The New AI-Native Growth Playbook

"Today's guest is Elena Verna, head of growth at Lovable, the most popular AI prototyping tool that lets anyone build websites or mobile apps from scratch using natural language prompts — no code required."

"今天的嘉宾是 Elena Verna,Lovable 的增长负责人。Lovable 是当下最火的 AI 原型工具,任何人都能用自然语言提示词从零搭出网站或手机 App,完全不用写代码。"

"In under 8 months, Lovable became the fastest company in history to reach $100 million in annual recurring revenue. Before Lovable, Elena helped scale Dropbox, Amplitude, MongoDB, Miro, and Survey Monkey."

"不到 8 个月,Lovable 就成为史上最快冲到 $100M 年度经常性收入(ARR)的公司。在 Lovable 之前,Elena 帮 Dropbox、Amplitude、MongoDB、Miro、Survey Monkey 都做过规模化增长。"

"You've done growth at pretty legendary companies — Miro, Amplitude, Superhuman, Dropbox. What is different this time?"

"你在一堆堪称传奇的公司做过增长——Miro、Amplitude、Superhuman、Dropbox。这一次有什么不一样?"

"This is actually the first company where I'm trying to catch up to the growth that is naturally happening in the market, because most of my roles in previous companies — except for Miro — have been re-accelerating or stabilizing growth away from declining."

"这其实是我第一次,要去追赶市场上自然发生的增长。因为我之前大多数公司的角色——除了 Miro——都是在重新拉升增长,或者把下滑的盘子稳住。"

"It's actually very easy to do growth in a company that is already organically and naturally growing and is operating in what I call fast-moving waters — where the category is just taking you, because the category is expanding, it's a hot one."

"在一家本身就在有机、自然增长的公司里做增长,其实很容易——我把这种状态叫'顺流而下':品类自己在推着你走,因为品类在扩张,而且是个热门品类。"

"There's so much hype around it too, so you can almost do no wrong. All you have to do here is just to remove barriers for growth."

"外面又有那么多热度,你几乎不会做错什么。你要做的,只是把增长路上的障碍清掉。"

"All of my previous experiences actually have been quite different, where the company is either not growing as fast as they want to, or they are slowing down. And how do you stabilize that?"

"我之前的经历其实完全不同:要么公司增长没达到预期,要么已经在放缓。那要怎么把它稳住?"

"That growth work I would say is even harder, because every single fault that you do shows up clear as day: it's not working, or there's lack of ROI on this, or we had a hypothesis and it does not work."

"那种增长工作我会说其实更难,因为你犯的每一个错都一清二楚地暴露出来:这个不行,这个没有 ROI,或者我们有个假设、结果不成立。"

"So at Lovable it's actually a very different role for me. It reminds me of Miro days for sure, because in Miro I was also in the company during the hyper-growth stage — that curve like the hockey stick that was going up."

"所以在 Lovable,这对我来说是个非常不一样的角色。它肯定让我想起 Miro 那段日子,因为在 Miro 我也是在超高速增长阶段进去的,就是那条像曲棍球杆一样往上翘的曲线。"

"But it's a very different job. I wouldn't say that it feels the same as any other head of growth role that I've held."

"但这是一份非常不同的工作。我不会说它跟我做过的任何一个增长负责人岗位是同一种感觉。"

"And when you use the term category, how do you define the current category for Lovable?"

"你用'品类'这个词的时候,你怎么定义 Lovable 当下所处的品类?"

"Yeah, I'll define it fairly simple. Vibe coding. What vibe coding becomes as a category, I think, is still unclear, because the capabilities of what AI can do in vibe coding are changing every single week."

"嗯,我会定义得相当简单:vibe coding。但 vibe coding 作为一个品类最终会变成什么样,我觉得还说不清,因为 AI 在 vibe coding 里能做的事情每周都在变。"

"And they're honestly just changing from improvements in LLM models alone. Our product gets better because LLMs are getting better — it's not even necessarily what we're doing."

"而且说实话,光是 LLM 模型本身的进步就在推着它变。我们的产品变好,是因为 LLM 在变好——这甚至不一定是我们自己做了什么。"

"And then on top of it we're innovating too — what is it that we can build on top of these LLMs. But I say vibe coding is the category that is becoming, and it's starting to swallow some of the older existing categories."

"在这之上我们也在创新——我们到底能在这些 LLM 之上搭出什么。但我会说 vibe coding 是正在成形的那个品类,而且它已经开始吞掉一些原有的老品类。"

"Like website building, no-code tools, some of the internal tooling that companies have developed before. It's starting to converge, because vibe coding is actually a better solution for all of that."

"比如建站、无代码(no-code)工具、公司以前自己搭的一些内部工具。这些都开始往一起收敛,因为对所有这些需求来说,vibe coding 其实是个更好的解法。"

"But what it means and what it actually is going to be defined even a year from now — who knows?"

"但它到底意味着什么、哪怕一年后会被定义成什么样——谁知道呢?"

"There are so many vibe coding companies. They keep popping up like mushrooms, and they all seem to be winning, in the sense that there's another one popping up on our radar. They're all raising capital. They're all generating revenue."

"vibe coding 公司多到不行。它们像蘑菇一样一茬接一茬冒出来,而且看上去个个都在赢——总有新的一家撞进我们的视野。它们都在融资,也都在产生收入。"

"It kind of reminds me of the early days in product, when there was literally no product analytics for Amplitude, or Miro also trying to figure out the right category. They were trying to go deep into one specific use case, but at some point they had to expand."

"这有点让我想起产品行业的早期:那会儿 Amplitude 这种产品分析根本还不存在,Miro 也在摸索自己到底属于哪个品类。它们一开始都想在某一个具体用例上扎深,但到了某个点就不得不扩张。"

"So how do you see the opportunity to expand from vibe coding into more of an end-to-end platform?"

"所以你怎么看从 vibe coding 扩张成一个端到端平台(end-to-end platform)的机会?"

"Yeah. So competition is very bizarre right now. I only believe that in any given category — at least if we hold history as something that will predict the future — there's always only one, two, three winners."

"嗯。现在的竞争格局非常诡异。我始终相信,在任何一个品类里——至少如果我们把历史当成预测未来的依据——最后永远只有一个、两个、三个赢家。"

"There's never such a thing as 10 companies that are wildly successful in the same category. So I think it's fascinating, because there's already a very clearly emerging couple of winners here."

"从来不会出现同一个品类里有 10 家公司都大获成功这种事。所以我觉得很有意思,因为这里已经很清楚地浮现出了那么两三个赢家。"

"And it's interesting to see — why are there so many, like you said, mushrooms popping up at the same time? Because the pie is pretty large. But to catch up, to do the first-mover advantage that other companies have had, including Lovable, it would be pretty difficult."

"有意思的是——像你说的,为什么会同时冒出这么多'蘑菇'?因为这块蛋糕确实很大。但要追上来、要复制别人(包括 Lovable)已经拿到的那个先发优势,会相当难。"

"So I'm curious to see if the VC money is going to help them, or is this going to be a zero-sum game — because there are already very clear runner-ups, and it's just the decision of who's going to be the winner in the category."

"所以我挺好奇,VC 的钱到底能不能帮到它们,还是说这本质上是一场零和博弈——因为很明显的第二梯队已经出来了,剩下的只是'谁会成为品类赢家'这一个悬念。"

"And the second part was about the expansion into an end-to-end platform."

"另外那半个问题是关于扩张成端到端平台的。"

"Yeah. So the interesting piece, at least with Lovable, is that when you look at a more traditional tech company, the reason you needed so much vertical focus is because product building was so much more complicated — you had to have all of these interfaces, all of these marketing materials, all of those educational materials."

"嗯。至少在 Lovable 身上有意思的一点是:当你看一家更传统的科技公司,你之所以需要那么强的垂直聚焦,是因为造产品复杂得多——你得有各种界面、各种营销物料、各种教学材料。"

"With an AI company, it's kind of interesting, because the agent solves for so much of it. You have a prompt box. As a product, almost the only interface you have with the customer is a prompt box."

"AI 公司就很不一样了,因为 agent 把这里面很大一部分都解决了。你有一个 prompt box。作为产品,你跟客户之间几乎唯一的界面,就是这个 prompt box。"

"So all of those vertical use cases and everything else are solved more with your training of an agent — you don't necessarily have to build the entire interface for the product either."

"所以那些垂直用例和其它一切,更多是靠你对 agent 的训练来解决——你也不一定非得把整个产品界面都搭出来。"

"So there's less need to have vertical focus. You can almost go more horizontally right from the beginning, because you don't need to develop so many UIs, or worry so much about UX, or even do education — because the agent is just conversing with you and doing education on your behalf."

"所以对垂直聚焦的需求变小了。你几乎可以从一开始就走得更横向(horizontal),因为你不用开发那么多 UI,不用那么操心 UX,甚至不用做教育——因为 agent 就在跟你对话,替你把教育这件事做了。"

"I think overall software is going to go into complete micro-SaaS development — the barrier to building software is going down, it's becoming cheaper and cheaper with vibe coding. I can create any app that I ever wanted; I don't need to go buy it, I can just use it for myself."

"我觉得整个软件行业会走向彻底的微型 SaaS(micro-SaaS):造软件的门槛在下降,有了 vibe coding,成本越来越低。我想要什么 App 都能自己造一个;不用去买,自己用就行。"

"So there's going to be a really big spread of super tight, vertically-aligned niche products, and then there's going to be these platforms that serve what those niche use cases are doing. But I don't think verticalization matters as much, especially in the vibe coding category. But I might be proven wrong."

"所以一边会冒出一大片高度垂直、定位极窄的细分产品,另一边会有这些平台,去支撑那些细分用例在做的事。但我不觉得垂直化有那么重要,尤其在 vibe coding 这个品类里。当然我也可能被打脸。"

"When I think about the term platform — Amplitude became a platform, branched out of analytics; Miro became a platform, branched out of visual collaboration. Lovable could be a platform if they branch out of vibe coding."

"我一想到'平台'这个词——Amplitude 从分析延伸出去,成了平台;Miro 从可视化协作延伸出去,成了平台。Lovable 如果从 vibe coding 往外延伸,也可能成为一个平台。"

"But then you have the mega-platforms, the OpenAIs. They recently announced how they're building their own automation platform, suddenly swallowing an entire category, the Zapiers. So how do you think of that as competition?"

"但接着你又有那些超级平台,比如 OpenAI 这一类。它们最近宣布自己也在做自动化平台,一下子就把 Zapier 那一整个品类给吞了。那你怎么看这种竞争?"

"Yeah, I think we're going to need to see where OpenAI is going to want to compete. We can look at the stories of Google: Google tried to go into so many verticals and launched so many products, yet there were still very much thriving ecosystems, and Google ended up shutting them down."

"嗯,我觉得得看 OpenAI 最终想在哪儿竞争。我们可以参考 Google 的故事:Google 试着进了那么多垂直领域,推了那么多产品,可那些领域明明还有蓬勃的生态,Google 最后还是把自家产品关掉了。"

"Remember Google Circles — them wanting to go into social? That did not happen, Facebook still very much won."

"还记得 Google Circles 吗——它想进社交?没成,Facebook 照样大获全胜。"

"So it's an open question for OpenAI as a whole: are they going to be a platform, or are they going to be solutions? Because they can be powering all of these solutions, or they can go and actually be all of the solutions."

"所以对 OpenAI 整体来说,这是个悬而未决的问题:它们到底要做平台,还是做解决方案?因为它们既可以去给所有这些解决方案'供电',也可以亲自下场把所有解决方案都做了。"

"It's the existential question that Google had to answer, that Apple had to answer, that Microsoft had to answer. I think OpenAI is naturally going to go into some of those vertical specializations."

"这是 Google 必须回答、Apple 必须回答、Microsoft 必须回答过的那个'存亡级'问题。我觉得 OpenAI 自然会切进其中一些垂直专精领域。"

"But it's the question of how much distinct training do these agents that supply those vertical categories need to have, and does OpenAI have the resourcing to do that specialized training. You cannot crowdsource it — it needs to have the specialty instructions loaded into it, and this is where the vertical specialization starts to come in."

"但关键是:供给那些垂直品类的 agent,到底需要多少专门的训练?OpenAI 有没有那么多资源去做这种专精训练?这件事没法众包——你得把专门的指令灌进去,而垂直专精正是从这里开始的。"

"But to be specific — to pick website building only doesn't fully make sense, because the delta between website building versus an app with a front end and back end is just too close now, so it doesn't make sense to specialize that much."

"但具体说——只盯着'建站'去做专精其实不太成立,因为如今'建个网站'和'做一个有前端有后端的 App'之间的差距已经太小了,没必要专精到那个程度。"

"Even outside tech, I've seen that with marketplaces like Amazon, where they'll still allow an ecosystem of partners while building their own white-label solutions if they see a specific demand. So you have to play in the game and integrate with them. But then the question is — is this a partner, or can they eventually swallow you?"

"哪怕在科技圈之外,我在 Amazon 这种交易平台上也见过:它一边允许一整个合作伙伴生态存在,一边只要看到某个明确的需求,就自己做白牌(white-label)方案。所以你必须下场玩、必须跟它们打通。但问题是——它到底是合作伙伴,还是最终会把你吞掉?"

"Well, so far OpenAI and all of the other LLMs are partners and friends, but like you said, you never know what the future is going to bring. And I think there's also going to be a lot of acquisition plays in the future too."

"目前为止,OpenAI 和其它所有 LLM 都是合作伙伴、是朋友,但就像你说的,你永远不知道未来会带来什么。我还觉得,未来会有大量的收购动作。"

"A lot of those LLMs are going to sit and wait to see who's going to succeed, or be the second runner-up, and instead of doing it in-house, they'll probably acquire and just specialize on that. So we'll see. I think the next two to three years are going to be fascinating."

"很多 LLM 会按兵不动,看谁会跑出来、谁会是第二名,然后与其自己从头做,不如直接收购、专注做那一块。所以再看吧。我觉得接下来的两三年会非常精彩。"

"— And the next two to three months, too. — Yeah, that's true."

"——接下来的两三个'月'也一样精彩。——对,确实。"

"I want to play a game with you, based on one of your previous posts where you say the old growth playbook is done, and you came up with nine principles for the new growth."

"我想跟你玩个游戏,灵感来自你之前的一篇帖子:你说旧的增长手册已经作废了,还给新增长总结了九条原则。"

"— Eleven. — Okay, well there might be two more you need to bring up, because I only have nine. Are you game? — Yes, let's do it."

"——是十一条。——好吧,那可能还有两条得你来补,因为我只数到九条。你愿意玩吗?——愿意,来吧。"

"This is you: you said PMF is a treadmill. What do you mean?"

"这句是你说的:PMF 是一台跑步机。什么意思?"

"When you think about traditional company growth and the life cycle of a traditional company, what we've been taught is: you reach product market fit. That's the first big threshold you have."

"当你想传统公司的增长、想一家传统公司的生命周期,我们被教的是:你先达到 product market fit(PMF)。那是你迈过的第一道大门槛。"

"You reach it usually by getting users that are retaining with you at some light scale. You don't need to be owning anything, but you have an inflow of customers, you can retain them, and some monetization starts to take place — so you can do a value exchange."

"通常你是靠拿到一批能在轻量规模上留存下来的用户来达到它。你不需要垄断什么,但你有持续涌入的客户、能把他们留住,商业化(monetization)也开始发生——也就是说,你能完成一次价值交换。"

"This is when you may be at about a million in recurring revenue or somewhere along those lines, and you're able to show retention."

"这通常发生在你差不多做到一百万左右经常性收入的时候,而且你能拿出留存(retention)数据。"

"Well, interestingly enough, the way I feel at Lovable — we're well over 100 million in revenue, but I don't feel like we have it in the bag. I actually don't even feel like we have product market fit yet."

"可有意思的是,我在 Lovable 的感觉是——我们收入早就过了一个亿,但我不觉得我们稳了。我甚至不觉得我们现在有 product market fit。"

"We had product market fit last month. We had product market fit 3 months ago. But the definition of product market fit in the vibe coding category is changing every single week, because again, LLMs are getting better."

"我们上个月有 product market fit,三个月前也有。但在 vibe coding 这个品类里,PMF 的定义每一周都在变,因为——再说一遍——LLM 一直在变强。"

"There are more opportunities of what's actually possible, and customer expectations are changing like there's no tomorrow. The bar is raising so quickly."

"'到底什么是可能的'这件事,机会越来越多,而客户的预期变得像没有明天一样疯狂。这条线在飞快地往上抬。"

"This is the fastest habitual change in our customers that we've ever seen, because usually it took years to change habits of customers — and all of a sudden with AI it's a matter of weeks or months where we adopt new capabilities as something that we now expect out of any interaction with AI."

"这是我们见过的、客户习惯变化最快的一次。以前改变客户习惯要好几年——结果有了 AI,变成几周或几个月,我们就把某个新能力当成了'跟 AI 的任何互动都理应具备'的东西。"

"So in any space in AI, product market fit is an elusive concept, because when the category is still evolving so quickly, your place is not guaranteed even if you're making hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue."

"所以在 AI 的任何领域里,product market fit 都是个抓不住的概念——因为当品类还在这么快地演化,哪怕你一年做几亿美元收入,你的位置也不保险。"

"Especially with so much competition, because the cost of building has really come down. So anybody can enter the level playing field and start competing with you. So it becomes an ongoing battle to recapture product market fit."

"尤其是竞争这么激烈,因为造东西的成本真的降下来了。所以任何人都能踏进这块同一起跑线的场地,开始跟你竞争。于是它变成了一场持续不断的、重新夺回 PMF 的仗。"

"There's no such thing as: you hit it, then you scale it, then you go to your second horizon of innovation, then you scale that. You're just constantly trying to hit it — a little scale — hit it — but did you hit it again?"

"根本不存在那种'你命中 PMF,然后规模化,然后进入第二条创新地平线,再规模化'的路径。你只是在不停地想去命中它——稍微放量——再命中——可你这次真的又命中了吗?"

"Okay, you hit it again, now a little scale. But it's happening at such a fast pace that I've never seen before."

"好,你又命中了,那再稍微放量。但这整件事发生的速度,是我从没见过的。"

"What I imagine is very hard is learning while you are winning. If you are losing traction, at least you know something is not right. But when you are growing — how do you maintain that beginner's mindset?"

"我能想象很难的一点是:在赢的时候还能学习。如果你的增长势头在掉,至少你知道哪里不对劲。可当你在涨的时候——你怎么保持那种'初学者心态'?"

"Well, you also have no real chance to learn much, because everything is changing so quickly. You don't have cycles to actually get full-fledged feedback. So you have to act so much on intuition, and you have to have that right vision."

"其实你也没什么真正学习的机会,因为一切都变得太快了。你根本没有完整的周期去拿到成型的反馈。所以你只能极度依赖直觉,而且你得有那个对的愿景。"

"Because if the technology is already there and you're not using it, you already lost the game, because somebody else is going to capitalize on it. And all of a sudden you lost your product market fit, because that became a new expectation — and that happens in a matter of weeks, not years."

"因为如果技术明明已经在那儿、你却没用上,你就已经输了,因为别人会抓住它。然后你突然就丢了 product market fit,因为那个东西一夜之间变成了新的预期——而这是以周计的,不是以年计的。"

"So much of it is based on these people — we have these incredible engineering leaders who have this vision of what they want to take Lovable to. We try to capture as much of the customer feedback and loops as we can, but it's almost non-existent, because it doesn't yet exist."

"很多事情其实是靠人——我们有几位特别厉害的工程负责人,他们对 Lovable 该往哪走有自己的愿景。我们也尽量去抓客户反馈、去搭反馈闭环,但这部分几乎是不存在的,因为(那个市场)还不存在。"

"So you have to pick a target and go after it, and just hope that you pick the right direction and the right destination. And so far for Lovable, the bets have paid off — not all of them, but some of the bigger swings have paid off, and they've been fairly intuitive internally."

"所以你只能选一个目标、冲上去,然后祈祷自己选对了方向和终点。到目前为止,Lovable 的这些押注都见效了——不是全部,但几个更大的挥棒(big swings)是奏效的,而且它们在内部都相当凭直觉。"

"It's never-ending. I've never seen a company that has to almost prove itself that it belongs in the space every month or two months. To try to maintain that beginner's mindset in an environment where you are growing — on the surface it feels like you don't have to, but you definitely do."

"这是没完没了的。我从没见过哪家公司,几乎每隔一两个月就得重新证明自己'配待在这个赛道里'。在一个你正在增长的环境里还要保持初学者心态——表面上看你好像不需要,但你绝对需要。"

"I think that connects with the concept of being your own customer. I know that you sign up for your own product daily. So how do you ensure that you are not getting behind as the customer of your own product?"

"我觉得这跟'做自己的用户'这个概念相通。我知道你每天都会去用自己的产品。那你怎么确保,作为自己产品的客户,你不会掉队?"

"I live my own customer journey. I vibe code every single week — my own apps, I vibe code for my children, I vibe code for myself. And sometimes I'm getting paid to vibe code. It's amazing — the realization that I've made it. I feel like I've made it, finally."

"我亲自走自己的用户旅程。我每周都 vibe code——做自己的 App,给孩子 vibe code,给自己 vibe code。有时候我还能靠 vibe code 拿钱。这感觉太奇妙了——意识到我'成了'。我觉得自己终于'修成正果'了。"

"But it's collectively talking about where we think the destination is — and that almost becomes your proprietary strategy: where do you think it's going to end up, what are the steps to get there, and what are the big enough swings that we need to take."

"但关键还是大家一起去讨论'我们认为终点在哪儿'——这几乎就成了你专有的战略:你觉得这事最终会落到哪里、到那里要走哪几步、需要挥出哪几记够大的棒。"

"It's almost like being in startup mode all the time, because you have to make a hypothesis, then sprint towards it, because there's a race going on — and learn along the way really quickly, just knowing that the moment you reach the destination, the goalpost has changed immediately, probably before you even launched."

"这几乎就像永远处在创业模式:你得先立一个假设,然后朝它全力冲刺,因为外面正在赛跑——而且边跑边飞快地学,心里清楚:你一到终点,球门马上就被挪走了,很可能在你还没发布之前就挪了。"

"So that velocity becomes one of the critical things you can maintain. The shipping velocity at Lovable is something I've never seen at any other company, but it almost becomes a means of survival. It's one of our moats — the velocity of development."

"所以'速度'就成了你能守住的最关键的东西之一。Lovable 的发布速度是我在任何别的公司都没见过的,但它几乎成了一种生存手段。它是我们的护城河之一——研发的速度。"

"What is that velocity?"

"这个速度具体是什么样的?"

"We ship things every single day. We don't have two-week sprints across the company, because sometimes there's even a monolithic once-a-month release, or every six months you do something. No — we push to production on the minutes."

"我们每一天都在发东西。我们整家公司不用两周一个 sprint,因为有的公司甚至是一个月一次的大整包发布,或者每半年才做点什么。我们不是——我们是以分钟为单位往生产环境推。"

"We have this internal shipped channel, because that's really the only way to keep up with what's going on in the product. I'm in that ship channel all the time. What did we release today?"

"我们有一个内部的 shipped 频道,因为这真的是唯一能跟上产品里在发生什么的办法。我一直泡在那个频道里:今天我们又发了什么?"

"Because everybody is just running at all of the fast speeds. It's not pre-planned, there's no big commitment happening — it's people finding opportunities and going after it."

"因为每个人都在以最快的速度往前冲。它不是预先排好的,也没有什么大的承诺立在那儿——就是大家发现机会、然后扑上去。"

"But we also tier our releases, so we understand how to talk to the market. We have tier one, tier two, tier three, which is very standard."

"不过我们也给发布分级(tier),好让我们知道怎么跟市场沟通。我们分 tier 1、tier 2、tier 3,这套很标准。"

"Tier one releases are those big moments — we try to have them every 3 months. We just had Cloud launch, for example. It's a completely seamless backend to every app that you build. That was a tier one release."

"Tier 1 发布是那些大时刻——我们争取每三个月来一次。比如我们刚发了 Cloud,它给你搭的每一个 App 都配上了一套完全无缝的后端。那就是一次 tier 1 发布。"

"Then you have tier two releases that are like voice mode. That's a cool feature, but it's not going to make or break our product. It's not new functionality that needs to release every week in our world."

"然后是 tier 2 发布,比如语音模式(voice mode)。那是个很酷的功能,但它不会决定我们产品的生死。它不属于那种'在我们这个世界里每周都得发'的新功能。"

"And then tier three releases — whether it's fixes, optimizations, or tweaks to make a better experience every single day."

"再然后是 tier 3 发布——不管是修复、优化,还是为了让体验更好而做的小调整,每一天都在发。"

"That sounds like the dream for a growth person."

"这听起来简直是增长人的梦想。"

"Yes, I love it. I absolutely love it."

"是的,我太爱了。我真的爱死了。"

"There's one more here. You said growth isn't really responsible for activation anymore — the core interaction is often stripped down."

"这里还有一条。你说增长其实已经不再负责激活(activation)了——因为核心交互往往被砍到极简。"

"I had an epiphany when I was talking to Kieran from HubSpot. I've spent so much time writing about how much growth is supposed to be responsible for activation — defining that setup moment, the aha moment, your first habit formation."

"我跟 HubSpot 的 Kieran(基兰)聊的时候突然顿悟。我花了那么多时间写文章,讲增长应该多么地为激活负责——去定义那个'初始设置的时刻'、那个 aha moment、用户第一次形成习惯的瞬间。"

"That's the number one low-hanging fruit, however you want to call it, that the growth team should work on, because it amplifies the entire ecosystem. You'll monetize better if you activate better. You retain better if you activate better. You'll acquire better if you activate better."

"那是——随你怎么叫——增长团队该最先去摘的那颗果子,因为它会放大整个生态:你激活做得越好,商业化就越好;激活越好,留存越好;激活越好,获客也越好。"

"But when I came to Lovable, even after two months of reflecting, I'm like — I haven't touched activation. What is going on? And I haven't been pulled into it. I haven't felt that that was a priority."

"可我到了 Lovable,哪怕反思了两个月,我都在想——我压根没碰激活。这是怎么回事?也没人把我拉进去做。我也没觉得那是个优先级。"

"I've been preaching to the market that activation is something the growth team should be responsible for, yet I stepped into this role and I'm not even doing what I'm talking about."

"我一直在对外布道,说激活是增长团队该负责的事,结果我自己一进这个岗位,连我自己讲的都没在做。"

"But then it came — I understood that in AI products (and this is very specific to AI products; I wouldn't give this advice to a traditional tech company), you only have a chat box that is this big, and all of your activation experience is happening by your conversation with an agent."

"然后我想通了——我明白了:在 AI 产品里(这一点非常特定于 AI 产品,我现在不会把这个建议给一家传统科技公司),你只有这么大一个对话框,而你全部的激活体验,都发生在你跟一个 agent 的对话里。"

"Whatever that agent is doing — planning tasks for you, writing marketing campaigns for you, building websites for you. But when the experience is condensed into just one box, what are you going to work on to optimize it?"

"不管那个 agent 在干什么——替你规划任务、替你写营销活动、替你建网站。可当整个体验被压缩成一个框,你还能优化点什么?"

"It actually becomes a core product's responsibility to activate people appropriately, and it's all through that agentic conversation."

"于是'恰当地激活用户'反而变成了核心产品(core product)的责任,而且全靠那段 agentic 的对话来完成。"

"So I work a lot on standing up product-led loops, and still on monetization — when it intersects all of the experiences. Retention is something I stress and obsess about. But activation — core product is responsible for it, and we have an amazing core product leader; that's all he thinks about."

"所以我大量精力花在搭建产品驱动(product-led)的增长闭环上,也还在管商业化——它在什么节点跟各个体验交叉。留存是我一直紧张、一直死磕的东西。但激活——由核心产品负责,我们有一位特别厉害的核心产品负责人,他满脑子想的就是这个。"

"And honestly it works so much better when it's not offloaded to the growth team, because that just makes core product so much stronger and so much more embedded into the entire customer journey."

"老实说,把它从增长团队手里拿走、不再外包出去,效果反而好得多,因为这让核心产品强大得多,也更深地嵌进了整条用户旅程。"

"But to wrap it up — there's just not many surfaces to optimize. There are no steps to condense or increase. It's literally just a prompt box. So there's not much growth work that can really happen there."

"但总结一句——可供优化的界面真的不多了。没有什么步骤可以压缩或增加。它就是字面意义上的一个 prompt box。所以那里能做的增长工作并不多。"

"So how do you partner with the product team? What's the actual org design?"

"那你怎么跟产品团队配合?实际的组织架构是怎样的?"

"I sit parallel to our core product as well as to our marketing. I'm responsible for product-led growth of a portion of Lovable — that self-serve experience, that self-serve revenue."

"我跟核心产品、也跟营销是平行的关系。我负责 Lovable 一部分的产品驱动增长(product-led growth)——也就是那套自助(self-serve)体验、自助收入。"

"Core product ships features; my growth team sometimes ships features now too, because if we see that this is something that will improve retention or product acquisition, we go and create it. So the lines are a lot more blurred compared to any other role I've had."

"核心产品出功能;而我的增长团队现在有时候也出功能,因为只要我们看到某个东西能改善留存或产品获客,我们就直接动手做。所以跟我做过的任何岗位相比,这里的边界要模糊得多。"

"But still, I obsess about those product-led loops, about retention, communication with the customer, education, inspiration, and that ecosystem building — versus core product is obsessed about how successful the first build can be."

"但我还是死磕那些产品驱动的闭环,死磕留存、跟客户的沟通、教育、激发灵感,以及生态的搭建——相比之下,核心产品死磕的是'用户第一次构建能有多成功'。"

"How many of them can get to the point where it's a usable app? How many can get to where it starts to get customers? So they are only building features in that, versus I'm still trying to smooth out all of the user journeys around it — to make sure the product sells itself, acquires on its own, and is highly habitual in nature."

"有多少人能做到那一步、产出一个真正能用的 App?又有多少能做到开始有客户?所以他们只在那一块里造功能;而我还在打磨它周围所有的用户旅程——确保产品能自我售卖、自我获客,并且天然地高度养成习惯。"

"So for someone who's so data-driven — and I'm bringing a third point here — what is your take on the role of brand?"

"那对一个像你这么数据驱动的人来说——我抛出第三点——你怎么看品牌(brand)的作用?"

"Brand is an interesting topic. If you ask anybody who knows Lovable, they would say that Lovable has a very strong brand. Well, the fact of the matter is — we don't have brand marketing at all."

"品牌是个有意思的话题。你去问任何了解 Lovable 的人,他都会说 Lovable 的品牌非常强。但事实是——我们根本没有品牌营销。"

"In fact, our marketing is a lot more focused on product marketing, on social, on influencer — not brand. We haven't had any brand campaigns. We haven't spent on any brand channels. We do have our first billboard going up, so we're very excited."

"实际上,我们的营销重心更多在产品营销、在社交、在 influencer(达人)上——不在品牌。我们没做过任何品牌 campaign,也没在任何品牌渠道上花过钱。我们倒是第一块户外广告牌马上要立起来了,挺兴奋的。"

"But all I'm saying is that brand has become all of a sudden a product exercise. Brand used to be defined like — you hire brand marketing, or you have a brand department, and the tone of voice, the vision, the look and feel, and all of the brand spend that doesn't have attribution."

"我想说的是,品牌一下子变成了一件产品上的事(a product exercise)。过去品牌是这么定义的——你招品牌营销,或者设一个品牌部门,管语气调性、管愿景、管整体的观感,还有那一大笔无法归因(attribution)的品牌预算。"

"Like, what percentage of our revenue should we be spending on brand. I think it's changing, because there's such a huge crowd in the market right now of all these products that you need to stand out — not through the marketing message, but through your product experience. Every single touch point with your product has to communicate your brand."

"比如'我们该把收入的百分之几花在品牌上'。我觉得这正在变,因为现在市场上产品多到挤成一团,你必须脱颖而出——不是靠营销话术,而是靠你的产品体验。你产品的每一个触点,都得在传达你的品牌。"

"Now Lovable has a little bit of a cheat sheet here, because our name is Lovable — we want to create lovable products for the world. So when people come in, we want them to build something that is lovable. That's our vision and mission."

"在这件事上 Lovable 算是有点'作弊小抄',因为我们的名字就叫 Lovable——我们想为世界造出 lovable(惹人喜爱)的产品。所以用户进来,我们希望他们也造出 lovable 的东西。这就是我们的愿景和使命。"

"However, we also have an internal saying of: is this experience lovable? And the moment that you say something is unlovable, it's all hands on deck on fixing it."

"但我们内部还有一句话:这个体验 lovable 吗?只要谁说出某个东西'不 lovable',全员立刻all hands on deck,放下一切去修它。"

"So we look at it through the lens of: does it invoke a lovable feeling within you? Every single product interaction and release goes through that cycle of evaluation. And I love it, because experiencing brand through product is such a superpower. It's a moat."

"所以我们都是用这个视角去看:它有没有在你心里唤起一种 lovable 的感觉?每一次产品交互、每一次发布,都要过这一道评判。我很喜欢,因为通过产品去体验品牌,是一种超能力。它是一条护城河。"

"It's the ability for you to stand out. It's the ability for you to activate that word-of-mouth loop. But not a lot of product teams think about brand as their responsibility, and I think that is something that is going to drastically change in the next year."

"它让你能脱颖而出,也让你能激活那个口碑(word-of-mouth)闭环。但没多少产品团队会把品牌当成自己的责任,我觉得这一点在未来一年会发生剧烈的改变。"

"When you use the term moat next to brand, that's extremely powerful. But I think the key is when you make product own that brand."

"当你把'护城河'这个词放在品牌旁边,威力极大。但我觉得关键在于:你让产品去拥有那个品牌。"

"Yes, exactly. Marketing will still support it and amplify it. But if it's not owned by product, in software, the amount of money you'll have to spend to tell your brand story is going to be impossible to justify in the future. Your product has to take accountability over brand."

"对,正是这样。营销仍然会去支撑它、放大它。但在软件里,如果品牌不是由产品来拥有,那未来你为讲好品牌故事得砸的钱,会多到根本没法自圆其说。你的产品必须为品牌担起责任。"

"But listen — we ship products like we fix a sink. Like, okay, checkbox done, shipped. Very few product teams take pride in: what does that interaction actually make a user feel? How does it come across?"

"但说真的——我们发产品的方式,就像修个水槽一样。好,打个勾,发了。很少有产品团队会在这件事上较真:这次交互到底让用户产生了什么感受?它给人的观感是什么?"

"Does it connect all of the pieces together? Does it fit within the feeling and emotion that we want to invoke when people interact with the product?"

"它有没有把所有碎片串成一体?它符不符合我们希望用户在使用产品时被唤起的那种感觉和情绪?"

"When we were going through the PLG revolution, product managers were like, 'Oh my gosh, we have to be responsible for monetization now, what the hell?' Well, now we're going through a brand evolution too. Product managers are going to have to be responsible for brand. Buckle up."

"当年我们经历 PLG 革命的时候,产品经理们都在想:'天哪,我们现在还得为商业化负责?搞什么?'好,现在我们又要经历一场品牌进化了。产品经理们将不得不为品牌负责。系好安全带吧。"

"When are you going to get the .com domain?"

"你们什么时候能拿到 .com 域名?"

"Oh, we're trying. We're trying. It's not for the lack of trying. How about that?"

"哦,我们在努力,一直在努力。绝对不是不够努力——就这么说吧。"

"The next one: the old growth marketing playbook doesn't hold. SEO plus paid plus content is no longer enough."

"下一条:旧的增长营销手册不灵了。SEO + 付费 + 内容,已经不够用了。"

"I've done lots of marketing roles where I've been responsible for marketing teams, and the playbook has always been the same. 80% of it, you just come in and plop it into the company."

"我做过很多营销岗位,带过营销团队,而那套手册一直都一样。其中 80% 你就是进去、往公司里一摆就行。"

"You put out your marketing site. You start investing into SEO and non-branded content. You start doing some SEM after you get some of this working. You put your blog out. You do some social media posts about your releases. Maybe you activate some partnerships and events."

"你做一个营销官网,开始投 SEO 和非品牌词内容,等这些跑起来再做点 SEM,把博客开起来,围绕你的发布发一些社媒帖子,可能再启动一些合作和线下活动。"

"Problem is, that's no longer how companies grow — especially an AI-native company. Out of what I know in marketing, I can only apply at most 30%, compared to 80% that I felt like I could copy-paste and pattern-match previously."

"问题是,公司现在已经不是这么长起来的了——尤其 AI-native 的公司。我懂的那套营销,现在最多只能套用 30%;而以前我感觉我几乎能复制粘贴、照着模式照搬 80%。"

"The biggest differences: number one, word of mouth is the way to cut through the noise. But it comes back to that brand being your product, and people wanting to share about you because you wowed them. And the only way to wow them is the product."

"最大的几个差别:第一,口碑(word of mouth)才是能穿透噪音的方式。但这又回到那句话——品牌就是你的产品,人们愿意主动分享你,是因为你让他们惊艳了。而让他们惊艳的唯一办法,就是产品。"

"So word of mouth is so important, especially for companies that are just starting up. In that startup mode, it's one of the strongest channels you need to figure out how to activate, while you figure out what else you can pull into your ecosystem to help you grow."

"所以口碑太重要了,尤其对刚起步的公司。在那种创业模式里,它是你必须想办法激活的最强渠道之一,同时你再去琢磨还能往生态里拉进什么别的来帮你增长。"

"The second piece is founder social. Oh my gosh, how important it is for CEOs, co-founders, leadership teams, employees to be vocal about how they're building, what they're doing, and to be public about it."

"第二块是创始人社媒(founder social)。天哪,这有多重要——CEO、联合创始人、管理层、员工,都要公开地讲他们在怎么造、在做什么,大大方方地亮出来。"

"Our customers want to connect with the people building behind the products, because it gives that product more humanity — more connection as to what is actually happening, as opposed to being this obfuscated cold thing that you just use for utilitarian value."

"我们的客户想跟产品背后那些造东西的人产生连接,因为这让产品多了一份人味——让你更能感知到真实正在发生的事,而不是把它当成一个面目模糊、冷冰冰、只为实用价值而用的东西。"

"Our CEO Anton is very active on social. Oh my gosh, it's a gift that keeps on giving. And we have other people that are very active as well."

"我们的 CEO Anton(安东)在社媒上非常活跃。天哪,这简直是个源源不断的礼物。我们还有不少人也很活跃。"

"It's harder for traditional tech companies that have legal teams — they can't do anything, can't say anything, because of all these legal risks. But if you can trust your employees that they have the company's best interest at heart, it is an organic channel that is far stronger than SEO. It's far stronger than any paid marketing you can light up."

"对有法务团队的传统科技公司就难多了——什么都不能做、什么都不能说,因为有各种法律风险。但如果你能信任员工、相信他们真心为公司着想,这就是一个比 SEO 强太多的有机渠道,比你能砸出来的任何付费营销都强得多。"

"The third piece that's quite different: the creator economy is absolutely booming. Before, if you thought about influencer marketing, it was very much a B2C practice — like, you have direct-to-consumer products, you need to do TikTok and Instagram."

"第三块很不一样:创作者经济(creator economy)正在爆发。以前一提到 influencer 营销,那基本是 B2C 的玩法——你有直接面向消费者的产品,那你得做 TikTok 和 Instagram。"

"Now you need to do TikTok and Instagram and YouTube. YouTube is so huge right now for B2B products too, because influencers and creators is where the eyeballs are at."

"现在你得做 TikTok、Instagram,还有 YouTube。YouTube 现在对 B2B 产品来说也巨大无比,因为眼球都在 influencer 和创作者那里。"

"So what we're seeing is they're not going to search, and paid marketing or display advertising or paid social — none of that works. What works is influencer marketing, and really empowering the creators to talk about your brand, your product, to experience it in front of their audience."

"我们看到的是:用户不会去搜索,而付费营销、展示广告、付费社媒——这些都不灵了。真正灵的是 influencer 营销,是真正赋能创作者去聊你的品牌、你的产品,在他们的观众面前现场体验它。"

"That's where the eyeballs are at right now, and every single company should be there. And it's YouTube. Huge YouTube. I would have never invested into YouTube the way I would invest now five years ago."

"眼球现在就在那里,每一家公司都该在场。而且是 YouTube,巨大的 YouTube。要是五年前,我绝不会像现在这样押注 YouTube。"

"And even TikTok and Instagram are absolutely huge. LinkedIn and X are really good for more employee posting, with some paid marketing and influencers there as well. But the creator economy is absolutely huge — something I would have never thought about before."

"TikTok 和 Instagram 也都大得不得了。LinkedIn 和 X 更适合员工发声,那里也有一些付费营销和达人投放。但创作者经济真的体量巨大——这是我以前压根不会去想的东西。"

"All of the rest, like paid marketing, SEM — yeah, great, we'll do it, because there's some opportunity with good payback period. But it's not going to be the channel of why you succeed and grow. And then of course we have to talk about AI search — how do you show up with ChatGPT — and try to figure out how to crack that, because that's very nebulous still at the moment."

"剩下那些,像付费营销、SEM——行,挺好,我们会做,因为确实有些回本周期不错的机会。但它不会是你成功和增长的根本渠道。然后当然,我们还得聊 AI 搜索——你怎么在 ChatGPT 这类产品里被'搜到'——并琢磨怎么把它攻克,因为这一块目前还非常模糊。"

"You gave a talk at Prod AI about how a lot of the distribution channels are collapsing with AI, and how some of these trends are emerging. So what is a good way to get that first-mover advantage?"

"你在 Prod AI 上做过一个分享,讲随着 AI 到来,很多分发渠道(distribution channel)正在坍塌,以及一些新趋势在冒头。那要怎么去拿那个先发优势(first-mover advantage)?"

"The channels I just talked about — there's no first-mover advantage there anymore. That is where the game is, that's where your customers are, so you just have to play there."

"我刚说的那些渠道——那里已经没有先发优势了。那就是牌局所在,就是你客户所在的地方,所以你只能在那儿下场玩。"

"On the first-mover advantage, you have to look at the new releases these large platforms are making. So let's look at OpenAI. Just yesterday they had a huge release where they opened up their app store — they have an SDK open, and they'll actually pull in products and perform tasks as customers chat in ChatGPT."

"要说先发优势,你得盯着这些大平台放出的新功能。就拿 OpenAI 来说,就在昨天,他们有一次重大发布——开放了应用商店(app store),开放了 SDK,而且会真的把第三方产品拉进来,在用户于 ChatGPT 里聊天时直接执行任务。"

"That is new. That's the first time you can actually show up as a product in chatting with an AI experience. That may be our new big channel — who knows? If you want a first-mover advantage, you should be jumping on those opportunities super fast."

"这是全新的。这是第一次,你能作为一个产品出现在'跟 AI 对话'的体验里。这可能就是我们新的大渠道——谁知道呢?如果你想要先发优势,就得超快地扑上这些机会。"

"I remember for me, when Facebook launched events or live streaming, we were one of the very first ones to do that. LinkedIn launched events, we did the same thing — and the platforms were heavily incentivized to drive adoption for those new features. That's how we got a lot of momentum, and then it became more mainstream."

"我记得对我来说,当年 Facebook 上线活动(events)或直播功能时,我们是最早一批去做的。LinkedIn 推出活动功能,我们也照做——而平台为了推这些新功能的采用率,有极强的动力去给你导量。我们就是这么拿到大量势头的,然后它才慢慢变主流。"

"Exactly. But because there's so much consumer shift in how they discover things — away from traditional search and into conversational AI experiences — there's also a social clampdown happening."

"完全正确。但因为消费者在'怎么发现东西'上发生了巨大的迁移——从传统搜索转向对话式 AI 体验——与此同时,社媒也在收紧(clampdown)。"

"Try to link out of social on your posts — your algorithms are going to absolutely not. You can't do it, because they're trying to maintain eyeballs on their platform too."

"你试试在社媒帖子里往外放链接——算法绝对不让。你做不到,因为它们也在拼命把眼球留在自己平台上。"

"So all of these traditional channels of search and social are collapsing. Social is still accessible through influencers and creators, but not through paid, or you posting on your company account."

"所以搜索和社媒这些传统渠道都在坍塌。社媒还能通过 influencer 和创作者触达,但通过付费、或者你用公司官方账号去发,就不行了。"

"There's something that is going to happen in the space — I don't know what it is. For a while, for example, if you wanted to succeed in AI search, you should have done Reddit, because so much of AI search was coming from Reddit. Well, they shut it down like last week. So now all of a sudden it dropped to nearly zero. So now Reddit is nothing."

"这个领域接下来一定会发生点什么——我也不知道是什么。比如有一阵子,你要想在 AI 搜索里跑出来,就该去做 Reddit,因为 AI 搜索很大一部分来自 Reddit。结果他们上周左右就把它关掉了。于是一夜之间它掉到了接近零。现在 Reddit 什么都不是了。"

"So it's changing so quickly, I can't even tell what that next big thing is going to be. I'm looking at OpenAI's app marketplace right now as a potential — but you just have to keep your eyes open all the time."

"它变得太快,我甚至说不出下一个大风口会是什么。我现在把 OpenAI 的应用市场当成一个潜在选项盯着——但你就只能时时刻刻睁大眼睛。"

"Let's keep going. You said marketing can't keep up with shipping velocity."

"我们接着往下。你说营销已经跟不上发布速度了。"

"That one's tough, because all of our marketing processes and structures were created on top of development teams that shipped at most once a month, probably even less, maybe once every 3 months. There were big releases that involved marketing."

"这条挺扎心,因为我们所有的营销流程和架构,都是搭在那种'最多一个月发一次、甚至更少、可能三个月才发一次'的研发团队之上的。那时候是有大发布、需要营销介入的。"

"And now with AI-native employees and the velocity of shipping — when you're releasing something every single day, how can marketing possibly keep up? And especially, there's no lead time."

"可现在有了 AI-native 的员工和这种发布速度——当你每一天都在发东西,营销怎么可能跟得上?而且尤其是,根本没有提前期(lead time)了。"

"My team — sometimes they pick up a task and an hour later it's like, oh, it's done, it's out. And I'm like, okay great, let me catch up with you to announce it to our customers. So you can't have any lead time, because there is no lead time anymore."

"我的团队——有时候他们接了个任务,一小时后就是,哦,做完了,上线了。我就只能说,好好好,我赶紧跟上、去跟客户官宣。所以你根本没法留任何提前期,因为提前期已经不存在了。"

"And marketing is so like, 'we need a couple of weeks, we need a couple of...' — that doesn't exist anymore. In a couple of months you might lose your product market fit. What do you mean, a lead time for a release in a couple of months?"

"而营销老是那种'我们需要几周、我们需要几个……'——这种东西不存在了。几个月之后你可能连 product market fit 都丢了。你还跟我说'一次发布要留几个月提前期'?"

"The velocity is happening so quickly, we don't have the processes. A lot of times what I'm seeing is that marketing teams that are really structured in 'this is how releases happen' end up holding the development team back, because they're like, 'you can't release, we're not ready.'"

"速度快到我们根本没有相应的流程。我越来越常看到的是:那些把'发布就该这么走'流程化得很死的营销团队,反而开始拖研发团队的后腿,因为他们会说'你不能发,我们还没准备好。'"

"If you hear that phrase — 'you can't release, marketing is not ready' — have a deep heart-to-heart with your marketing team, because it's not an option to even voice that anymore. So marketing right now is in a big scramble of trying to figure out how to support this velocity, and we don't really have frameworks for that. So we'll see how marketing is going to evolve and change."

"如果你听到这句话——'你不能发,营销还没准备好'——那你得跟你的营销团队好好深谈一次,因为如今连把这句话说出口都不该是个选项了。所以营销现在正手忙脚乱地想搞清楚怎么去支撑这种速度,而我们其实还没有现成的框架。营销接下来会怎么演化、怎么变,再看吧。"

"I always tell my team — especially, you're not Apple. You can do worldwide releases every single day. Nobody goes to bed thinking about you."

"我总跟我的团队讲——尤其是,你又不是 Apple。你完全可以每天搞全球发布。没人会躺床上还惦记着你。"

"At the same time, I just want to clarify — you don't consider yourself a marketer, right? You're putting yourself in the growth category?"

"同时我想澄清一下——你不把自己当营销人,对吧?你把自己归在增长这一类?"

"I don't think anybody can have the privilege of not considering themselves a marketer anymore. I even look at our engineers — they're marketers now too, because a lot of times they have to handle their own releases and their own GTM strategy for those releases."

"我觉得现在没有谁还能享受'不把自己当营销人'这种特权了。我连看我们的工程师都是——他们现在也是营销人,因为很多时候他们得自己处理自己的发布、自己为那次发布做 GTM 策略。"

"We can't afford to only have marketing be responsible for marketing nowadays. Every single one of us has to take on the marketing hat."

"如今我们再也负担不起'只让营销去负责营销'这种事。我们每一个人都得戴上营销那顶帽子。"

"Well, let's talk about that — the role of the GTM engineer, and how it's growing now. How are you thinking about that?"

"那我们就聊聊这个——GTM engineer(GTM 工程师)这个角色,以及它现在怎么在壮大。你是怎么看的?"

"GTM engineer I see materialize in two ways, and I'm actually not clear where it's going to completely converge. I see GTM engineer replacing a lot of sales roles."

"GTM engineer 我看到它以两种形态出现,而我其实也说不准它最终会收敛成哪一种。一种是,我看到 GTM engineer 在取代大量销售岗位。"

"So GTM engineer is a combination of BDR and SDR and AE and AM and success person, all wrapped up in this one person — basically more of a generalist in sales, able to handle all the functions from prospecting, to having conversations, to closing, to renewals, to expansion, to any success issues of additional adoption."

"所以 GTM engineer 是 BDR、SDR、AE、AM 加客户成功(success)这些角色揉成的一个人——本质上是个销售上的通才,能从找客户(prospecting)、到谈、到成交、到续约、到扩展、再到推动更多采用过程中的各种成功问题,一条龙全包。"

"But I also see GTM engineering replacing RevOps — they're piping all of these things together for GTM to run faster. And both roles right now are being conflated in the market, because I see them both exist and mean two different things."

"但另一种,我也看到 GTM engineering 在取代 RevOps(收入运营)——他们把所有这些东西用管道串起来,好让 GTM 跑得更快。这两种角色现在在市场上被混为一谈,因为我看到它们同时存在,却指的是两件不同的事。"

"It's very similar to what growth used to be — who knows what growth is. So right now we're in that same space with GTM engineering."

"这跟当年的'增长'特别像——谁说得清增长到底是什么。所以现在 GTM engineering 也正处在那个同样含糊的阶段。"

"But regardless, it comes back to the same concept of a person wearing multiple hats, because in times of such rapid iteration and velocity, you just can't afford specialties, and there's no need for optimizations in specialties. You need more generalists."

"但不管怎样,它都回到同一个概念:一个人身兼多职。因为在这种高速迭代、高速发布的时代,你根本养不起专才,也没必要在专精上做优化。你需要的是更多通才(generalist)。"

"I'm getting to the end. You said growth shapes features now — and you touched on this before. I'm curious how that potentially conflicts with other teams that are in charge of shipping."

"快到尾声了。你说现在增长会去塑造功能(growth shapes features)——前面也提到过。我好奇这会不会跟那些本来负责发布的团队产生冲突。"

"I've actually been, my entire career, like — no, growth does not ship features. We work on distribution. We work on acquisition, activation, monetization, retention questions, but core ships features; we distribute those features."

"其实我整个职业生涯都坚持——不,增长不出功能。我们做的是分发。我们做获客、激活、商业化、留存这些事,但功能由核心团队(core)来出;我们负责把那些功能分发出去。"

"What I found interesting is that when we were able to do a lot of these optimizations so quickly — because of our shipping velocity, because of how much trust we have in every single developer, where they can make a lot of the decisions, there's no up-and-down approvals or speccing, it's just 'here's the problem, go solve it' — we actually have room to take on some of the feature work."

"我发现有意思的是:当我们能这么快地做完一大堆这类优化——靠的是我们的发布速度,靠的是我们对每一个开发者的高度信任,他们能自己拍很多板,没有上上下下的审批、没有写规格说明书,就一句'这是问题,去解决它'——我们其实就腾出了空间,能接一部分功能开发的活儿。"

"Now we don't take any platform work or infrastructure work, because we don't want to get in there and mess it up, since we have teams dedicated to it. But some of the other features — why not? We have cycles, we believe this is going to improve retention, let's go."

"我们不碰任何平台或基础设施的活儿,因为我们不想插手把它搞砸,那些有专门的团队在做。但另外一些功能——为什么不呢?我们有余力,我们相信这能改善留存,那就上。"

"So to me it's more of an outcome of our increased velocity. This growth team is definitely the fastest I've ever worked with, in terms of their ability to execute on the number of people we have. But shipping features — we still have conversations with core, to be fair. We're not just roguely doing it."

"所以对我来说,这更像是我们速度提升之后的一个自然结果。就以我们这点人数能执行的程度而言,这个增长团队绝对是我合作过最快的。但出功能这件事——平心而论,我们还是会跟核心团队沟通的。我们不是擅自乱来。"

"We're like, 'hey, we think we're going to do this, cool with you? Or did you already have this on the roadmap?' And if we really believe it's going to help with growth, we just go and do it."

"我们会说,'嘿,我们打算做这个,你这边 OK 吗?还是你们路线图上已经有了?'然后,只要我们真的相信它能帮到增长,我们就去做。"

"So are there engineers that are fully dedicated to growth?"

"所以是有工程师完全专职做增长的吗?"

"Correct, yes. We have a dedicated growth engineering team at Lovable. They still report — everybody — to our CTO and co-founder Fabian, but they are 100% dedicated to only growth efforts that I'm working with them on."

"没错,有。Lovable 有一支专职的增长工程团队。他们——所有人——汇报线还是在我们的 CTO、也是联合创始人 Fabian(法比安)那里,但他们 100% 只投入到我跟他们一起在做的增长工作上。"

"Is there any bonus principle we haven't touched on yet?"

"还有没有什么加分项,是我们还没聊到的?"

"The two I'll just say: great product is still the best way to grow, at the end of the day. Because right now — I'm going to sound like a broken record — but with the cost of software development going down, it's no longer enough to ship an experience. You have to ship an amazing experience for it to matter."

"我就说两条:第一,归根结底,好产品仍然是最好的增长方式。因为现在——我又要像复读机一样了——随着软件开发的成本一直在降,光是'发布一个体验'已经不够了。你得发布一个惊艳的体验,它才算数。"

"And continuously shipping amazing experiences accelerates all of your growth efforts. It becomes a much better soil to grow on top of, as opposed to it being completely dried out or unwatered, and then you're trying to stick a seed into it."

"而持续不断地发布惊艳的体验,会加速你所有的增长动作。它变成了一片肥沃得多的土壤,你在上面种东西——而不是那种已经干裂、没浇过水、你硬把一颗种子戳进去的地。"

"So core overall can participate in growth efforts a lot more if they're mindful of what they're actually putting out to customers, and that matters more now than ever."

"所以,只要核心团队对'到底给客户端出了什么'足够上心,他们整体上其实能更多地参与到增长里来,而这件事如今比以往任何时候都重要。"

"And the second bonus: retention in our world of AI is going to make or break companies. So every single growth team — before, it was like 'activation, activation' — yeah, no: retention. This is something you should be stressing about every single day."

"第二条加分项:在 AI 这个世界里,留存(retention)将决定一家公司的生死。所以每一个增长团队——以前是那种'激活、激活'——不,现在是:留存。这是你每一天都该为之紧张的东西。"

"We're definitely living in the hyped AI era, and the only companies that will succeed are the ones that see above-benchmark retention rates — both from user engagement and paid retention. So that's something you just have to obsess about. Growth teams that are responsible for acquisition are going to die. Those companies are going to die if you don't have somebody stressing about it all the time."

"我们确实正活在一个 AI 被过度炒作的时代,而最终能成的公司,只会是那些留存率高于行业基准的——既包括用户参与度(engagement)的留存,也包括付费留存。所以这是你必须死磕的东西。只盯着获客的增长团队会死掉。如果你没有一个人时刻为留存紧绷着,那家公司会死。"

"That's incredible to hear from you, because you changed your mind on it, right? You used to advocate very heavily for activation."

"从你嘴里听到这个太震撼了,因为你在这件事上改变了立场,对吧?你以前可是非常强力地为激活站台。"

"Also, on your point about best products win — that's the classic Google mantra that got trashed for a long time, where people started saying, 'no, good distribution wins, even if the product is not the best.' You can't build a company without good distribution — but you can bake distribution into your product experience. And that is the difference."

"还有你说的'好产品会赢'——那是 Google 的经典口号,后来被狠批了很久,大家开始说'不对,好的分发才会赢,哪怕产品不是最好的。'没有好的分发你建不起一家公司——但你可以把分发做进你的产品体验里。差别就在这儿。"

"It's not just about having the most beautiful products — that's never been the case. The most beautiful products that don't have distribution hooked into the experience still end up not known by anybody."

"它不只是'拥有最漂亮的产品'——从来就不是这样。那些没有把分发钩进体验里的最漂亮的产品,最后照样没人知道。"

"So distribution is still the king, the queen, whatever you want to call it, but the bar for product has gone up. And I think the best products with distribution are the ones that are going to win. So there's still that distribution caveat — and that's honestly the hardest thing to figure out right now, because it's too easy to build products."

"所以分发仍然是王、是后,随你怎么叫,但产品的及格线被抬高了。我觉得最终会赢的,是'带着分发的好产品'。所以分发这个前提依然在——而老实说,这才是现在最难搞清楚的事,因为造产品已经太容易了。"

"Thank you for being on the show and breaking down the new growth playbook here."

"谢谢你来上节目,把这套新的增长手册给我们拆解了一遍。"

"Yes, thank you for having me. I appreciate it. Hallelujah."

"嗯,谢谢你请我来,真的很感激。哈利路亚。"