where we landed.

先把数字摆出来：我们目前是 OTE 8 到 12 倍——具体看市场、segment 和区域。

But we don't just take a multiple and apply it to the competitive market OTE.

但我们不是拍脑袋拿一个倍数就套到 OTE 上。

You've got to take a bottoms-up approach — look at all the metrics: ramp time, productivity per head, ARR per head, pipe evolution within certain territories.

必须从下往上推：ramp 时长、人均产出、人均 ARR、各 territory 的 pipe 演化——所有指标都得看。

We did a bottoms-up exercise last year, and that's how we got to that range.

我们去年就是这么一项项推出来这个区间的。

But last year we absolutely blew out every metric we put in front of the team. So I don't know how effectively we're doing it — but that's how we're doing it right now.

不过去年团队把每个指标都炸穿了——所以我们这套到底有多准我也不敢说，但目前就是这么打的。

But you think 8 to 12x today is where you sit, which is good.

所以今天你们坐在 8 到 12 倍这个区间，这挺合理。

What percent of people should hit that?

这个区间下，多大比例的销售应该达到目标？

Well, our average attainment last year was 280%.

我们去年的平均达成率是 280%。

Wow. So, is that an effective attainment setting?

哇。那这算合理的达成水平吗？

Yeah, that was a bad job by me. No offense.

是的，那是我（作为 CRO）没干好。无意冒犯。

Yeah. When I started — just for context — we were at $3.5 million ARR, and Chayen and the Redpoint guys were like, "Can we do $25M?"

嗯。给点背景：我入职时我们 ARR 是 $3.5M，Chayen 和 Redpoint 那帮人说："今年能做到 $25M 吗？"

And Logan did it. Yeah.

Logan 投的那一轮，对吧。

I'm a VC so I give credit to other VCs for a living — but I give credit to Logan on that one: he paid up in advance for something that wasn't that obvious, respectfully.

我自己也是 VC，"给同行点赞"是我吃饭的活——但 Logan 这一笔我真心服：在这事还没那么明朗的时候，他就提前把价格付了，恕我直言。

Credit to him.

敬他。

Absolutely. He got me — that's how I got connected with Max, through Logan. And he actually introduced me to Braze as well. So I'm always a big fan of the Redpoint team.

完全同意。是他把我牵到 Max 那边的——也是他当年把我介绍到 Braze 的。所以我永远是 Redpoint 的粉。

But sorry — you joined and it was $3.5M.

回到正题——你入职时 ARR 是 $3.5M。

Yeah, three and a half. So then we're like, "Can we do $25M?"

对，$3.5M。然后大家问"今年能做 $25M 吗？"

I remember we were at like seven. We raised a Series B and we had everyone to Stockholm, and I'm giving a big rah-rah speech to the global team at that point, which fit in the kitchen of our Stockholm office basically.

那时大概 $7M。我们融了 B 轮，把全球团队都召到斯德哥尔摩，我在那儿做了一段动员演讲——而当时全球团队全员塞在斯德哥尔摩办公室那个厨房里就坐下了。

We hit $25M in Q3, and then we went nuts in Q4 and blew through every number — we ended the year at $70M.

Q3 我们就到了 $25M，Q4 直接打疯，所有目标都打穿——年底落在 $70M。

Then we obviously crossed $100M earlier this year.

今年早些时候我们破了 $100M。

So projections are very hard from our side, from a forecast perspective at the beginning of the year. I only give guidance to the board on a rolling six-month basis.

所以从年初做预测对我们来说极难。我只给董事会做 rolling 6 个月的 guidance。

At this point, based on the data we have and the pipe analysis we have, we feel pretty good about our ability to forecast a topline business.

到了今天，基于我们手里的数据和 pipe 分析，预测 topline 我们已经比较有底。

The individual productivity stuff can be all over the place — because there are bluebird deals that happen, and so on.

单个销售的产出还是飘——会有 bluebird deal（意外大单）那种事冒出来。

We also have a ton of intra-quarter open-and-close, so being able to forecast that is a bit of a pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey challenge — but we're getting better.

而且我们经常一个季度内开单又闭单——这种 forecast 难度有点像"蒙着眼睛贴驴尾巴"——但我们在变好。

What's your biggest advice to other CROs — like the ones who ping you on the 20x we discussed?

那你对其他 CRO——刚说的那种因为 20 倍倍数私聊你的 CRO——最大的建议是什么？

What's your biggest advice on how the [bleep] to do forecasting effectively in this very dynamic landscape?

在这种动态市场里到底他妈的怎么做 forecasting？

So what does that actually mean? Sorry — what is rep roll-up?

能展开讲讲吗？rep roll-up 具体是什么？

Yeah. So if you're a sales director at Legora and you have a team of eight people, you go to all eight and basically say: "bet your life — how much ARR are you going to close this quarter?" That level of seriousness.

行。假设你是 Legora 的 sales director，团队 8 个人——你逐个问他们："押上身家——这个季度你能 close 多少 ARR？"严肃到这种程度。

That manager has to take the rep roll-up, then commit a number based on the input from the reps.

这位经理把每个销售的承诺收上来，再据此给出自己的承诺数字。

The directors take that to the VPs. The VPs take their director roll-ups and commit a regional number.

director 把这个数字交给 VP。VP 再把 director 们的数字收上来，承诺一个区域数字。

Right now we have five regions including India: APJ, India, EU, the UK, and the US.

我们目前 5 个区域：APJ、印度、欧盟、英国、美国。

I take the VP roll-up and compare it to the weighted forecast.

我拿到 VP 层的 roll-up，再跟"加权预测"做对照。

We've got this amazing woman on our RevOps team — Lulu — who I worked with to create a weighted version of weekly / monthly / quarterly forecast based on opportunity stages.

我们 RevOps 团队有位非常厉害的成员，Lulu——我跟她一起搭了一套"基于 opportunity stage 的加权预测"，覆盖周/月/季。

With that, you have to have really tight rigor around opportunity management. The stages and amounts on the opportunities have to be dialed in and updated in real time.

要跑这套，opportunity management 必须极其严谨。每个 opportunity 的 stage、金额必须实时更新到位。

Last quarter, the regional rep roll-up and what we call the "Lulu cast" — the math version of the forecast — were the same. And we were pretty accurate on both.

上个季度，区域 rep roll-up 和我们叫 "Lulu cast"（数学口径预测）这两条线对上了。两边都挺准。

Where does stages go most wrong?

stage 设置最常错在哪？

If you don't have really good entry and exit criteria that you could explain to your grandma —

如果你的 entry / exit 标准做不到"能跟你奶奶解释清楚"——那就废了。

What does entry and exit criteria mean?

"entry / exit criteria"是什么意思？

In our sale, there's the two-sided buyer journey: the funnel on the way in to closed-won, and the funnel on the way out as you look for advocacy and adoption.

在我们这种 sale 里，buyer journey 有两段：进入 closed-won 的入口漏斗；以及客户签约后，追求 advocacy 和 adoption 的出口漏斗。

On the way in, say we have five sales stages.

入口这边假设我们有 5 个 sales stage。

For example, the pipeline we generated off Jude Law — to get into qualified pipe, you have to go through a discovery call where we ask about the buying process, what they're looking for, what they're interested in.

比如 Jude Law 那一波 pipeline——要进入"qualified pipe"，必须先过一次 discovery call，问清楚采购流程、客户在找什么、感兴趣的方向。

To progress to the next stage, certain things have to be true: they have to be in a buying cycle, have budget — think BANT framework: budget, authority, need, timing.

进入下一阶段，几件事必须成立：客户要在采购周期里，有预算——也就是 BANT framework（budget / authority / need / timing）。

As you move into the qualification criteria, it's: okay, the next stage is the pilot — what do we need to get into the pilot?

进入 qualification 这一阶段后是：好，下一关是 pilot——要进 pilot 需要什么？

I alluded to: executive buy-in, info-sec, budget allocation, things like that.

前面提过：高管 buy-in、info-sec、预算到位等等。

If you get that right and you have consistency across global teams, typically the forecasting is right.

这一套规则做对，并且全球团队执行一致，预测通常就准。

If you get the right weighting based on historical funnel progression, you can get to a weighted forecast that's directionally accurate.

再基于历史 funnel 数据给每个 stage 配上合理的加权，你的"加权预测"方向上就是准的。

You mentioned different regions. If you were advising CROs / CEOs today — do you have to be everywhere all at once today?

你说到多个区域。如果今天让你给 CRO / CEO 提建议——今天必须"全场同时铺开"吗？

It's different. And the speed at which we're doing it is very different.

不一样了。我们今天展开的速度跟以前完全不一样。

Going back to the Braze experience — New York tech, we had a London office, that was the next move — but it took us a really long time to expand into Germany, which we eventually did. Expanding into Japan and other places took even longer.

回到 Braze 那时——总部在纽约，下一步开了伦敦——但进德国花了好久。后来才进的日本，时间更长。

Whereas all of these — we just opened Germany, we just opened Spain, we've opened five or six offices in the US, Sydney, Bangalore — we've been all over the place.

在 Legora 完全不一样——德国刚开、西班牙刚开、美国 5、6 个城市开了办公室、悉尼、班加罗尔——遍地开花。

India feels like a strange one. It's just such a different universe. What was the thing you buy in India, and how's India going?

印度感觉是个奇怪选择，那是另一个宇宙。你们为什么进印度？做得怎么样？

We typically follow the ball in terms of pipeline.

我们一般"跟着 pipeline 走"。

We had a ton of initial interest. We have great interest in the Middle East. We have great interest in India.

前期需求很多，中东兴趣大，印度也有大量兴趣。

There was a ton of inbound signal.

inbound 信号非常多。

Where's the hardest? Carles spoke about Japan and South Korea. I'm friends with Daniel from UiPath who always says that's a difficult region.

最难的是哪里？Carles 提过日本和韩国。UiPath 的 Daniel——我的朋友——一直说那个区域难。

That region is very hard. We've been consulting a lot of our investors and advisers on how best to enter those markets. APAC is probably the most complex.

那个区域确实非常难。我们一直在请教投资人和顾问怎么进。APAC 大概是最复杂的。

Each region has its own nuance: data hosting requirements, processing requirements — you can't process certain things in Europe or the US, you have to process them in-region.

每个区域都有自己的特点：数据主权、处理要求——某些数据不能在欧美处理，必须本地处理。

Some model providers don't provide access to their models in China, for example. So there's architectural work that goes into it.

某些模型提供商在中国没法用，比如。所以背后有大量架构层的活儿。

We announced today a big project with McKinsey, focusing on European public sector work.

我们今天还宣布了跟 McKinsey 的一个大项目，重点是欧洲公共部门业务。

If you think about FedRAMP in the US, there are all kinds of things that are really hard from a technology perspective that you have to keep in mind.

想想美国的 FedRAMP——技术层面要顾及的合规要求多到吓人。

With the greatest of respect, I'm probably going to get in trouble — sovereignty is an interesting word that's thrown around.

恕我直言——"主权（sovereignty）"这个词现在被滥用。

To what extent do you see Americans choose American, Europeans choose European? Is that a thing?

"美国人选美国货、欧洲人选欧洲货"——这事儿真的存在吗？

It's definitely a thing.

真的存在。

When we come into a deal, people think I'm from Sweden, for example. A lot of people —

我们进一个 deal，很多客户会以为我是瑞典人——

You look Swedish. Seriously, you could change your name to Sven and partially be that. Just don't talk.

你确实像瑞典人。说真的你改名叫 Sven，演一半就行——只要别说话。

It's like the guy from Frozen. Yeah.

就像《冰雪奇缘》里那个哥们儿。

Sorry, he's mute. Yeah.

他在剧里不说话嘛。

But yeah, there's definitely that perception we deal with. I always joke the LLMs we use are all American.

这种"刻板印象"我们确实要应对。我经常开玩笑说：我们用的 LLM 全是美国的。

That's definitely a thing — particularly in Europe, with a lot of the geopolitical stuff going on.

尤其在欧洲——地缘政治背景下，这种倾向更明显。

In the US, people really care about understanding jurisdictional context. So it's a big thing.

在美国客户特别在意 jurisdictional context——这是个大事。

We spoke earlier about the hardest challenge being just the speed and velocity of scaling.

刚刚你说最难的就是 scaling 的速度。

What breaks that people don't see, and what are the lessons from that?

外界看不见的、最先崩的是什么？你从中学到了什么？

Things like the plumbing — RevOps, billing systems, pricing models. If you want to change anything in your pricing model or billing system, and you're adding as many customers as we are every month, it gets very hard.

先崩的是"管道工程"——RevOps、billing 系统、定价模型。如果想改任何东西，再叠加我们每个月新增客户的速度，这就极难。

A lot of it gets done manually at times — because if you're moving from a system that worked at $10M to one that works at $100M, you have to make those changes.

很多事情阶段性还得手工处理——因为你必须从"$10M 能跑通的系统"切到"$100M 能跑通的系统"。

We migrated CRM — to Salesforce, which is awesome — but anytime you do a CRM migration, it's a huge pain in the ass.

我们做了 CRM 迁移——迁到 Salesforce，挺好——但任何 CRM 迁移都是巨痛。

So you migrated to Salesforce — from what?

迁到 Salesforce——从什么迁过来的？

I don't want to say. But — I don't want to speak ill — but it wasn't working for us.

原系统我就不说了。我不想说人坏话——但反正不适合我们了。

I did a full survey of the market. We picked Salesforce.

我把市面上的方案都过了一遍，最后选了 Salesforce。

Anytime you go through a systems change like that, there's change management, but also opportunity management and ways of working that are hard to roll out and you have to get right. People grumble.

这种系统切换不只是 change management——还涉及 opportunity management、工作方式重塑——很难铺开，必须做对。大家会怨声载道。

Do you think Salesforce faces the threat of being a database that agents crawl on top of, and you have no interaction or engagement with?

你觉得 Salesforce 会不会沦为"被 agent 调用的数据库"——你跟它本身没有 UI 交互？

I think all traditional SaaS companies are under threat right now. But I've been so impressed with Salesforce.

所有传统 SaaS 现在都受威胁。但我对 Salesforce 印象极深。

If you look at it, they did a hard "break glass in case of emergency" pivot last year, and at their scale, they went full agentic — go-to-market framework, positioning.

你看他们去年来了一次"砸窗式"大转向，在他们那种规模上，他们全面 agentic——GTM、定位都重打。

Credit to them for being very early on that, ahead of every other big tech company.

他们这一步走得非常早——比任何其他大公司都早。

I don't know how it's going to shake out, but we did a survey of all the hyperscaling AI companies, and most of them are using Salesforce.

最后会怎么收场我不知道，但我们调研了所有 hyperscaling AI 公司，绝大多数都在用 Salesforce。

If there's one CEO you would bet on for a tectonic shift in the landscape — it would be Benioff.

如果让我押注一个 CEO 能在大格局转换中胜出，那就是 Benioff。

Yeah, 100%. Anytime the words "Benioff" and "Davos" came up in a deal review, you knew you were pretty [bleep].

100% 同意。deal review 里只要冒出"Benioff"和"Davos"两个词，你就知道这单凶多吉少。

What I love about Benioff, which I actually see in Max — Max would get on every freaking plane to close the deal.

我喜欢 Benioff 的地方，我也在 Max 身上看到——Max 会为了 close 一单飞遍世界。

100%. You have to have that right now. Max basically lives on a plane. As do I, candidly.

100%。今天必须这样。Max 基本住在飞机上。坦白讲我也是。

So you see guys like him leaning in.

这种 leader 是在真正 lean in 的。

I think Max is one of my — we're pretty great and very lucky.

Max 是我最喜欢的一类 founder——我们能跟他合作非常幸运。

What does no one see about Max that you think makes him special?

Max 身上有什么"外界看不到、但你觉得他特别"的地方？

He leads from the front. He's always up early, online, pushing the ball, setting the tone for the team.

他是冲在最前面那种 leader。永远起得最早、在线、推进事情、给团队定调。

As a leader, he's someone who's going to get on the flight, take the call, jump on an escalation, call into a deal — do whatever it takes.

作为 leader，他随时会上飞机、接电话、亲自处理客户升级、亲自进 deal——什么都干。

That permeates throughout the organization.

这种气质会渗透整个组织。

But also he's very kind. He cares deeply about the business and about building it the right way.

同时他人非常 kind。他对业务在意，也在意"用对的方式建公司"。

He wants to build a business that's remembered, with a culture that made a big impact on the people who worked there.

他想建一家被记住的公司，有一种能给员工留下印记的文化。

He's focused not just on Legora being successful, but all the people at Legora developing their careers and taking the next step.

他不仅在意 Legora 成功，也在意每个 Legora 员工的职业发展，下一步往哪走。

He takes that stuff really seriously, and we work on it as a leadership team.

他在这件事上非常认真——我们整个 leadership team 一起在做。

Any lessons on culture with scale?

规模扩张过程中，文化方面有什么经验？

That's one of the hardest things. When people ask me what's hard, maintaining the culture as we add the number of people we're adding is very difficult.

这是最难的事之一。别人问我什么难，我会说：在我们这个加人速度下守住文化，非常难。

I have this now where I don't have time to say hello to everyone internally. I used to come in and it was under 20.

我现在也有这种感觉——内部我连一个个打招呼的时间都没了。以前公司不到 20 个人。

I could literally go around and say good morning to everyone. Now I can't, and I find that really weird — which is pathetic given how tiny it is compared to you. But that's a weird one for me.

那时候我能挨个说"早安"。现在不行了，感觉很怪——跟你们比规模我这点根本算不上什么，但对我来说是个奇怪的转折。

Anything that you learned — know — do?

你有什么经验？

Our cultural values are LFG: Lean in, Grow together, and Fight for excellence.

我们的文化价值观叫 LFG：Lean in（投入）、Grow together（共同成长）、Fight for excellence（追求卓越）。

From a cultural perspective, it goes back to being intentional. You have to repeat what your values are. You have to highlight what good looks like. You have to constantly reinforce expectations.

文化层面就是要"有意识地做"。要反复说价值观是什么，要展示什么样的行为是"好"，要持续强化期待。

One of the things I always say: we're big on "no [bleep]" — the biggest way to get on my [bleep] list is to be disrespectful to someone internally, or heaven forbid, externally.

我反复说的一条："no 混蛋"——上我"黑名单"最快的方式，就是对内部或外部的人不尊重。

Living our standards and constantly reinforcing them is something we spend a lot of time on.

把标准活出来、并不断强化，是我们花最多时间的事。

And that's why Matt's never hired me.

这也是为什么 Matt 从没招过我。

A weird one, but everyone's talking about token-maxing now. For you as CRO, you're the man holding the budget — how do you think about encouraging AI usage internally, token-maxing, token-budgeting, anything CROs of the future will need to think about?

问个怪问题——现在大家在聊 token-maxing。你是 CRO，你在管钱——你怎么鼓励内部用 AI？token-maxing、token 预算这些事，未来 CRO 要怎么考虑？

We're pushing our teams to use AI in every aspect of the deal as much as possible.

我们在推团队在每一个 deal 环节都尽量用 AI。

Thankfully for us, budget isn't a huge concern at the moment.

好在我们目前预算不是大问题。

Actually, as the man with the budget, I don't want people to know I have a lot of budget.

话说回来——身为管钱的人，我不希望员工知道我手头预算多。

Yeah, yeah.

懂懂。

Well, it's more around my expectations. It's less about budgetary questions and more about: we have access to a bunch of AI tools.

这事更多是我"期待"层面的，不是预算层面的——我们手上有很多 AI 工具。

We've created playbooks for account planning, for example — we built an agent that can do a one-click account plan, help with meeting prep, use-case development, etc.

比如我们做了一套 account planning playbook——做了一个 agent 能一键生成 account plan、协助 meeting prep、协助 use case 设计。

So it's about being specific: we expect you to use these tools. Here's what we've built centrally — but I also expect teams to go build their own stuff and elevate the game.

所以重点是"明确":"你必须用这些工具"。这是中央团队建好的——但我也期待各团队自己造工具、把水位拉高。

We can't do things the same way as last year and expect to be successful moving forward.

用去年那套打法继续干，是赢不了下一阶段的。

I want them to share that stuff broadly, and we highlight what good looks like on our global team calls.

我希望好东西要广泛分享，全球团队会上我们会展示"好"长什么样。

Are you seeing non-engineering people building their own tools?

非工程师在自己造工具吗？

100%.

100%。

Really? In what way?

真的？怎么造？

We have legal engineers who have a product idea around something we should build in Legora — maybe for a specific industry.

我们有 legal engineer 经常会冒出一个想法："Legora 应该为某个行业建什么东西"。

We have a funds attorney named Felix who's excellent. He had a perspective on things we could build for our private equity clients that would be highly impactful.

我们有一位非常厉害的 funds attorney 叫 Felix。他有个针对私募股权客户的产品想法。

He was having a hard time describing the requirements to our product team — so he just spent a weekend vibe-coding a version of what he thought would be impactful, showed it to the team, showed it to me.

他给产品团队讲不清需求——索性一个周末 vibe-code 了一版原型，展示给团队，也展示给我。

It was highly helpful in just understanding the vision of what the product could be.

特别帮助大家理解"这个产品最终能长成什么样"。

Final one before we do a quickfire — I know budget's not necessarily a constraint, but it always is slightly. You have to keep it in mind.

最后一个问题，再做 quickfire——预算虽然不是硬约束，但总会有一点。

What would you do if you had unlimited money that you're not doing today?

如果你有无限预算，今天没做的什么事你会去做？

It's less about money and more about time.

这其实跟钱关系不大，跟时间有关系。

The hardest thing right now is taking the time to pause and think about ways of working and our operating model.

最难的就是停下来花时间思考工作方式和 operating model。

I'd love to do a two-day boot camp, bring in some AI experts, and go through every part of every process — every GTM team, every motion — and build more automation and agents to take the rope work off my team's plate, so they can focus on the highest-impact things.

我特别想搞一个两天的训练营，请 AI 专家进来，把每个 GTM 团队、每条流程都过一遍，多搭自动化和 agent，把繁琐工作从团队身上摘掉，让他们专注于最高价值的事。

It's more about time than money right now.

现在拼的是时间，不是钱。

Taking that time to think strategically and get everyone together in person — we did our sales kickoff at the beginning of the year in Stockholm, there was so much learning and relationship-building. I wish we could do that stuff all the time.

花时间做战略思考、把所有人召集到一起——年初的 sales kickoff 我们在斯德哥尔摩做了一次，学习量、关系量都极大。我真希望能经常这么干。

The speed of development of our business — we don't have time to get together in that way, and that's something I wish we were able to do more.

但业务发展太快，根本抽不出时间——这是我希望能多做的事。

Did you ever doubt whether you were able to make the jump to next-gen CRO?

你怀疑过自己能不能跳到"下一代 CRO"这条曲线吗？

Yeah, definitely.

绝对怀疑过。

How did you — how do you get comfortable with that?

你怎么跟这种怀疑相处的？

I face it every day as an investor — what was good is no longer good. Legora's growth is unparalleled. Before it was 1 to 5.

我做投资人每天都面对这个——以前算"好"的标准，现在已经不够了。Legora 的增长是空前的——以前是 1 到 5 的故事。

Exactly.

就是这样。

And we're forced to think: [bleep], maybe we need to be energy investors, maybe infrastructure investors. And you are struck with: am I good enough to make the jump?

现在我们被逼着想："妈的，我们是不是该转去做能源投资？基础设施投资？" 然后就是那种感受：我够不够格跳过去？

How do you reflect on that?

你怎么看？

For me, it's more about being super-intentional about what I want and my vision for myself.

对我来说，关键是对自己想要什么、对自己的愿景非常 intentional。

People ask me, "What do you want to do next?" — I'm doing it. This is what I've always wanted to do. The job I'm doing right now is the job I've wanted to do for a really long time.

大家问我"下一步想干什么"——我正在干。我现在做的，就是我一直想做的事。

More often than not in this world, it's about: did you bet on the right horse?

在这一行更多的不是"你够不够格"，而是"你押对马没"。

I took a bet after leaving Braze, went to another company, and it didn't work out.

我从 Braze 离开后赌过一次，去了另一家公司，没成。

I was working really hard, doing all kinds of things I thought were smart, and we just weren't seeing the results.

我那时拼命干、做了我以为聪明的所有事，但结果就是出不来。

Then come to Legora — right place, right time, right market.

然后来到 Legora——天时、地利、市场全对。

So much of our success is the company, the team, and the market we go into.

我们的成功很大一部分是公司、团队、市场决定的。

It's like sports — you put the wrong person on the wrong team in the wrong system, they're not going to be as successful as they would have been otherwise. I feel very fortunate.

跟体育一个道理——错的人放进错的团队、错的体系，再厉害也跑不出来。我觉得自己很幸运。

The truth is, true product-market fit is so unwavering that any question of "Do I have it or not?" — if you have it, you [bleep] know.

真相是：真正的 PMF 是不会摇晃的——你只要问自己"我有没有 PMF"，那就说明没有。真有的话，你他妈一清二楚。

Exactly. And when you have it, when you have momentum and you have an advantage — press the advantage.

完全同意。一旦你拿到了势头和优势——把优势压实。

If anything is working, disseminate that to the team. Press, press, press.

只要某条路跑通了，立刻扩散给团队。压、压、压。

In terms of playbooks and things that work competitively — when we find something that works, we document, share, and press on that immediately. That changes all the time, and people react, and things change. But that's the kind of stuff that gets me out of bed in the morning.

竞争场上一旦发现有效的打法，我们立刻文档化、立刻分享、立刻压上——这种东西每天都在变，对手也在反应。但这就是让我每天清晨起床的东西。

Final final one. There are a lot of people questioning whether they took the right step or made the right decision. You mentioned the interim move that didn't work out — with respect to that company. Some decisions don't work out.

最后一题——很多人都在怀疑自己"那一步走对没"。你刚提到中间那次没成的跳槽——尊重那家公司，确实有些决定就是不成。

Any lessons or advice for someone thinking, "I don't know if I made the right step, the right decision"?

对于正在怀疑自己"我那一步走对没"的人，有什么建议？

Mostly when people come to me and ask that question, I say: are you hitting your numbers? Are you doing well in your role? Do you like your boss? Are you learning, getting better? Is this serving you in a way where you're making an impact and the company's making an impact on you, helping you level up?

大多数人来问这个问题，我会反问：你业绩 OK 吗？这份工作你干得好吗？喜不喜欢你老板？在学习、在变强吗？你和公司互相在让对方变好吗？

If the answer to all three is yes, typically you're in a good spot. If you've got two out of three or one out of three, maybe it's time to think about what's next.

如果三条都"是"，那基本你状态不错。如果只剩 2 条或 1 条，那可能该想想下一步了。

I walk every weekend with my mother — a marathon — and I always talk about big decisions with her. She gave me the best advice this weekend.

我每个周末跟我妈走一次马拉松距离的散步，重大决定我都跟她聊。这个周末她给了我最棒的建议。

I was talking about something specifically about our funds, and she said: "Move fast, but don't be in a hurry."

我跟她聊我们基金的事，她说："move fast, but don't be in a hurry."（走得快，但别慌。）

I just thought it was brilliant. I think it's the same advice — you don't want to sit and rot in a company, but you also don't want to jump too fast and too hastily.

这句太狠了。我觉得跟这话题一样：你不想在一家公司"坐到发霉"——也不想跳得太急、太鲁莽。

Exactly. You have to be really thoughtful around it.

完全对。要非常 thoughtful。

So much of it is around picking the right market and the right company.

很大一部分是"挑对市场 + 挑对公司"。

I think people overindex on title and underindex on growth. I'd rather take a role below the level you're at, at a high-growth company.

大家在 title 上 overindex，在 growth 上 underindex。如果让我选，我宁愿降级去一家高增长公司。

You did. You took like VP of GTM, I think — or whatever — as the sole owner of your kitchen.

你自己就是这么干的——VP of GTM 之类的 title——结果一上来就是你那个厨房办公室的"独苗"。

Yes. My kitchen was the hottest tech company in Brooklyn.

是的。我那个厨房是当时布鲁克林最 hot 的科技公司。

But yeah — bet on yourself, have confidence in yourself, and bet on growth.

所以——押注自己、相信自己、押注增长。

If you go in and operate at a really high level within a high-growth environment, that's the best thing for your career — as opposed to having ego around "I'm an X title, I want to stay X."

在高增长环境里把自己拉到一个高水准，这是对职业最好的事——而不是抱着"我是 X title 我要守住 X"的执念。

I'd rather go somewhere where you can make a big impact in a growth framework.

我宁愿去一个能在增长环境里造成大冲击的地方。

Final final one, I promise. Someone's great, they want a bigger salary than the rest of the people in that role. They're great. You and Max know they're great. Do you just suck it up and pay more?

真最后一题。某人特别强，他要求的薪水比同岗位其他人都高。你和 Max 都知道他强。你会忍痛多付吗？

But what about what that does to everyone else who now wants that same?

那其他人发现之后想要同样的待遇怎么办？

Yeah, you can't really do that. We have bands, and we have to have parity and fairness for a reason.

不能这么干。我们有薪资带，要保持 parity 和 fairness 是有原因的。

That's one way to create a toxic culture — if people figure that stuff out, it leads to bad things in the long run, even though in the short term it might feel good because you get this person.

这是制造 toxic culture 的一条最快路径——短期你拿到了这个人，长期一旦其他人发现，公司就坏了。

You've got to go about it the right way.

必须用对的方式来做。

It's tough.

挺难。

It's tough. Yeah.

挺难的。

Right, my friend. You ready to rock and roll?

好兄弟，准备开车了吗？

Let's do it.

来吧。

Quickfire. What do you know now that you'd go back to yourself on day one and say, "You should know this"?

Quickfire 快问快答。今天的你想回到第一天告诉自己一句："你应该知道这个"——是什么？

Yeah. The degree to which the broader investor influence shows up on our deals — and the syndicate of influence around the opportunity, not just the opportunity itself.

投资人对我们 deal 的影响有多大——以及围绕一个 opportunity 的"影响力联盟"，不只是 opportunity 本身。

I wish I had known a few things on that sooner.

这事我希望早点知道。

It's interesting. It's almost like a land grab on investors as well.

挺有意思——这等于在投资人这一层也在"抢地盘"。

Exactly. If you look at our last fundraise, our CFO David described it as "the investment syndicate" — kind of reminds me of Mission Impossible.

完全是。我们上一轮融资，CFO David 把它叫做"investment syndicate"——有点 Mission Impossible 那感觉。

One of my friends is a GP at AirTree in Australia. He pinged me about Legora because they joined the round.

我朋友是澳洲 AirTree 的 GP。他给我发消息说："Legora 这轮我们投了。"

It's like land-grabable in Australia.

连澳洲都在抢。

Exactly. We want people who are leaning in and going to really help.

就是这样。我们要的是真正 lean in、真正能帮上忙的投资人。

Yeah, I totally get that. We mentioned Jude Law — what personality / individual brand would you most like to be in the next Legora ad?

完全 get。说回 Jude Law——你最想让谁出现在下一支 Legora 广告里？

Well, we have one coming up with Aaron Judge. That's going to be awesome.

我们已经定好了下一支——Aaron Judge。要起飞了。

That's pretty cool.

挺帅的。

Yeah, very cool. I have a first-grader in Brooklyn — you go to drop-off at his elementary school and the number of Aaron Judge jerseys is astronomical.

非常帅。我儿子在布鲁克林读一年级——送他去学校，校门口 Aaron Judge 球衣多到离谱。

So very cool from a New York and US perspective. We're really excited.

所以从纽约和美国市场视角看，这个 campaign 我们特别期待。

What one tool could you not live without?

哪个工具你离不开？

I use Gemini all the time.

Gemini，我一直在用。

Wow. I wasn't expecting that. What's it best for?

哇，没想到。它最擅长什么？

I find it best for transcript analysis. It's really good at that.

我用来分析 transcript 特别好用。

It also has access to all the systems of work we use — Gmail, Calendar, Google Drive. So from an agentic perspective, it has all the context and all my stuff.

而且它能接入我用的所有工作系统——Gmail、日历、Google Drive。从 agentic 角度看，它有我全部的上下文和资料。

It helps me with meeting prep, managing my calendar, a lot of the simple productivity stuff — not to mention making funny pictures.

它帮我做会议准备、管日历、各种日常生产力琐事——顺便还能整一些搞笑图片。

I have to say I love Whisper Flow.

我超爱 Whisper Flow。

Yeah, Whisper Flow is awesome. Definitely [bleep] great.

对，Whisper Flow 真的牛。爆款。

That's one of those viral products that everyone in Silicon Valley is on.

就是那种硅谷人人都在用的爆款。

But it's great. It's really good. The only [bleep] thing is in offices.

但它真的好用。唯一的麻烦是——在办公室用很尴尬。

Exactly. I'm in the middle of the office and I just like talk to my computer now. It's just weird.

就是。我坐在办公室中间，突然开始对着电脑说话。挺怪的。

Yeah, well, I actually think that's going to be one of the ways of working. Our team hired headsets, so they now like customer support.

但我觉得这会变成一种工作方式。我们团队配了头戴耳麦，现在像在做 customer support。

I was going to say — we've got a lot of headsets and a lot of AirPods going around.

我正要说——我们办公室里头戴耳麦和 AirPods 满地都是。

What's the best advice you've ever been given?

你听过最好的建议是什么？

I had a mentor tell me: if you want to be a CRO, you need to be really well-rounded.

我有位 mentor 跟我说："你想当 CRO，必须 well-rounded。"

Mostly because at the beginning of my career, I'd been really successful in a more transactional mid-market sort of role.

主要因为我职业早期，做的是偏 transactional 的 mid-market 销售，跑得很好。

Then I moved into leadership very early — in my 20s — and was running a big team. I thought I was killing it.

然后我很早进入管理岗——20 多岁就开始带大团队——自我感觉良好。

But I couldn't get a real VP job, because I didn't have big enterprise experience.

但拿不到真正的 VP offer——因为我没有大 enterprise 经验。

If you want to be a CRO, it's not just sales — it's customer success, partnerships, implementation, onboarding — all these different things.

想当 CRO，不只是销售——还有 customer success、partnerships、implementation、onboarding——一大堆模块。

Me taking a step back and doing different roles to give myself a broader set of experiences has been really beneficial.

我后退一步、轮岗去做不同的 role，把经验铺宽——这件事对我帮助巨大。

Dude, I've absolutely loved this. Thank you so much for being so open, for putting up with my meandering.

兄弟，这期我太喜欢了。谢谢你这么 open，也忍着我跑题。

I got described the other day as the "Louis Theroux of venture" — I didn't know whether to take it as a compliment or not. But you've been amazing.

前几天有人形容我是"VC 圈的 Louis Theroux"——我也不知道这是不是表扬。总之你今天太棒了。

No, thanks so much, Harry. I really enjoyed it. Thanks for having me.

不会，谢谢你 Harry。今天聊得太爽了。谢谢你邀请我。