Looking at the World Through Principles

Uh so uh, as Sasha mentioned, uh it's been uh 25 years that uh, that we've been friends and professional colleagues.

正如 Sasha 刚才提到的,我们做朋友、做业内同行,已经有 25 年了。

And so uh, you know, I look in the room and I see these old friends, I'm so happy to be here.

我环视这个房间,看到的都是这些老朋友,能来这里我很高兴。

I um — he also mentioned uh that uh I'm very systematic, meaning I got in a habit of every time I would make a decision, to write down the criteria I would use to make that decision.

他还提到我做事非常系统,意思是我养成了一个习惯:每次要做决定,就把做这个决定所用的标准写下来。

We're getting a little echo I think, uh, and it's not a big room, so I don't even know if I need a mic, but um...

我这边好像有点回声,而且这屋子不大,我都不确定还用不用麦克风,不过……

So every time I would make a decision, I would write down the criteria I used for making those decisions, because cause-effect: everything happens because of a cause.

所以每次要做决定,我都会把做这些决定用的标准写下来,因为有因才有果:每件事的发生都有它的原因。

And so, and the same things happen over and over again.

而且同样的事情会一遍又一遍地发生。

And so by taking the time to write them down, and then seeing how those criteria would have worked over a period of time, I could get perspective.

所以只要肯花时间把它们写下来,再回头看这些标准在过去一段时间里究竟管不管用,我就有了看问题的视角。

And so I wrote down those principles, and as Hashem mentioned, I — I wrote a book called Principles, which has to do — which just was a collection of the life and work principles.

于是我把这些原则写了下来,正如 Hashem 提到的,我写了一本书叫《Principles》,它其实就是生活原则和工作原则的合集。

So the culture that we have is very, very important; it was really the most important thing in terms of whatever success we've had.

所以我们的文化非常非常重要;不管我们取得过什么成就,真正最重要的其实就是它。

At the same time I wrote down the economic and investment principles.

与此同时,我也把经济原则和投资原则写了下来。

So what I thought I would do today is to share with you what I think of my most important economic and investment principles, and then look at the world through the perspective of those principles.

所以我想今天就跟你们讲讲我认为最重要的经济原则和投资原则,然后再用这些原则去看这个世界。

In other words, rather than just tell you what I think, I want to tell you how it works, and then we can apply that mechanics — you can decide, does it work that way or not?

换句话说,我不想只告诉你们我怎么看,我想告诉你们它是怎么运转的,然后我们把这套机制拿来用——由你们自己判断,它是不是这样运转的?

So, are these principles valuable? Because if you know the principles, it's like it's giving it — like a giving man the fish, ability to fish rather than to just give the fish.

那么,这些原则有没有价值?因为你要是掌握了这些原则,就相当于授人以渔,而不是直接给他一条鱼。

I can tell you what I think, but if these principles are right, then you could apply them yourself to whatever time or circumstances exist.

我可以告诉你我怎么想,但如果这些原则是对的,你就能自己把它们用到任何时代、任何处境上。

So um, I broke it down in terms of economic principles and investment principles, because the markets follow the economy.

我把它分成了经济原则和投资原则两块,因为市场跟着经济走。

So in order to understand economics and all the markets, you have to understand — in order to understand the market you have to understand the economy.

所以要理解市场,你得先理解经济。

So I want to describe how I think the economy works.

所以我想讲讲我认为经济是怎么运转的。

I think it's like a ver— it's a perpetual motion machine, and there are four big forces, three important equilibriums, and two levers.

我认为它就像一台永动机,里面有四股大力量、三个重要的均衡、两根操纵杆。

If you get this down, I think this basically — everything through my eyes is along those lines.

只要把这些搞明白,基本上——在我眼里,所有事情都是照这个路子在走的。

Um, over a period of time we raise our living standards because we learn how to do things better, we become more efficient; that's called productivity, output.

随着时间推移,我们的生活水平会提高,因为我们学会了把事情做得更好、效率更高;这就叫生产率,叫产出。

And that is something that evolves over a period of time.

而这个东西是随着时间慢慢演进出来的。

That is — because it evolves, it is not something that is a big thing, that's — we see as a big thing, but it's the most important thing over a period of time.

正因为它是慢慢演进的,它不像是一件大事,我们也不会把它当成大事,但拉长时间看,它才是最重要的。

The big things that we see and feel every day are debt cycles.

我们每天看得见、感觉得到的那些大事,是债务周期。

Now, there's a short-term debt cycle and there's a long-term debt cycle.

债务周期有短期的,也有长期的。

When I say a short-term debt cycle, what I mean is what we think of is normally the business cycle, right?

我说短期债务周期,指的是我们平常说的商业周期,对吧?

You have a recession, you have a weakness in the economy; when the rate of economic activity is too low, then central banks produce credit — and credit is buying power.

你会碰上衰退,经济变得疲弱;当经济活动的水平太低时,央行就会创造信贷——而信贷就是购买力。

So you produce that credit, it makes purchases of goods, services and financial assets happen, and so the economy picks up.

于是你造出这些信贷,商品、服务和金融资产就有人买了,经济也就回升。

That cycle usually lasts seven to ten years.

这个周期通常持续七到十年。

As the economy picks up, the demand rises relative to the capacity; as you get later in the cycle, the central bank puts the brakes on it, they raise interest rates, tighten monetary policy.

随着经济回升,需求相对产能往上走;到了周期后段,央行会踩刹车,加息,收紧货币政策。

As the uh — there's less slack in the economy, the unemployment rate is low, they put the brakes on it, interest rates go up, tightness and monetary policy, then you have a recession, slow up.

随着经济中的闲置产能变少、失业率走低,他们就踩刹车,利率上去,货币政策收紧,接着就是衰退、放缓。

And that's the cycle, right?

这就是这个周期,对吧?

And because credit is buying power, by providing it, it also produces debt, and debt means the obligation to pay back.

而信贷既然就是购买力,那么在给出信贷的同时,它也造出了债务,债务意味着还钱的义务。

And so by its very nature it's cyclical: first comes the stimulation, then comes the paying back.

所以它天生就是周期性的:先是刺激,后是偿还。

Which means when you produce credit you can spend more than you earn, and when you pay back you have to spend less than you earn — and that's the nature of the cycle.

也就是说,创造信贷的时候你可以花得比赚的多,还债的时候你就得花得比赚的少——这就是这个周期的本质。

And I think we're all acquainted with that type of cycle, and with that cycle goes market cycles, which we'll talk about.

我想这类周期我们都不陌生,而跟着这个周期走的还有市场周期,这个我们后面会讲。

That's what I mean by the short-term debt cycle.

这就是我说的短期债务周期。

There's also a long-term debt cycle, which is the accumulation of all of those, of those shorter-term debt cycles.

除此之外还有长期债务周期,它是所有这些短期债务周期累积起来的结果。

Because everybody wants things to go up — they want their asset prices, the markets, to go up, they want employment to go up, they want everything to go up.

因为所有人都希望什么都往上走——希望资产价格往上走、市场往上走,希望就业往上走,希望一切都往上走。

And for that reason, they — central banks over a period of time stimulate, and they do that by normally lowering interest rates, until interest rates hit zero.

正因为如此,央行会长期不断地刺激,通常的做法是降息,直到利率降到零。

And then when interest rates hit zero, they can't do that anymore, and then we come to the need to print money and buy financial assets, which we call quantitative easing.

而利率一旦到零,这一招就用不下去了,于是就得印钞、买入金融资产,这就是我们说的量化宽松。

And when they can't do that anymore, or there are limitations, we come to the end of the long-term debt.

而当这个也做不了了,或者受到了限制,我们就走到了长期债务周期的尽头。

So there's a short-term debt cycle, a long-term debt cycle, and productivity.

所以,有短期债务周期,有长期债务周期,还有生产率。

Now, related to all that is politics: internal politics and external politics.

跟这一切相关的还有政治：对内政治和对外政治。

In that normal cycle they're related, as we're going to see in terms of that dynamic.

在正常周期里，这两者是联动的，等下讲那套运作机制时就会看到。

The period that we're going through — 2008 and 9, there was a debt cycle and interest — and that's very similar to 1929 to 32, there was a debt crisis and...

我们正在经历的这段时期——2008、2009 年有一轮债务周期，还有利率——这跟 1929 到 32 年非常像，那时有一场债务危机，还有……

...interest, and in both of those cases there was the printing of money and the buying of financial assets, which caused those financial asset prices to go up and more liquidity in the economy.

……利率，而这两次都出现了印钞和买入金融资产，把金融资产价格推了上去，也让经济里的流动性变多。

And that particularly benefited those who had financial assets, and it contributed to the wealth gap and the income gap, as did technology.

这尤其让持有金融资产的人受益，它和技术一样，加剧了财富差距和收入差距。

And as a result of that, in the 1930s as also happened now, politics entered into the picture.

结果就是，1930 年代政治进入了这幅图景，今天也一样。

So, as we're seeing in the world right now, that issue of wealth gap is causing populism — populism of the left and populism of the right — and that's having an effect on the markets and having an effect on the...

所以，就像我们眼下在全世界看到的，财富差距这个问题正在催生民粹主义——左翼的民粹主义和右翼的民粹主义——这对市场产生了影响，也在影响……

So we are also seeing a situation very much like the 30s, in which uh we're seeing a rising power uh challenging an existing power.

我们同样看到一种非常像 30 年代的局面：一个崛起国在挑战一个既有强国。

That's a geopolitical cycle: when a rising power in the form of China, a challenging and existing power in the form of the United States.

这就是地缘政治周期：崛起国是中国，它挑战的既有强国是美国。

And if we look at histories and cycles of those periods, there's a cycle of conflict and peace.

如果去看那些时期的历史和周期，会发现存在一个冲突与和平的周期。

Normally peace happens after a war, because some dominant country wins the war, nobody wants to fight the dominant power, and you have an extended period of peace, until there's then — that particular conflict doesn't...

通常和平出现在战争之后，因为某个主导国打赢了战争，没人愿意跟这个主导强国开战，于是就有很长一段和平期，直到后来——那个特定的冲突不再……

I'm not saying we're going to have a military conflict or anything like that, although you know that always exists as a possibility.

我不是说我们会发生军事冲突之类的事，尽管这种可能性始终存在。

So these cycles, these things have happened um over and over again.

所以这些周期、这些事情，一遍又一遍地发生。

So politics enters into — can affect the cycles.

所以政治会介入进来——会影响这些周期。

For example, um, the shift in the uh United States to be able to create tax cut changes helped the corporate tax picture and caused stock prices to rise.

举个例子，美国这边转向减税，改善了企业税的状况，把股价推了上去。

Okay, those are the cycles.

好，这些就是那些周期。

Then when I look at what's happening, I compare it to three equilibriums.

然后，我在看当下发生的事情时，会拿它跟三个均衡对照。

And what are these three equilibriums? First, that debt growth has to be in line with the income growth that's required to service the debt.

这三个均衡是什么？第一，债务增长必须跟得上偿还这些债务所需的收入增长。

If debt growth is faster than the income growth that's going to service the debt, we're going to have an adjustment.

如果债务增长快过用来偿债的那部分收入增长，就会出现一次调整。

And so I'm always doing the pro forma: what is the ability to service that debt? So that's what I'm watching.

所以我一直在做 pro forma 测算：偿付那笔债务的能力到底有多强？这就是我盯着的东西。

Second equilibrium is that the rate of economic activity, economic capacity utilization, is neither too high nor too low.

第二个均衡是，经济活动的水平，也就是经济的产能利用率，既不太高也不太低。

What that means is, if you have it pressing up too much over — an overheating economy — that's going to be the tightening of monetary policy and a correction.

意思是，如果它往上顶得太过头——经济过热——那就会招来货币政策收紧和一次修正。

And if you have it too low, so that the economy is depressed and there's a lot of slack, that's going to cause an adjustment to bring it up.

反过来，如果太低，经济低迷、有大量闲置产能，那就会引发一次把它往上拉的调整。

And so I'm always watching, where are we relative to that? Because that's a key driver of these cycles.

所以我一直在看，我们相对于这个均衡处在什么位置？因为这是这些周期的一个关键驱动力。

And the third is that the projected returns of equities are above the projected returns of bonds, which are above the projected returns of cash, by appropriate risk premiums.

第三个是，股票的预期回报高于债券的预期回报，债券的预期回报又高于现金的预期回报，中间隔着适当的风险溢价。

In other words, the capital markets produce the circulation of buying power in the form of this credit coming around, and this relationship of the cash to bond yields to stock yields and asset classes determines how money flows through.

换句话说，资本市场靠信贷这样循环流转，制造出购买力的流通；而现金、债券收益率、股票收益率这几者与各资产类别之间的关系，决定了钱往哪儿流。

And a normal condition is — for reasons I won't digress into — to have cash have a lower return than bonds, that have to have a lower return from equities, having to do with how the system works.

正常状态是——原因我就不展开了——现金的回报低于债券，债券的回报又必须低于股票，这跟这个体系的运作方式有关。

Basically central banks put cash on deposit, and people with better ideas have to make a profit to that, they use that money to create these other uh — the level of economic activity — and have to have higher returns.

大体上，央行把现金摆在存款这一头，而有更好点子的人必须在这个基础上赚出利润，他们拿这笔钱去创造别的东西——也就是经济活动的水平——所以回报必须更高。

And when that's not the case, the way they tighten it is that there are two levers.

而当情况不是这样时，他们收紧的办法，就是有两根操纵杆。

So now, there are two levers: monetary policy and fiscal policy, right?

所以，这里有两根操纵杆：货币政策和财政政策，对吧？

Monetary policy is the means by which the brakes and the gas are put on, and the brakes and the gas being put on become reflected in each of these other items.

货币政策就是踩刹车、踩油门的那个手段，而刹车和油门一踩下去，就会反映到前面这些项目的每一项上。

So let's say if debt growth is too high relative to income growth, and capacity utilization is high and strat— stretched, monetary policy will be tightened.

比如说，债务增长相对收入增长太高了，产能利用率又高、绷得很紧，货币政策就会收紧。

And that tightening of monetary policy will change the projected return of ec— of cash relative to bonds and of equities, those risk premiums, and that will slow the economy down, and that will drive those cycles.

而货币政策这么一收紧，就会改变现金相对于债券、相对于股票的预期回报，也就是那些风险溢价，经济随之放缓，这就驱动了那些周期。

And that's how the economy is operating in these perpetual-motion kind of way.

经济就是以这种永动机式的方式在运转。

And if you — you could almost picture, I literally can picture where you are in those cycles and what is happening, and you can anticipate what is going to happen next from that, because it's that perpetual motion machine.

你几乎能把它想出来——我是真的能看见你处在这些周期的什么位置、正在发生什么，你也能由此预判接下来会发生什么，因为它就是那台永动机。

So that's my template in a nutshell.

简而言之，这就是我的模板。

And if you keep thinking like, where are we now, then you um, you know, you can kind of think where we are.

只要你一直在问，我们现在到底在哪儿，你大致就能想明白我们处在什么位置。

Okay, so I'm just going to show you some charts to help to convey the picture.

好，我给你们看几张图，帮着把这个图景讲清楚。

This is uh real GDP going back to 1900.

这是实际 GDP，一路回溯到 1900 年。

So this is — that line is productivity, right? And that's a big inevitable force that happens over a period of time.

这条线就是生产率，对吧？这是一股巨大的、必然会发生的力量，在很长一段时间里持续起作用。

Even the biggest economic turbulence, you know, looks like a bump in that cycle, right?

即便是最大的经济动荡，在那个周期里看上去也不过是个小鼓包，对吧？

Productivity is a big force; betting on productivity is a big force.

生产率是一股大力量；押注生产率，也是一股大力量。

But what happens is that cycle — as you get later in the long-term, that productivity begins to slow, because there needs to be investment and there needs to be other things.

但实际会发生的是，这个周期——越走到长期周期的后段，生产率就开始放缓，因为得有投资，也得有别的东西跟上。

And when you — activity um — when there's prosperity and so on, you get more productivity; it's a self-reinforcing cycle.

而当经济繁荣起来之类的时候，你就会得到更多生产率；这是一个自我强化的周期。

So these charts are just meant to show productivity and how it's changing over a period of time in the developed countries and then in China.

所以这几张图只是想说明生产率，以及它在发达国家、然后在中国，一段时间里是怎么变化的。

So just to give you a quick picture here, you could see it in varying degrees bend over, as they are later into their longer-term debt cycle.

简单给你们一个直观印象：你能看到它们不同程度地向下弯折，因为都走到了各自长期债务周期的后段。

This — United States over the last 10 years versus since 1980.

这是美国过去 10 年，对比 1980 年以来。

And so in each one of those cases you could see it declining — Japan, which is large, later in that debt cycle, and so on, basically hardly any growth in productivity.

每一个例子里你都能看到它在往下走——日本，体量很大，处在债务周期的后段，等等，生产率基本上几乎没有增长。

So, so okay, that's what productivity looks like.

好，生产率大致就是这个样子。

Now, where are we in the short-term debt cycle of the — this is what the cycle looks like that I was describing.

那么，我们在短期债务周期里处在什么位置——我刚才描述的那个周期，就长这个样子。

In other words, um, what happens from the capital markets perspective is, as you um begin to go to higher levels of operating rates, lower levels of unemployment, central banks begin to tighten, liquidity starts to tighten, then risk premiums start to rise.

换句话说，从资本市场的角度看，会发生的是：当开工率越来越高、失业率越来越低，央行开始收紧，流动性开始收紧，风险溢价随之开始上升。

Okay, in this cycle we're nine years into the cycle, unemployment rates are comparatively low and there's less slack.

这一轮周期，我们已经走到入周期第 9 年，失业率相对偏低，闲置产能也更少。

So you know, no surprise, central banks tighten monetary policy.

所以毫不意外，央行开始收紧货币政策。

And the way they tighten monetary policy is by either raising interest rates or lowering the purchases of the financial assets that they buy by expanding the balance sheet.

他们收紧货币政策的办法，要么是加息，要么是减少那些靠扩张资产负债表买进来的金融资产的购买量。

So that's where we are in that cycle.

这就是我们在这一轮周期里所处的位置。

Now if you look at how markets behave in that part of the cycle — this is breaking the cycles into three parts: the early phases of the cycle, the mid phase of the cycle, and the late phase of the cycle.

再看市场在周期的这个阶段是怎么表现的——这里把周期拆成三段：周期早期、周期中期、周期晚期。

And this is across the world, different countries: this is the United States, this is Europe, to show how the historical...

这是全球不同国家的情况：这是美国，这是欧洲，用来看历史上……

So we're in a period of time — this period of time which is relatively late in the cycle is also associated with a period of time where there is less attractive returns, greater vulnerability.

所以我们正处在这样一段时期——处在周期相对后段的这段时期，往往也对应着回报吸引力更差、脆弱性更大的时期。

So that's largely where we are in the cycle: interest rates have hit their lows, in some cases can't go lower, and then we're dealing with the issue of quantitative easing.

我们在周期里大致就处在这个位置：利率已经触及低点，有些地方甚至不能再低，接下来我们要面对的就是量化宽松的问题。

So taking this back to uh — this goes back to 1900 — this shows debt, debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States, and it just shows how the cycle that we're going through now is very similar to the cycle that we went into the 30s.

把这个往回推——这张图一直回到 1900 年——显示的是美国的债务、债务占 GDP 的比率，它要说明的就是我们现在正在经历的这个周期，跟当年走进 30 年代的那个周期非常像。

In other words, because of that debt crisis and interest rates hitting zero, you had the printing of money.

换句话说，因为那场债务危机、因为利率触及零，才有了印钞。

This shows the central bank's balance sheet, the monetary base, the acceleration of printing and money.

这张图显示的是央行的资产负债表、基础货币，以及印钞的加速。

Same thing happened in the 2008 financial crisis; you could see that.

2008 年金融危机时也是同一回事，图上看得到。

What happens is you have the debt crisis, you have the hitting of zero in interest rates, they're stuck, so they have to print the money.

过程是这样：先出现债务危机，接着利率触及零，他们被卡死了，只能印钞。

And then we have the reaction very similar to 1932 to 1937, in the economy picks up.

之后的反应跟 1932 到 1937 年非常像，经济回升。

1937 they start to tighten monetary policy because they're worried that the economy is overheating and inflation's going to rise, and they cause a recession.

1937 年他们开始收紧货币政策，因为担心经济过热、通胀会上行，结果造成了一场衰退。

That's the first time they use the word recession — recession, it was like re-depression, they used the term recession — and that was the uh, the 1938 period.

recession（衰退）这个词就是那时第一次用的——recession，意思等于「又一次 depression」，他们就改用了 recession 这个说法——那就是 1938 年那段时期。

Now um, I talked about debt, but there are also unfunded liabilities that we don't call debt, which would be pension and health care liabilities.

我刚讲了债务，但还有一类我们不叫债务的未拨备负债，也就是养老金和医疗方面的负债。

And I just wanted to give you a picture of what that's like, that has — there's a lot of liabilities out there, um, promises that have to be kept, and so the liabilities are very large.

我只是想让你们对这个量级有个概念：外面有大量负债，都是必须兑现的承诺，所以负债规模非常大。

Um, I want you to focus then on these — the bottom charts, before I put the top charts in — because I, I want to convey um, as it relates to both markets and the economy, the important um, the — the really realizing that we've been really in a golden age of capitalism, in the following sense.

我想请你们先看这几张——下面这几张图，在我把上面那几张放上来之前——因为我想传达的、对市场和经济都重要的一点，就是要真正意识到：我们一直处在资本主义黄金年代，是在下面这个意义上说的。

This chart shows how profit margins have increased; in other words, uh, they've more than doubled since 2000.

这张图显示的是利润率怎么涨上来的——换句话说，2000 年以来翻了一倍还不止。

Means if you didn't have an expansion in profit margins, you wouldn't have — you'd have the stock market 40 percent lower.

意思是，要是没有利润率这轮扩张，股市会比现在低 40%。

You had an expansion in profit margins, and at the same time you had a decrease in the form of employee compensation, and profit margins be largely because of a number of factors, but technology has been replacing people, and so it's made it more efficient, so that that was an element.

利润率在扩张，与此同时员工薪酬这一块在下降；利润率上升主要是若干因素共同作用的结果，但技术一直在替代人力，效率因此提高，这是其中一个因素。

Uh, also globalization has helped.

另外，全球化也帮了忙。

Um, just to show you a couple of charts pertaining to this: this is um, number, the globalization pressure movement, and this is um the capital movement.

给你们看两张跟这个有关的图：这张是全球化带来的压力变化，这张是资本的流动。

And these scatter diagrams show um, if you go — the globalization companies that have gone global on the margin have improved their profit margins more, and those that are more concentrated have improved their profit margins more, and those who have reduced union membership have produced their profit margins more.

这些散点图显示：走出去做全球化的公司，利润率在边际上改善得更多；集中度更高的公司，利润率改善得更多；工会成员减少的公司，利润率也改善得更多。

And so as a result of that, this has contributed to the growth of um the wealth gap and the prof— profit gap.

结果就是，这助推了财富差距和利润差距的扩大。

It's been great for companies, but it has not been good for a certain percentage of the population.

这对企业来说是好事，但对相当一部分人口来说不是。

If you look at the conditions of the bottom 60 percent of the population — bottom 60 means the majority — the conditions have uh, have been bad.

你去看底层 60% 人口的处境——底层 60% 就是大多数人——他们的处境一直很糟。

There has not been, over the — since 1980, any income growth, real income growth, in the United States.

自 1980 年以来，美国就没出现过收入增长，实际收入的增长。

Um, in a Fed survey, the 40 of all Americans could not raise 400 in the event of an emergency.

Fed 的一项调查显示，四成美国人遇到紧急情况拿不出 400 美元。

So there is a gap, and with that gap um has come — this is the wealth gap, that the top um one-tenth of one percent of the population's net worth is almost the same as the bottom 90 percent combined.

所以存在一个差距，伴随这个差距而来的——这就是财富差距：最顶端千分之一人口的净资产，几乎相当于底层 90% 人口加起来的总和。

And as a result we have populism, populism of the left and populism of the right.

结果我们就有了民粹主义，左翼的民粹主义和右翼的民粹主义。

That was a phenomenon that developed countries didn't used to have.

这是发达国家过去没有的现象。

And so now it is a — not only political phenomenon, it's an economic and market phenomenon, because as we come to go into the political elections in the number countries in Europe and in the United States, it will be really um a, a conflict over capitalism versus socialism, or the left and the right.

所以它现在不只是一个政治现象，也是一个经济现象和市场现象，因为随着欧洲若干国家和美国走进大选，这真的会变成一场资本主义对社会主义、也就是左派对右派的冲突。

And it's going to become rather extreme in both of those cases, and that has...

而且两边都会变得相当极端，这已经……

...an implication, just as the — these profit margins improved, and then I — and then tax rates.

……这有一层含义，就像这些利润率改善了，然后是税率。

That's the effective corporate tax rate, and how the effective corporate tax rate isn't — that's been fantastic.

这是有效企业税率，有效企业税率的走势——那一直好得不得了。

So imagine: you have profit margins increasing, you have the tax rate going down, you have cheap money.

所以想象一下：利润率在上升，税率在下降，钱又很便宜。

Cheap money has been used to borrow to buy back stock or make mergers; that's also supportive to stock prices, and so on.

便宜的钱被拿去借债回购股票、做并购，这同样对股价有支撑，诸如此类。

Many of those things will not continue.

这里面很多都不会再继续下去。

We think profit margins will go down; I think you're at the best of the corporate tax rates; and in terms of the issue, in terms of the wealth gap...

我们认为利润率会往下走；企业税率我认为已经是最好的时候了；而就这个问题、就财富差距而言……

So we're entering a newer environment, including an environment which is not going to be as conducive to the purchasing of financial assets by central banks and all of that.

所以我们正在进入一个更新的环境，这个环境不会再像过去那样有利于央行去购买金融资产之类的操作。

We're going from uh, headwind — from tailwinds to headwinds.

我们正在从顺风转成逆风。

And to give you a flavor of what this political uh situation is like, and, and the polarity and the entrenchedness, these are two charts; the first, they go back to 1900.

为了让你们感受一下这个政治局面是什么样的，以及其中的政治对立和阵营固化，这里有两张图，数据都回溯到 1900 年。

The first chart, which is the red chart, shows um how conservative the Republicans are — survey, surveyed economically conservative — so they're more conservative than they have ever been.

第一张是红色那张，显示共和党人有多保守——调查测的是经济上的保守程度——他们比历史上任何时候都更保守。

The Democrats, it shows how liberal they in terms of policies, and they're more liberal than they have ever been.

民主党那张显示他们在政策上有多偏自由派，也比历史上任何时候都更自由派。

So the two have not had greater polarity than we have today in politics.

所以两党在政治上的对立，从来没有像今天这么大。

And this shows how much is the votes cast along party lines; in other words, Republicans sticking with Republicans and Democrats sticking with Democrats.

这张图显示有多少票是按党派界线投出去的；换句话说，共和党人跟着共和党走，民主党人跟着民主党走。

And so it shows the entrenched conflict that we're having.

所以它显示出我们眼下这种阵营固化的对立。

This is in — this is not just a United States phenomenon, it is a European phenomenon as, as much.

这不只是美国的现象，欧洲同样如此。

We're going to be going into elections in uh Europe, and then for the European elections, and then we're also going to have changes in politics, and there's going to be more movement to political extremes.

欧洲马上要进入选举，接着是欧洲议会选举，之后政治上也会有变化，会更多地滑向政治极端。

For example, in the UK I think it's likely that um Jeremy Corbyn will be um in power, which will have an effect on capital flows.

比如在英国，我认为 Jeremy Corbyn 上台的可能性不小，这会影响资本流动。

So we're entering a period of time in which we're late, rather late in the — central banks have less power than they used to, to ease, and we're having this populism in an election cycle.

所以我们正在进入这样一个时期：我们已经处在相当晚的阶段——央行放松的能力不如从前，同时又在一个选举周期里碰上民粹主义。

So that's kind of the lay of the land.

这大致就是眼下的格局。

If you look at Europe, uh, you can — you can judge the capacity of a country to ease by looking at the level of interest rates relative to zero and the amount of quantitative easing that can take place and its marginal effects.

看欧洲的话，判断一个国家还有多大放松空间，可以看利率离零还有多远、还能做多少量化宽松，以及它的边际效果。

So let's say in the United States you go from two and a half percent to zero and you're done; in Europe you're at zero.

比如美国，从 2.5% 降到零就到头了；而欧洲已经在零了。

And in Europe there are limitations, caps at 33 of certain types of debt, that they have hit, that they can't go beyond unless there's some sort of an agreement — and politically very difficult to have an agreement.

欧洲还有别的限制：某些类型的债务有 33% 的持有上限，他们已经撞上了，除非达成某种协议，否则不能突破——而政治上要达成协议非常难。

So in — in Europe is going to be a problem for the ECB in terms of being able to have uh the ability to stimulate.

所以在欧洲，ECB 有没有能力去刺激经济，会是个问题。

And Japan is in a position somewhat similar, with these negative interest rates, slightly negative interest rates farther, and a lesser ability to stimulate.

日本的处境有些类似：利率已经是负的，往下也只能再负一点点，刺激的能力同样更弱。

So that's the lay of the land I think in terms of markets and economy, within the template that I showed you for, to begin with.

所以在我一开始给你们看的那个框架里，这就是我看到的市场和经济格局。

Okay, um, in terms of um the rising power challenging existing power: uh China will be an important influence in the world that we're operating in um for the rest of our lifetimes.

好,说到崛起国挑战既有强国:在我们这辈子剩下的时间里,中国都会是我们所处世界里的一股重要影响力量。

It'll become an increasing influence in — in that globalization and so on.

它在全球化这些事情上的影响还会越来越大。

Um, so this just shows uh where they are in United States and China in relative output.

这张图显示的就是美国和中国在相对产出上各自的位置。

This is what I believe that what's likely in terms of equity market cap and share of debt securities outstanding; in other words, the European — the Chinese markets are big and becoming bigger and more liquid and more effective.

这是我判断的,股票市值和债券存量占比可能会走成什么样;换句话说,中国市场很大,而且正变得更大、流动性更好、也更有效。

And they're going to play an important role, as will the Chinese in the environment we're in, not only in the form of trade but also in the form of, you know, the — the whole geopolitics, particularly reflected through technology.

在我们所处的这个环境里,它们会扮演重要角色,中国人也一样,不只是通过贸易,也通过整个地缘政治,尤其体现在技术上。

If you look at history and what caused countries to succeed and fail, it was um particularly led by technology.

回看历史,看是什么让一个国家兴起、又是什么让它衰落,主导的尤其是技术。

So um, I've been uh over the last several months wanting to research the rise and declines of world reserve currencies.

所以过去这几个月,我一直想研究世界储备货币的兴起和衰落。

And in order to do that I have to watch the arc of each one of these reserve currencies: there's the US dollar, before that there was the British pound, before that there was the Dutch guilder.

要做这件事,我就得看清每一种储备货币走过的那道弧线:现在是美元,在它之前是英镑,再往前是荷兰盾。

And as a result of that I needed to understand uh a number of things about the economies that I um, that made them reserve currency: how did they become reserve currencies, how did they lose their reserve currency status?

于是我需要弄懂这些经济体的一些事情,也就是它们凭什么成了储备货币:它们是怎么成为储备货币的,又是怎么丢掉储备货币地位的?

And that led me to uh watch um a number of factors and studying those.

这就带着我去看一系列因素,并且去研究它们。

Um, and I, I love putting together statistics and numbers to put together indices.

而我很喜欢把统计数据和数字拼在一起,做成指数。

So uh, these are the six main factors uh that you can judge a country's power by.

所以,这就是判断一个国家实力可以用的六大因子。

You know, power's a, a vague thing — you can have economic power, you can have military power, you can have power in different ways.

实力这个说法很模糊——可以是经济实力,可以是军事实力,实力有很多种形式。

But this is the uh — when I uh went to each one of these four cases: here's the Dutch cycle, here's the British cycle, here's the US cycle, here's the Chinese cycle, and reflected in these this dynamic.

但我逐一去看这四个案例:这是荷兰的周期,这是英国的周期,这是美国的周期,这是中国的周期,这套动态就体现在里面。

And uh, what you can see, this classic cycle is: first it's innovation, meaning technology, education and competitiveness — mostly a new technology.

你能看到,这个经典周期是这样的:先是创新,也就是技术、教育和竞争力——主要是一项新技术。

And the new technology, like the 5G technology today and the issues pertaining to Huawei and other technology companies — if you have technology it works uh both economically and militarily.

而这项新技术,比如今天的 5G 技术,还有围绕 Huawei 和其他技术公司的那些问题——你手里有技术,它在经济上和军事上都管用。

And so there's always a new technology; in the case of the Dutch it was...

所以总会出现一项新技术;在荷兰这个案例里,那就是……

...the ability to build ships that can go anywhere around the world.

……造船的本事:造出来的船能开到世界上任何地方。

And they took those ships and they put — and because the Europeans were experts in fighting, because they was fought with each other, they took the guns, they put them on the ships, and they go out to the rest of the world, and they accounted for half of world trade.

他们有了这些船,而且因为欧洲人打仗是行家,他们自己人之间就打来打去,于是他们把炮搬上船,开到世界其他地方去,占了全球贸易的一半。

Can you imagine that?

你能想象吗?

And when they go out there with half of world trade, they're bringing their money, the Dutch guilder.

而当他们带着一半的世界贸易走出去,他们也把自己的钱带了出去,那就是荷兰盾。

Okay, so they bring the money, and when they have — bring the money, it becomes a world reserve currency.

他们把钱带出去,钱一带出去,它就成了世界储备货币。

And in order to go out in the world they have to have a military to support that.

而要走出去闯世界,他们就得有军队来撑着。

And so these cycles go on.

这些周期就这样一轮接一轮地走下去。

And if you look at that, this is — the red line is China and the blue line is in the United States, in terms of the averages of these things, and it goes back to 1500.

你看这张图,红线是中国,蓝线是美国,画的是这些指标的平均值,一直回溯到 1500 年。

And one of the things you could see there is the Chinese have typically been number one or number two, although the world was a different size then — you know, those were all very far away places, we now have one sort of world.

你在里面能看到一点:中国通常是第一或第二,尽管那时候世界的尺度不一样——那时候那些地方都远得很,而现在世界差不多算是一个整体了。

So that's where — those are the economic principles.

以上就是那些经济层面的原理。

So I think we're late in the — relatively late, um, I would say the seventh inning of the business cycle.

我认为我们已经走到商业周期比较靠后的阶段,我会说是第七局。

There is a relatively tightening and monetary policy, we have less capacity, and we are — we have greater polarity, and we have um a situation in which we're going to have political issues.

货币政策相对在收紧,闲置产能更少了,政治对立更严重了,而且我们眼下的局面里注定会出政治问题。

And those political issues will be market issues, because as, as we start to think, will this be a movement to the right or a movement to the left, that will affect capital flows.

而这些政治问题就是市场问题,因为我们一开始琢磨这会是往右转还是往左转,资本流动就会受影响。

So these are my list of investment — the template that I look.

这些就是我列的投资原则——我看事情用的那套模板。

First, the theoretical — theoretical value equals the present value of future cash flows.

第一,理论价值等于未来现金流的现值。

In other words, every investment is a lump sum payment for a future cash flow.

换句话说,每一笔投资都是一次性付一笔钱,买下一串未来的现金流。

So when we think what is something worth, we look at those projected cash flows and we discount it with an interest rate; that's the theoretical value.

所以我们想某样东西值多少钱的时候,就去看它预测出来的现金流,再用一个利率贴现;这就是理论价值。

The actual value that it will trade at will equal the total amount of spending, if I calculate total amount of dollars spending on something divided by the quantity of goods sold.

而它实际成交的价值,等于总支出量,也就是我把花在某样东西上的美元总额,除以卖出去的商品数量。

So I'm always looking at who — how much is going to be spent, and what are the motivations of the spenders, and what are the — and how much of it is going to be quantity.

所以我一直在盯着:会花出去多少钱,花钱的人动机是什么,以及其中有多少会落在数量上。

I try to estimate what the total spending is divided by the quantity, to estimate the price.

我会拿总支出除以数量,由此估出价格。

Okay, number three is that asset classes will outperform cash over the long term.

好,第三条是,资产类别长期会跑赢现金。

I explained that it's required, otherwise the gears come — the economy comes to a halt.

我解释过这是必须的,否则齿轮就卡住了,经济就会停摆。

And that the outperformance of asset classes over cash, that beta, cannot be very positive for too long, because if it was, it would be easy — if it was positive you just buy — borrow cash and you buy the long things and you make a lot of money.

而资产类别跑赢现金的那部分,也就是那个 beta,不可能长时间都非常高,因为如果真是那样,钱就太好赚了——只要它是正的,你借现金去做多这些资产,就能赚很多钱。

It ha— comes with big bumps along the way.

而且这一路上会有很大的颠簸。

And that assets are priced to discount future expectations, most importantly inflation, growth, risk premiums and discount rates — and I'm going to get into that in a minute.

还有,资产的定价是在贴现对未来的预期,最重要的是通胀、增长、风险溢价和贴现率——这个我过一会儿会讲到。

And then, every investment is a return stream.

然后,每一笔投资都是一条回报流。

What I mean is, every day you can mark to the market, you know what it's like, and so the key is to be able to put together portfolios of return streams so that they balance well.

我的意思是,每天你都能按市值计价,随时知道它是什么表现,所以关键是能把回报流搭成投资组合,让它们彼此平衡得好。

As Hashem was saying, I would say whatever success that I've had in life, or that Bridgewater has had, has to do with knowing how to deal with our not knowing, more than anything we know.

就像 Hashem 刚才说的,我会说,我这辈子取得的成功,或者 Bridgewater 取得的成功,靠的是懂得怎么应对我们所不知道的东西,而不是靠我们知道的。

Because what you don't know is a lot, and if — and you can reduce your risk by a lot more than you could reduce your return by knowing how to diversify well.

因为你不知道的东西太多了;而只要懂得怎么把分散化做好,你能压下去的风险,远远多于你会牺牲掉的回报。

So, so diversification can reduce risk more than it reduces return, so it improves the return-to-risk ratios.

所以分散化降低风险的幅度大于它降低回报的幅度,回报风险比就提高了。

And then I say that there — I'm sorry if I'm getting technical — but there are two types of return streams: there is a beta return stream and an alpha return stream.

接下来我要说——讲得有点技术,抱歉——回报流有两种:一种是 beta 回报流,一种是 alpha 回报流。

And what I mean by a beta return stream is that there is an intrinsic reason that that asset class will behave in a certain way that you will know.

我说的 beta 回报流,是指有一个内在的原因,让那类资产以某种你事先就知道的方式表现。

In other words, if growth rises faster than discounted and interest rates don't rise much, you know that that stocks are going to go up; so there is environmental, so you can structure that.

换句话说,如果增长涨得比已经贴现进去的更快,而利率没怎么涨,你就知道股票会涨;这是环境决定的,你可以照着去搭结构。

Alpha is a zero-sum game; in other words, for me to produce alpha I have to be uh — outperform, I have to take money away from somebody else.

alpha 是零和游戏;换句话说,我要做出 alpha,就得跑赢别人,就得从别人那里把钱拿走。

It's a zero-sum game, like poker at a poker table.

这是零和游戏,就像牌桌上的扑克。

So, so they can be either alphas or betas, and the key to good investing is to create good portfolios of good return streams.

所以,它们要么是 alpha,要么是 beta,而投资做得好的关键,是用好的回报流搭出好的投资组合。

And then in order to balance these you have to risk-balance them.

然后,要让它们彼此平衡,你就得对它们做风险平衡。

In other words, if — somebody might think, if I put 50 of my dollars in stocks and 50 percent of my dollars in bonds, that I have my diversification — but not so, because the volatility of stocks is greater than the twi— is twice the volatility of bonds, and because of that you have to risk-balance them.

换句话说,有人可能觉得,我把 50% 的钱放进股票、50% 的钱放进债券,分散化就做到了——其实不是,因为股票的波动率是债券的两倍,正因为这样,你必须对它们做风险平衡。

And then the holy grail of investing is to find 15 or more good uncorrelated return streams — I'll get into that in a minute.

然后,投资的圣杯,是找到 15 条甚至更多条好的、彼此不相关的回报流——这个我过一会儿会讲。

And then, as Hashem mentioned, then systemizing decision rules is — is critical, and those rules should be timeless and universal.

再有,就像 Hashem 提到的,把决策规则系统化非常关键,而这些规则应该跨时代、跨国家都成立。

What I mean is, as I said, I write down the criteria — we write down the criteria for investing, and then we take those criteria and we test them through all periods of time and all countries: timeless and universal.

我的意思是,就像我说的,我们把投资的标准写下来,然后拿这些标准去所有时期、所有国家做检验:跨时代、跨国家都成立。

Because if something happened in one...

因为如果某件事发生在某一个……

...time and your process is not working in that, then it must be that you haven't explained the differences.

……时期,而你那套流程在那个时期不管用,那就一定是你没把其中的差异解释清楚。

And so by forcing ourselves to try to make those rules timeless and universal, it then becomes the, you know, the standard that we operate by.

所以,逼着自己把这些规则做到跨时代、跨国家都成立,它就成了我们做事所依据的标准。

So all the rules that we're operating them by are timeless and universal.

所以我们运作所依据的全部规则,都是跨时代、跨国家都成立的。

I'll just pass through some charts.

我就快速过几张图。

So this, going back to 1975, think of this as the rolling returns of asset classes, okay?

这张图回溯到 1975 年,你可以把它看成各类资产的滚动回报,好吗?

What you can see is that all of the asset classes there have some times that are good, sometimes that are bad; on average they're above zero, but they all have periods of down.

你能看到,图上每一类资产都有好的时候,也有差的时候;平均下来都在零以上,但都经历过下跌的阶段。

And inevitably what happens is that investors — most investors — love the asset classes that did well.

而结果几乎是必然的:投资者——大多数投资者——都偏爱那些表现好的资产类别。

The biggest mistakes of most investors is that they think that the investment that did well is a good investment, rather than it's a more expensive.

大多数投资者最大的错误,就是把表现好的投资当成好投资,而没看出它只是变得更贵了。

And so like, so here we — here's eq— whoops — you know, here's equities recently done well, here's commodities done very poorly, then here — but here's right, done very poorly in that period of time.

比如这里,股票最近表现很好;这里,大宗商品表现非常差;而这里,在那段时间里也表现得非常差。

So the key, as Hashem was saying, is balance — how to do that.

所以关键就像 Hashem 刚才说的,是平衡——怎么做到平衡。

So you can break the drivers of asset class returns into a few categories; this is true for any asset class and it's true for all asset classes.

你可以把驱动资产类别回报的因素拆成几类;这对任何一个资产类别都成立,对所有资产类别也都成立。

There are two main things that drive it, in terms of — that's inflation and growth.

驱动它的主要是两件事,就是通胀和增长。

And if basically, if you tell me that inflation's going to be higher than expected and growth be higher than expected, um, I would know what to invest in — higher than discounted — and if it's, you say it's lower, I'll know what to invest in, and most people here would.

基本上,如果你告诉我通胀会高于预期、增长也会高于预期——高于已经贴现进去的水平——我就知道该投什么;你要是说低于预期,我也知道该投什么,在座大多数人也都知道。

So those become the two main drivers; they can rise or that decline.

所以这两个就成了主要的驱动因素;它们可以上升,也可以下降。

And then there are discount rates and risk premiums.

然后还有贴现率和风险溢价。

Discount rates mean the — as I told you, the interest rate affects all asset classes, because the interest rate is the discount rate that you use to compare the cash flow.

贴现率的意思是,我前面讲过,利率会影响所有资产类别,因为利率就是你用来比较现金流的贴现率。

So you raise the interest rate and that's negative for all asset classes.

所以你把利率提上去,对所有资产类别都是负面的。

And then you have, when you strip all that risk premiums out, and that equals the following.

然后,把这些都剥离出去之后,剩下的就是风险溢价,也就是下面这些。

This shows what happened in history in relationship to that context.

这张图显示的是,在这个框架下历史上发生了什么。

The top chart shows a growth assets relative to uh strong, and assets that you hold if you had a falling growth environment, assets that you'd have a rising fault aggregate with inflation.

上面那张图显示的是增长类资产,包括增长下行时你会持有的资产,以及通胀上升时你会持有的资产。

Then it shows what the discount rate is, and then it shows what the risk premium, which was the residual of that.

接着显示贴现率是多少,再显示风险溢价是多少——风险溢价就是剔掉前面这些之后剩下的残差。

And that's what we have all-weather return — all-weather return, it all rather is our optimally diversified portfolio.

这就是我们的全天候回报——全天候回报,全天候就是我们最优分散化的组合。

Okay, uh, what I'm going to skip this chart — what it's meant to show basically is that how diversification can substantially improve your risk-to-return ratio.

这张图我跳过——它想说明的,基本上就是分散化能大幅改善你的回报风险比。

I want to turn uh to this chart.

我想转到这张图。

So this is what I believe the holy grail of investing is.

这就是我认为的投资圣杯。

If you can do this, you will make a fortune, you'll be very successful, and it's simple really — maybe not simple to pull off, but simple concept.

如果你能做到这一点,你会赚一大笔钱,会非常成功,而且道理其实很简单——做起来也许不简单,但概念很简单。

If you can get 10 good uncorrelated investments, five good uncorrelated investments, 15 good uncorrelated investments, you can substantially improve the return-to-risk ratio.

如果你能找到 10 项好的不相关投资,5 项好的不相关投资,15 项好的不相关投资,你就能大幅改善回报风险比。

And this just shows how it works, and why diversification is more important than being good, even in picking the best investments.

这张图就是说明它怎么起作用,以及为什么分散化比挑得准更重要,哪怕你真的很会挑最好的投资。

And most people think, give me the best investment and let me put all my money in what I think is the best investment — wrong.

大多数人想的是,给我最好的那个投资,让我把所有钱都押在我认为最好的那个上面——错。

The best — find your best 10 uncorrelated investments and put your money in that, and you're going to do a lot better.

正确的做法是,找出你最好的 10 项不相关投资,把钱放进去,你的结果会好得多。

And this just gives you an example.

我给你举个例子。

So this is the standard deviation, let's call it the risk, of 10 percent.

这是标准差,我们就叫它风险,是 10%。

And just imagine I put in an asset — I'll use a simple example — that has 10 percent return and standard deviation, uh, so let's say it's return 10, standard deviation.

想象我放进一个资产——我举个简单的例子——它的回报和标准差都是 10%,就说回报 10,标准差也是 10。

And let's say I put in a second investment that is six— sixty percent correlated with that, third, fourth, fifth and sixth and so on; this is how my risk in my portfolio would change.

再假设我放进第二项投资,它跟前一项的相关性是 60%,然后第三项、第四项、第五项、第六项,以此类推;我组合里的风险就会这样变化。

That means, like, if you have a diversified portfolio of stocks, average stock is about 60 correlated with average other stocks, and you can put in a hundred, you can put in a thousand, and you are not going to materially reduce your risk relative to putting in, you know, just five to ten.

也就是说,如果你持有一个分散化的股票组合,一只股票跟其他股票的平均相关性大约是 60%,你放进一百只、放进一千只,相对于只放五到十只,风险并不会实质性下降。

And you could see that that'll lower your risk 10 or 15 percent.

你可以看到,那只会把风险降低 10% 或 15%。

If you have an uncorrelated return stream — and you can get actually better than uncorrelated, because you could have negatively correlated, but let's say I put in an uncorrelated return stream — this is how the line goes.

如果你拿到的是一条不相关的回报流——其实还能比不相关更好,因为可以是负相关的,但就说我放进一条不相关的回报流——这条线是这样走的。

So you could see, like at five you've more than cut your risk in half — five uncorrelated return streams.

你能看到,到第 5 条的时候,风险已经砍掉了一半以上——5 条不相关的回报流。

If you have down to 15, you're going to reduce your risk by nearly 80 percent; that means you've improved your return-to-risk ratio by a factor of five.

如果一路做到 15 条,风险会降低将近 80%;这意味着你把回报风险比改善了 5 倍。

So you can reduce your risk a lot without reducing your return, and that is the key to it, right?

所以你可以在不降低回报的前提下大幅降低风险,这就是关键,对吧?

So when I look at this, I think that um there are two types of assets: what's your strategic asset allocation mix, what is your beta?

所以我看这张图时会想,资产分两类:你的战略资产配置组合是什么,你的 beta 是什么?

In other words, what portfolio do you normally have? And in my opinion it should be highly diversified, but with — along those lines, in terms of like half and growth, half inflation, rising or declining.

换句话说,你平常持有的是什么样的组合?在我看来它应该高度分散,但要按这个思路来,比如一半是增长,一半是通胀,上升或者下降。

And then alphas — you have to have a lot of different alphas, like in our case we have, you know, well over 100 different types of alphas, about 130 different kinds of markets actually, in terms of trading.

然后是 alpha——你得有很多种不同的 alpha,比如我们这边,不同类型的 alpha 远超过 100 种,交易上实际涉及大约 130 种不同的市场。

So that's it. Thank you for your patience — let's have a conversation about it.

就讲这些。谢谢各位的耐心——接下来我们一起聊聊吧。